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Abstract 
Necessity, Possibility and the Search for Counterexamples in Human Reasoning 
Sylvia Mary Parnell Serpell 
This thesis presents a series of experiments where endorsement rates, latencies and 
measures of cognitive ability were collected, to investigate the extent to which people 
search for counterexamples under necessity instructions, and alternative models under 
possibility instructions.  The research was motivated by a syllogistic reasoning study 
carried out by Evans, Handley, Harper, and Johnson-Laird (1999), and predictions were 
derived from mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).   
With regard to the endorsement rate data:  Experiment 1, using syllogisms, found no 
evidence to suggest that a search for counterexamples or alternative models took place.  In 
contrast experiment 2 (transitive inference) found some evidence to support the search for 
alternative models under possibility instructions, and following an improved training 
session, experiment 3 (transitive inference) produced strong evidence to suggest that 
people searched for other models; which was mediated by cognitive ability.   
There was also strong evidence from experiments 4, 5 and 6 (abstract and everyday 
conditionals) to support the search for counterexamples and alternative models. 
Furthermore it was also found that people were more likely to find alternative causes when 
there were many that could be retrieved from their everyday knowledge, and that people 
carried out a search for counterexamples with many alternative causes under necessity 
instructions, and across few and many causal groups under possibility instructions.  The 
evidence from the latency data was limited and inconsistent, although people with higher 
cognitive ability were generally quicker in completing the tasks. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to Human Reasoning 
 
It has been said that reasoning is fundamental to human intelligence (Evans, Newstead, 
& Byrne, 1993), and as such is central to science, society, and the solution of all 
practical problems.  However, despite a long history of reasoning research, there are 
still a number of unanswered theoretical and practical questions about the cognitive 
processes involved.  The aim of this thesis is to add to our knowledge, by exploring the 
way in which people consider possibilities when seeking to find a solution to a problem, 
which are based upon the knowledge and information available to them.   
The majority of studies in the large body of psychological reasoning research generated 
since the early 1900’s, have adopted deductive logic as a standard against which to 
explore these processes.  This dates back to the work of 19th century philosophers 
Boole (1854) and Mill (1843), who argued that the laws of logic are the laws of thought. 
The experimental programme of work reported in this thesis uses three deductive 
reasoning paradigms: syllogistic reasoning, transitive inference, and conditional 
inference, which are applied to a range of problem types and content (abstract and 
2 
 
everyday) to facilitate the collection of responses and response latencies.  A cognitive 
ability1 test was administered in all of the experiments, to gain a more sensitive 
measure of the relationship between general intelligence and deductive competence.  
This is primarily because past research has found reliable correlations between 
reasoning performance and cognitive ability (Evans et al., 1983; Newstead et al., 2004, 
Stanovich and West, 1998a; Torrens et al., 1999).  
The approach that has been taken is novel, as previous research studies have tended to 
focus on only one reasoning paradigm, with abstract or everyday content, and few have 
added a measure of ability.  This has therefore not allowed comparisons to be made 
across paradigms or content types, within a study.  Another way in which this research 
is different from all but a few of the studies reported to date (i.e. Evans, Handley, 
Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999), is that not only were participants asked to judge 
whether conclusions were necessary given some premises, but participants were also 
asked to judge whether conclusions were possible in the light of the given information.  
The differences between these two types of instruction will be discussed later in this 
chapter; but the first part is concerned with standard logical concepts of necessity, 
where a deductive inference is valid if its conclusion must be true, given that its 
premises are true.   
The main rationale and design of the experimental work is motivated by the mental 
model theory of deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
                                                             
1 Cognitive ability is defined by Sternberg and Salter (1982) as goal directed adaptive behaviour; 
and the ability to deal with cognitive complexity (Gottfredson, 1997).   
3 
 
1991), which supposes that people reason deductively by constructing and 
manipulating internal representations (mental models) of the information available.  
Research has shown (i.e. Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) that those tasks requiring the 
manipulation of multiple models prove more difficult to participants than tasks with 
only one model, reflecting higher error rates and longer latencies.  Initially, this chapter 
will introduce the main deductive reasoning paradigms and findings in the literature, 
which relate specifically to the experiments presented in the thesis.  This will be 
followed by a review of the most significant general theories of deductive reasoning, 
which have attempted to explain reasoning processes; with reference to reasoning 
paradigms where appropriate.   
The list of deductive reasoning paradigms and theories is exhaustive, but in the main 
serves to provide a balanced account of reasoning across domains, in support of the 
experimental program presented herein2.   
Deductive reasoning 
Deduction is a process of thought whereby people start with information such as 
perceptual observations, memories, statements, beliefs or imagined states of affair, to 
arrive at a novel conclusion that follows from the given information.  In other words, 
the conclusion is not wholly explicit in the premises, but can be deduced from the 
content of the preceding statements.   
                                                             
2  A comprehensive review of both theories and paradigms can be found in more general texts 
such as (Evans et al., 1993), together with specific texts such as Rips (1994) and Johnson-Laird 
(1983). 
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Reasoning paradigms and tasks have changed little since the early days of reasoning 
research, in that individuals are given deductive premises, to which they are required 
to generate a response, evaluate a given conclusion, or select a response from a number 
of possible ones made available.  Generally past research has been organized around 
three main questions which look at either; the competency of untrained reasoners in 
deduction tasks, the kinds of systematic biases influencing their inferences, and the 
extent to which responses influenced by content and context.  One of the most 
frequently used paradigms, which has generated a large body of published research, is 
syllogistic reasoning. 
Syllogistic reasoning  
Syllogisms of the type first devised by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 BC – 322 
BC) as a tool for teaching logic, are deductive arguments consisting of two premises 
followed by a conclusion. The premises are made up of 3 terms, A, B and C, which are 
defined by one of four quantifiers all, none, some, or some …. not; the first premise links 
terms A and B, the second premise links terms B and C, and the middle term (B) is 
common to both premises.  The conclusion links terms A and C, and content varies 
depending on the requirements of the research study but is generally abstract, 
thematic, or content which depends on people’s everyday knowledge of the world (see 
examples below and on the next page).   
Abstract content: Some of the A’s are B’s 
None of the B’s are C’s 
Therefore:  Some of the A’s are not C’s 
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Thematic content: All of the Actors are Beekeepers 
   All of the Beekeepers are Chemists 
Therefore:  All of the Actors are Chemists 
Everyday content: Some police dogs are vicious 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious 
Therefore:   Some highly trained dogs are not police dogs 
There are four possible arrangements of these premise terms, which are traditionally 
referred to as figures, and although the arrangement  varies depending upon the 
source, this thesis will follow the convention of  Johnson-Laird (1983) by describing the 
four figures of premise arrangements as shown in table 1.1.  
As there are four figures, and the premises and conclusion each contain one of four 
different quantifiers, there are a total of 256 syllogisms; which when extended to 
include conclusions in the form A - C and C - A,  provide a total of 512 possible 
combinations.  
Table 1.1 
The four Syllogistic Figures (Johnson-Laird, 1983)  
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
A - B B - A A - B B - A 
B - C C - B C - B B - C 
 
Furthermore, each of the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism is described by 
four quantifier moods, which are referred to by the terms A (all), E (no/none), I (some) 
or O (some …. not); thus, a syllogism containing the quantifier no in the first premise, all 
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in the second premise, and no in the conclusion, is described as mood EAE.  The 
quantifiers all and no are universal in that they encompass all members of a group, and 
the quantifiers some and some .… not are particular because they encompass specific 
members of a group (see table 1.2). 
Table 1.2 
Mood term, together with quantifier and description 
Mood term Quantifier Description 
A All Universal affirmative 
E No Universal negative 
I Some Particular affirmative 
O Some …. not Particular negative 
 
The logical validity of a syllogism is determined by the mood and the figure, but only 27 
out of a possible 256 syllogisms (or 512 if the order of the major and minor premises is 
changed) yield logically valid conclusions.  To illustrate this, below is an example of a 
valid syllogism, which combines the structure of figure 3 with an A - C conclusion, in the 
mood OAO: 
Some of the A’s are not B’s 
All of the C’s are B’s 
Therefore: Some of the A’s are not C’s 
However, when the conclusion is changed to mood I, the problem becomes invalid, 
because although it can be deduced from the premises that some of the A’s are not C’s, 
the premises do not imply that some of the A’s are C’s (see next page). 
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Some of the A’s are not B’s 
All of the C’s are B’s 
Therefore:  Some of the A’s are C’s 
A number of syllogistic reasoning behaviours and effects have been consistently 
observed and reported in the literature, which fall broadly into two categories; 
response generation effects such as the atmosphere effect, figural effect, and matching 
theory; and linguistic explanations such as conversion theory and conversational 
implicature.  These are discussed below; although given the long history of syllogistic 
reasoning research that has been carried out, this list is not exhaustive.     
Response generation effects   
Probably the earliest reported heuristic explanation is the Atmosphere effect (Begg & 
Denny, 1969; Woodworth & Sells, 1935), which suggests that reasoners are influenced 
by the ‘atmosphere’ created by the mood (A, E, I or O) of the premises, so:  
When presented with at least one negative premise, no (E) or some .… not 
(O) a negative atmosphere is created, and participants are inclined to 
select a negative conclusion 
When one or more of the premises is particular, some (I) or some …. not 
(O) then the preferred conclusion is particular 
If neither of the above is present then an affirmative universal all (A) 
conclusion is chosen  
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For example:   
Some of the A’s are B’s 
Some of the B’s are C’s 
Given that both premises are positive and particular, the theory predicts a strong 
preference for a particular conclusion, despite it being an invalid problem: 
Some of the A’s are C’s 
Although the atmosphere effect seems to account for up to 90% of responses (Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984), the theory only describes patterns of performance, does not allow 
for differences in difficulty between problems (Evans et al., 1993), and fails to explain 
why some participants produce a ‘no valid conclusion’ response.   
Matching theory, another heuristic effect that has been found in studies of syllogistic 
reasoning (Wetherick, 1989; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990), is based on the notion that 
when the logic of a problem is not immediately apparent, reasoners choose conclusions 
where the quantifier is the same as one of those used in the premises.  So, where there 
is a choice, a preference is shown for the more conservative one3, or in other words 
where the quantifier commits the speaker to the smallest possible number of positive 
instances, E  >  I  =  O  >  >  A, for instance:   
Some of the A’s are B’s 
All of the B’s are C’s 
                                                             
3 The forms are ordered for conservatism from most to least: no, some, some .… not, and all; with 
some and some .… not being equal. 
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According to the rule, participants tend to select the conclusion some of the A’s are C’s, 
because this uses the more conservative of the two quantifiers some (I) and All (A); but 
if both premises contain the quantifier all (A) then the conclusion all (A) is chosen.  
Generally, matching theory makes similar predictions to that of the atmosphere effect, 
but differ with the premise pairs, IE and OE, where the atmosphere effects predicts an 
O conclusion, while the matching effect predicts an E conclusion.  However inspection 
of data collected by Dickstein (1978) reveals that the atmosphere of a syllogism 
correctly predicts the response to the premises pairs 29% of the time, whereas 
matching theory makes the correct prediction 17% of the time.   
Other predictions that can be made from the theory are, when one of the premises 
contains some and the other some …. not, the preferred response should be some.  
However this was found not to be the case by Evans et al. (1993); and Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne (1989) found that participants rarely preferred conclusions containing only, 
even when the both premises used the quantifier referred to.  It would therefore 
appear that there is little to choose between the earlier findings of the atmosphere 
effect and the more recent matching effect. 
The figural effect, which is another of the earlier effects reported in the literature, 
suggests that the figure of a syllogism influences both accuracy and directionality 
preferences.  Studies using conclusion production tasks (i.e. Johnson-Laird & Bara, 
1984) and more recently Stupple and Ball (2007) have shown that A - B, B - C problems 
yield more correct responses than B - A, C - B problems.  Also, directional bias on 
conclusion production tasks tend to show a preference for A - C conclusions when 
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presented with terms in the order of A - B, B - C, and C - A conclusions when presented 
with terms in B - A, C - B order.  Notwithstanding this, other studies (Evans, Handley, & 
Harper, 2001; Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004), failed to replicate these effects, or at 
best found weak associations between figure and endorsement rates.   
Linguistic theories 
The first of the three theories with a linguistic basis is conversion theory (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1959).  As one of the earlier theories in the history of syllogistic reasoning, 
conversion theory claims that people treat the quantifiers all and some …. not as though 
they imply their converses, for example, All of the A’s are B’s implies that All of the B’s 
are A’s.  This fallacious inference can perhaps be best illustrated by a statement using 
realistic content:  All cats (A) are animals (C), does not mean All animals (C) are cats (A).  
Support for the conversion theory is consistent across studies (i.e. Dickstein, 1978; 
Revlis, 1975), although results for the also irreversible problem Some …. not are less 
convincing, and the theory does not extend to Some and No statements, because Some 
of the A’s are B;s can also be correctly interpreted as Some of the B’s are A’s, and None of 
the A’s are B’s can also be correctly interpreted as None of the B’s are A’s. 
The second linguistically based explanation of syllogistic reasoning, is conversational 
implicature, which is rooted in the Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1975), and states that 
speakers should be as informative as possible and not deliberately withhold 
information they know to be true.  Therefore if the speaker means all, then they should 
say all, rather than some.  There is a wealth of early reasoning research producing 
evidence to suggest that some is frequently interpreted as some but not all, rather than 
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the logical interpretation of some, and possibly all (Begg & Denny, 1982; Newstead & 
Griggs, 1983; Newstead, Pollard, & Riezebos, 1987).  Later studies of syllogistic 
reasoning however (i.e. Newstead, 1995), report that the effects diminish as the logical 
demands of the task increase. 
More recently, Schmidt and Thompson (2008) looked at whether pragmatic responses 
explain some of the errors in syllogistic reasoning, regardless of the logical demands; 
by replacing the standard particular premises some and some … not with at least one 
and at least one … not.  Schmidt and Thompson (2008) found that reasoning 
performance was significantly improved, which raises interesting questions as to 
whether standard quantifiers should be clarified in reasoning tasks, and also suggests 
that Gricean implicature does impact on performance.  While discussion of this is 
beyond the scope of the thesis, it is worthy of further investigation at a later date. 
The review of effects and behaviours reported in studies of syllogistic reasoning was 
perhaps made simpler because it is a relatively small field compared to transitive 
inference and conditional inference.  The next section will review some of the transitive 
inference literature, while at the same time remaining focussed on the topics which are 
most relevant to this thesis.   
Transitive Inference 
Transitive inferences are made by all individuals on a daily basis, when required to 
decide between three or more entities based on their relative attributes; for example, if 
textbook A is easier to understand than textbook B, which is in turn is clearer than 
textbook C, then a student may consider that textbook A is probably the best book to 
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purchase.  However, it is important to differentiate between these and intransitive 
relationships which cannot be arranged on a linear scale, such as: 
James is the father of Harry 
Harry is the father of Charlie 
As well as transitive and intransitive relationships there are also atransitive 
relationships, when nothing can be deduced from the premises.  Consider the example 
shown below, when it is unclear whether James, Harry and Charlie are standing in a 
triangle or in a row:  
 James is next to Harry 
Harry is next to Charlie 
Within the transitive inference paradigm, negations (not as long as), inverse negations 
(not as short as) and inverse relational adjectives (shorter than) increase the number 
of possible combinations, and the speed and ease with which individuals make 
inferences depends largely on the combination that is presented.  Using length as a 
property, the terms ABC might be expressed as: 
A is longer than B    or as   B is not as long as A 
C is shorter than B    B is longer than C 
Typically, transitive inference studies use either 3-term series problems (sometimes 
referred to as linear syllogisms), which as the name suggests, are constructed from 3 
terms, ABC, which can be arranged in a linear sequence according to their relative 
properties.  A number of studies have used 5-term series problems (e.g. Capon, 
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Handley, & Dennis, 2003; Vandierendonck, Doerckx, & Vooght, 2004), although these 
tend to be studies designed specifically to investigate working memory, or to test how 
well people understand spatial descriptions, when the use of 3-term series problems on 
their own is too simple a task.   
Research has reliably shown that performance is affected by the number of arguments 
in a problem, in line with the Theory of Relational Complexity (Andrews & Halford, 
1994, 2002); which argues that the number of interacting variables determines the 
difficulty in correctly resolving the relationship between entities.  Goodwin and 
Johnson-Laird (2005) also found that complexity affects the ease by which an 
integrated representation of the premises is formed, for instance A > B, C > D, D > A is 
difficult because of the need to hold the first two premises (A > B, C > D) in mind, to 
integrate them with the third premise.  The merits of 5-term series problems are 
discussed in more general texts (e.g. Evans et al., 1993), but for the purpose of this 
thesis, we will concentrate on 3-term series problems, which are more suited to the 
aims of the study, both in terms of difficulty and problem complexity 
When considering the terms in 3-term series problems, typical tasks contains either 
abstract terms (A, B and C) or thematic terms (the jug is to the right of the glass),  and 
task requirements are similar to studies of syllogistic reasoning, in that participants are 
required to either produce a conclusion, or evaluate a given conclusion about the 
relationship between the terms.   Although in deductive reasoning studies it has been 
found that most people provide the correct answers to simple problems, with correct 
responses ranging from 81% to 92% (Huttenlocher, 1968) the time taken to reach 
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these conclusions varies between problems, which suggests variations in difficulty.  For 
instance, take the two 3-term series shown below; the first of these has emerged as 
being one of the easiest problems, and the second has emerged as being one of the 
more difficult: 
1. B is better than C   2.    C is worse than B  
A is better than B           B is worse than A 
The two main theories specific to transitive inference, are spatial array theories and the 
belief that deductive reasoning ability on materials with transitive properties is based 
on the linguistic representation of the premises. The theories are contrasting, in that 
they do not lead to similar predictions about the relative difficulty of the problems. 
Spatial array theory 
The view put forward by spatial array theorists (De Soto, London, & Handel, 1965; 
Huttenlocher, 1968) is that reasoners represent the terms as a visual image, and ‘read 
off’ the answer by inspecting that image.  Take for instance the transitive terms: Ann is 
taller than Beth, Cath is shorter than Beth.  Spatial array theorists would suggest that 
individuals visualize Ann, Beth and Cath in a spatial array, to reach the correct 
conclusion that Ann is taller than Cath:    
                                                              
                                      Ann                      Beth                  Cath 
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Furthermore, evidence has been found (Clement & Falmagne, 1986; Shaver, Pieron, & 
Lang, 1975) to suggest that the responses are mediated by the ease in which the given 
materials can be visualized internally; therefore returning to the above examples, 
visualizing Ann as taller than Beth, might be easier than visualizing Ann as better than 
Beth. 
Evans et al. (1993) suggest that spatial array theory may be an early precursor to 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991), which 
proposes that people make inferences by constructing and revising mental models of 
the premises under consideration.  This is a view that is also shared by Knauff, Rauh, 
Schlieder, & Strube (1998), and is discussed in chapter 3. 
Linguistic representation of the premises 
On the other hand, those who support a more linguistic explanation for the 
interpretation of the premises, such as Clark (1969), suggest that reasoners represent 
the relational meaning of the premises.  Therefore rather than integrating the two 
premises, reasoners represent them by a set of linguistic propositions relating to the 
underlying meaning of the premise.  So, with the premise Ann is better than Beth, 
reasoners construct a linguistic representation, based on a dimension of goodness: 
Ann is more good; Beth is less good 
Alternatively, with Beth is worse than Ann, the representation is based in a dimension 
of badness: 
Beth is more bad; Ann is less bad 
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The differences in difficulty according to the predictions of this theory, are mediated 
not by how well the materials can be visualized, but by whether or not there are 
negated propositions; when increased difficulty in constructing negated propositions 
results in longer response times. 
More recently, a number of researchers (Knauff, 1999; Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002; 
Rauh, Hagen, Schlieder, Strube, & Knauff, 2000) have questioned the materials 
traditionally used in studies of transitivity, such as left of, right of, in front of, and 
behind, suggesting that they have no clear semantics.  This poses the question as to 
whether the results reported in the literature can be attributed to the inference 
processes, or whether the ambiguity of the relations also plays a role.    Further 
reference and more detailed discussion takes place in chapter 3, where the 
development of the experimental materials was heavily influenced by these concerns.   
Conditional Inference 
The third and final paradigm used in this thesis is that of conditional inference, which is 
based on if-then statements.  Conditional inference, which has made a major 
contribution to our understanding of the processes underlying deduction, is studied in 
three main ways.  The first of these, and the one that was used in the preparation of this 
thesis, is when people evaluate or generate conclusions relating to four basic 
conditional inferences (shown in table 1.3), namely Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, 
Denial of the Antecedent and Affirmation of the Consequent.  The second involves the 
study of how people understand truth tables: a truth table is based on a mathematical 
table used in logic to express the truth status of logical connectives as a function of 
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truth value assigned to its component propositions.  The third is the selection task 
developed by Wason (1966) where participants are shown a set of cards on which 
there is either a letter or a number.  Following this they are given a conditional rule, 
and asked to decide which of the four cards would need to be turned over in order to 
decide whether the rule is true or false4.  The following discussion will focus on studies 
using the four basic conditional inferences mentioned above.  
Over the past decade, the majority of deductive reasoning studies using the conditional 
inference paradigm, have asked participants to make an inference on the basis of the 
major premise, if p then q, and the minor premise q.  The first term of the major 
premise (p) is known as the antecedent and the second term (q) is known as the 
consequent.  The four basic inferences that can be made from a major conditional 
premise are shown in table 1.3.   
Table 1.3 
The four basic conditional inferences of the form if p then q 
Inference 
Major 
Premise 
Minor 
premise 
Conclusion 
MP:  Modus Ponens  if p then q p q 
MT:  Modus Tollens  if p then q not q not p 
DA:  Denial of the antecedent  if p then q not p not q 
AC:  Affirmation of the consequent  if p then q q p 
 
In formal logic, MP and MT inferences lead to logically certain conclusions; and the AC 
and DA forms are logically uncertain or invalid.  The number of possible premise 
                                                             
4 See more general texts (Evans et al., 1993; Manktelow, 1999) for discussion of truth table tasks 
and the Wason selection task.  
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arrangements can be increased by negating either the antecedent or consequent, or 
both: if p then not q, if not p then q, and if not p then not q (see table 1.4). 
Table 1.4 
Conditional inferences with basic and negated major premises  
  MP  MT  AC  DA 
  Given Conclude  Given Conclude  Given Conclude  Given Conclude 
If  p, q   p     q   not q     not p   q     p   not p     not q 
If p, not q*   p     not q   q     not p   not q     p   not p     q 
If not p, q*   not p     q   not q     p   q     not p   p     not q 
If not p, not q*   not p     not q   q     p   not q     not p   p     q 
*conditionals with negated major premises 
Although earlier studies within this paradigm tended to focus on conditional inferences 
with abstract content, there is growing emphasis in more recent literature to use 
materials with a more everyday or realistic content, which will be discussed in the 
following two sections.     
Conditional inference with abstract content 
Studies which use abstract content, or content where no everyday knowledge can be 
accessed in order to interpret the premises, tend to be similar to the MP inferences 
shown in the following examples:  
If the letter is a p then the number is a 2 
The letter is a p 
Therefore: The number is a 2 
If Mary is in Paris then Julia is in London 
Mary is in Paris 
Therefore: Julia is in London 
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Typically, studies with these types of content, present people with conditional 
statements in each of the four argument types (MP, MP, AC and DA), using basic 
premises, or all four forms of the major premise.  Performance is generally good on the 
logically valid MP problems, with some studies reporting 100% correct response rates 
(Rumain, Connell, & Braine, 1983; Wildman & Fletcher, 1977).  On the other hand, 
correct response rates have been found to be lower for MT problems (also logically 
valid), ranging from 41% to 81% (Evans et al., 1993).  The two fallacies, AC and DA are 
also quite often endorsed as valid arguments, although there has been found to be more 
variability, between studies not only in terms of results (endorsements ranging from 
21% to 75%), but in methodology, making it less easy to draw clear conclusions from 
the data (Evans et al., 1993).   
Conditional inference with everyday content 
While conditional reasoning studies with abstract or context free content might help 
researchers to understand logical competence; over the past decade the impact of 
background knowledge and prior knowledge on reasoning processes has become 
dominant in the literature (Byrne, 1989; Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & 
Rist, 1991; Handley & Evans, 2000; Thompson, 1994).  One of the key findings is that it 
is possible to measure the willingness of a participant to fallaciously endorse a 
conditional inference problem, by explicitly introducing additional information or 
changing the content of the inference.  This has become known as the suppression effect 
(Rumain et al., 1983), and is particularly relevant to this thesis in terms of the selection 
of materials for experiment 5. 
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The suppression effect therefore occurs when logically valid inferences are suppressed 
by the content or context of the premises, resulting in reasoning behaviours based on 
the content or context rather than the logical structure.  This often leads to better 
reasoning on AC and DA inferences.  Byrne (1989) found that instead of just saying if 
she meets her friend (p), then she will go to a play (q), but giving additional information 
such as if she has enough money, fewer AC (she will go to play, therefore she meets her 
friend) and DA (she does not meet her friend, therefore she will not go to a play) 
endorsements were made.  Furthermore, Byrne (1989) also found that when explicitly 
presenting other reasons why it might not be possible to go to the play, there was an 
increased rejection of MP (she meets her friend, therefore she will go to a play) and MT 
(she will not go to a play, therefore she did not meet her friend) inferences.  For 
example, if she meets her friend, then she will go to a play followed by the additional 
information of if the theatre is open.   
The range of literature relating to psychological research on conditional reasoning is 
vast (see for instance Evans et al., 1993; Evans & Over, 2004; Manktelow, 1999), much 
of which is not pertinent to this thesis; but relevant findings will be discussed in the 
introductory sections for experiments 4, 5 and 6, all of which are rooted in making 
conditional inferences.   
General theories of deductive reasoning 
There are a number of general theories which have been developed to explain 
deductive reasoning, and until recently the two major and opposing schools of thought 
were the theory that reasoning depends either on the manipulation of mental models, 
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or on logical rules.  Although a great proportion of reasoning research tends to fall into 
one or other of these theoretical accounts, with model theories arguably gathering the 
most support amongst researchers; there are other theories which warrant discussion.  
Therefore as well as the mental model theory and rule based theories; the Verbal 
Reasoning Hypothesis (Polk & Newell, 1995), the Probability Heuristics Model 
developed by Chater and Oaksford (1999), and various dual processing theories 
incorporating hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2003, 2004; Kahneman, 2003; 
Sloman, 1996) will also be considered. 
Mental Model Theory of Deduction 
The mental model theory of deduction (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991) proposes a semantic approach to deduction, whereby reasoners construct and 
manipulate mental models representing the possible state of affairs consistent with the 
premises.  One of the main tenets of the theory is that deductive competence is 
achieved by individuals having the ability and/or the desire to search for 
counterexamples.  These processes can be conceptualized in three stages:   
Comprehension and model formation:  Reasoners combine their general 
knowledge and knowledge of language to understand the premises, and 
then construct an internal model from the state of affairs described. 
Conclusion formation:  Reasoners try to form a parsimonious conclusion 
by fleshing out the model they have constructed.  This conclusion should 
assert something that is not explicitly stated in the premises.  When no 
such assertion is found, the conclusion is deemed be invalid.   
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Conclusion validation:  Reasoners search for alternative models 
(counterexamples) of the premises in which their putative conclusion is 
false.  If no such model is found, then the conclusion is valid.   
Although the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) 
was originally devised as an account of syllogistic reasoning, and has been widely used 
in this paradigm (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Newstead, Handley, & Buck, 1999; 
Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992); it has since been adapted to account for 
performance patterns in other paradigms, such as conditional inference and transitive 
inference, and these will be clarified in the appropriate chapters of the thesis.  The main 
principles of the theory are illustrated using the syllogistic reasoning paradigm.   
Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) argue that the difficulty of a syllogism is dependent 
upon the number of models it is necessary to construct when attempting to validate or 
produce a conclusion.  Out of the 27 valid syllogisms, 10 are single model problems, in 
as much as the conclusion can be drawn from one initial model with no fleshing5 out 
required, and the remaining 17 syllogisms are multi-model, because there are two or 
three possible models of the premises which need to be considered (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991).  The notational system developed by Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) is 
most frequently used to illustrate each stage of the reasoning process, and is used 
below to define the reasoning process of a three model syllogism: 
All of the Beekeepers are Athletes 
None of the Beekeepers are Chemists 
                                                             
5 Constructing more models. 
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These premises initially elicit the following model, where the square brackets indicate 
that a token is exhaustively represented in the set of models, and the ellipsis ‘….‘ 
indicates that there are alternative models of the premises that are not initially 
represented.  Each line represents a hypothetical individual possessing the 
characteristics indicated by the token: 
[a [b]]  
[a [b]]  
  [c] 
  [c] 
….   
 
This initial model supports the putative conclusion; None of the Chemists are Athletes, 
and as such has been found to be one of the most common errors with this problem 
type. 
In order to conclude that the conclusion is not necessitated by the premises, the model 
shown on the following page refutes the initial conclusion, and the two models together 
support the conclusion Some of the Chemists are not Athletes: 
[a [b]]  
[a [b]]  
 a  [c] 
  [c] 
….   
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Model three is a counterexample to the second model, which suggests the conclusion, 
Some of the Athletes are not Chemists: 
[a [b]]  
[a [b]]  
a  [c] 
a  [c] 
….   
 
It is these three models that collectively support the valid inference, and the conclusion 
can only be drawn with certainty after constructing the full set of models of the 
premises, as shown above.  The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991) proposes that these models are produced in a specific order 
determined by the way in which the models of individual quantified assertions are 
combined (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999).  This multi-model problem that has 
been used as an example is one of the hardest syllogisms, which is perhaps not 
surprising given the number of stages involved.  The role of counterexample search to 
enable validation, is the third stage of the mental model theory, and is more fully 
discussed later in this chapter.  
Mental Logic Theories 
Formal logic proposes that a deductive argument is correct only if the conclusion is true 
in all states of affairs in which the premises are true, and probably the best developed 
mental logic theories to explain the process are those of Rips (1994) and Braine and 
O’Brien (1998).  These theories assume that reasoning is carried out by applying rules 
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of inference stored in a mental logic.  Problem difficulty is accounted for in terms of the 
number of rules that must be applied, and problems that require long ‘proofs’, are 
predicted to be more difficult than those requiring shorter ‘proofs’.  Accordingly, people 
reason by abstracting the underlying logical structure of an argument and then 
applying the inference rules.  Mental logic theories propose separate rules for dealing 
with every connective or quantifier, and a formal proof is a finite sequence of 
propositions in which each sentence is either a premise, an axiom of the logical system, 
or a sentence which follows on from a preceding sentence by one of the system rules.   
This can be illustrated by one such commonly used rule, the conditional inference 
modus ponens:  according to the principle of mental logic, the proposition if p then q, 
and the proposition p, entails the proposition q.  The following example is taken from 
Rips (1994):  
If Steve deposits 50 pence, Steve will get a coke 
Steve deposits 50 pence 
Steve will get a coke 
However, not all inferences are as simple, and the process for modus tollens requires a 
supposition that is more prone to errors, and requires reasoners to disprove a 
proposition by showing that it leads to an untenable conclusion.  So, for instance given 
the same if p then q, and then not q; reasoners suppose p, infer q, conjoin q and not q, 
before concluding not p.  Therefore, with reference to a similar example to the one 
above, if it is found that Steve did not get his coke, the assumption can be made that 
Steve did not deposit his 50 pence.  A full set of inference rules based on classical logic 
can be found in Rips (1994).   
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When considering how to apply the rules of mental logic to syllogistic reasoning, which 
include quantifiers such as All and Some, it can again be illustrated by an example from 
Rips, (1994, p. 5): 
All square blocks are green blocks 
Some big blocks are square blocks 
Some big blocks are green blocks 
 To determine whether the conclusion to the above problem is correct, a reasoner 
might take an arbitrary big square block and call it ‘b’.  Block ‘b’ must be green since ‘b’ 
is square and all square blocks are green.  Hence, some big blocks (b, for instance) are 
green, as stated in the conclusion.  The proof proceeds by considering an arbitrary 
example of the premises, tests whether this examples guarantees properties mentioned 
in the conclusion, and generalises it to the entire conclusion.  Again, a full set of 
inference rules based on classical logic can be found in Rips (1994, p. 52).   
In summary, mental logic theories propose that people reason by applying inference 
rules to the logical structure of the argument, the focus being the interpretation of the 
premises using linguistic and pragmatic influences.  The deduction process is based 
upon two cognitive skills: the ability to make suppositions or assumptions and the 
ability to formulate sub-goals within working memory before linking these to reach a 
conclusion.  A more thorough and unbiased explanation of rule based theories can be 
found in broader texts (i.e. Evans et al., 1993).  The next general theory of deductive 
reasoning to be reviewed is the Verbal Reasoning Hypothesis (VRH) which includes 
both representational and rule-based processes. 
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Verbal Reasoning Hypothesis  
The VRH (Polk & Newell, 1995) which centres on the role of coding and encoding, 
proposes that the linguistic ability of people is deployed adaptively to deductive 
reasoning tasks, and reasoning processes must occur in a way which reflects the needs 
of deduction, rather than those of everyday communication.  The reasoning process 
involves repeatedly re-encoding the problem until a conclusion is formed, based on a 
detailed computational model where the initial stage is to construct a mental model of a 
situation in which the premise in question is true (see Polk and Newell, 1995 for a 
detailed explanation).  Polk and Newell (1995) present a model of reasoning, when the 
initial stage is to construct a mental model of a situation in which the premise in 
question is true.  The objects represented in this model are annotated by two additional 
pieces of information; a not flag that the object does not have a specific property, and 
an identifying flag indicating that the object is identified by a specific property.   
As was the case with the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991) the VRH (Polk & Newell, 1995) was first developed within the paradigm 
of syllogistic reasoning.  Table 1.5 shows the default encodings for each of the four 
standard syllogistic quantifier premises, and how these may be changed or augmented 
when information from a second premise is introduced.  The identifying properties 
correspond to the grammatical subject of the premises and are distinguished from 
other lesser properties by being more readily available; for instance given All A are B, 
the model distinguishes an A (identifying) who is a B; from a B (identifying) who is an A.  
There are often several ways in which premises can be represented; an annotated 
model may contain information that is not inherent in the original premise, or fail to 
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encode information which is inherent.  For example given Some of the A’s are B’s, the 
model may contain unnecessary information if it also encodes the notion that Some of 
the A’s are not B’s.     
When the encoding process has taken place, the reasoning process produces a 
conclusion based on the annotated model, and conclusion of the form All of the A’s are 
B’s or None of the A’s are B’s, will be proposed when there is an object with an A as an 
identifying property, and all objects with the property A also possess the property B or 
not B.  Conclusions of the form Some A are B or Some A are not B will be proposed when 
there is an object A as the identifying property and at least one other object with the 
properties A and B/not B.   
Table 1.5 
Default encodings for the four syllogistic quantifiers 
Premise Initial model Augmented model 
All of the A’s are B (A’ B) All (A …)        (A’ … B) 
Some of the A’s are B 
(A’ B) 
(A’) 
MR (A …)        (A’ … B) 
                                   (A’ ) 
None of the  A’s are B (A’ not Y) All (A …)       (A’… not B) 
Some of the A’s are not B’s 
(A’ not Y) 
(A’) 
MR (A …)           (A’ … not B) 
                                 (A’ …) 
’ identifying property flag 
not  =  not flag 
… other properties 
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Although the theory, as has already been mentioned, was initially developed within the 
syllogistic reasoning paradigm, Polk and Newell (1995) ran a number of studies, which 
produced evidence to show that their computational model provides a good 
explanation of behaviour on a variety of deductive reasoning tasks.  Furthermore it 
accounts for all of the major phenomena found in deductive reasoning such as the 
atmosphere effect and figural bias in syllogistic reasoning, together with no valid 
conclusion responses across problem types.  This is fully discussed in a much cited 
paper (Polk & Newell, 1995); but the general assertion of the VRH is that behaviour can 
be explained in terms of standard linguistic processes, without the need to posit 
reasoning-specific mechanisms. 
Dual process theories (including hypothetical thinking theory) 
It is thought that dual process theory dates back as far as the American psychologist 
and philosopher, William James (1842-1920), who believed that there were two 
different kinds of thinking: associative thinking and true reasoning.  This belief was 
based on the view that associative thinking is used for creative things like art, where 
things are created from past experience, while true reasoning is used for navigating 
obstacles that have not previously been experienced.   
Within the psychology of reasoning over the past two decades, several researchers 
have revisited dual process theory (i.e. Evans, 2008; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999)6.    While there is some variation in 
                                                             
6 See Evans (2008) for a comprehensive discussion and review of the literature relating to dual 
process theory. 
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these accounts of dual process theory, they all share a number of general 
characteristics in that on the one hand there are the fast, automatic and unconscious 
cognitive processes of system 1, while the system 2 processes are slow deliberative and 
conscious.  In terms of the two different kind of thinking proposed by James (1842-
1920), system 1 is akin to associative thinking, and system 2 is analogous to true 
reasoning.  The general characteristics7 are set out in table 1.6:   
   Table 1.6 
Dual Process Theory typical characteristics relating to deductive reasoning 
 System 1: Implicit System 2: Explicit 
Unconscious Conscious 
Automatic Controllable 
Independent of language Related to language 
Pragmatic/contextualized Logical/abstract 
High processing capacity, parallel Constrained by working memory, sequential 
Driven by learning/innate modules Permits hypothetical thinking 
Independent of general intelligence Correlated with general intelligence 
 
Although different proponents of dual process theory have proposed names for these 
two kinds of thinking, Evans (1989) refers to these systems as heuristic and analytic 
processes, where heuristic processes (system 1) are pragmatic and preconscious, 
which act to form selective mental representations of reasoning problems.  This is 
carried out by representing problem features and applying relevant prior knowledge 
which is retrieved from long term memory.  On the other hand analytic thought (system 
2) is involved in abstract hypothetical thinking and logical reasoning, before 
                                                             
7   See Evans, 2008 for a comprehensive discussion and review of the literature relating to dual 
process theory. 
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subsequently being applied to the selective representations.  Dual process theories 
tend to portray heuristic and analytic elements as competing, thus explaining cognitive 
biases in terms of faulty heuristic processing.  This is perhaps best explained by taking 
an example from the belief bias paradigm, which is where there is a conflict between 
the believability of the conclusion and its underlying logical status. Consider for 
instance, the following argument (taken from Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999): 
All plants need water 
Roses need water 
Therefore, roses are plants 
The heuristic-analytic dual process account (Evans, 1989) suggests that the heuristic 
type 1 response is to endorse the conclusion, because it is consistent with the 
underlying beliefs that roses are plants; although the logically correct rejection of the 
conclusion requires a more deliberate analytic type 2 process.   
However, although the various accounts of dual process theories have been widely 
researched leading to a large number of publications, there some controversial aspects 
of dual-system theories particularly relating to consciousness and evolution. Although 
discussion of these areas is not within the scope of this thesis, they are discussed in 
detail by Evans (2008).  However, it is these contentious areas that led to the 
development of a revised version of the heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 2007) which 
minimizes these issues, and also provides a more inclusive theoretical framework to 
explain hypothesis testing, forecasting, decision making, counterfactual thinking, and 
suppositional reasoning.  This revised theory is called hypothetical thinking theory, and 
is based around three principles: 
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The singularity principle: People consider a single hypothetical 
possibility, one at a time.  This is because hypothetical thinking requires 
use of system 2, which is constrained by working memory and sequential 
in nature.  People often consider more than one possibility, but not at the 
same time. 
The relevance principle:  People consider the possibility that is most 
relevant to the current goals (generally the most plausible).     
The satisficing principle: These possibilities are evaluated with reference 
to the current goals and accepted if satisfactory, unless there is a good 
reason to reject, modify, or replace them.   
 
Hypothetical thinking theory allows that biases will also arise in analytic processing; 
because with the singularity and satisficing principles, the implication is that one model 
is considered, and accepted if there is no good reason to reject that model.  The dual 
process account of deductive reasoning is still retained as a processing model, and 
thinkers are required to imagine possible states of the world.  Evans (2007) offers a 
range of experimental evidence to support hypothetical thinking theory, but perhaps 
that which is most relevant to this thesis is research carried out by Evans et al. (1999), 
which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, and in chapter 2.  Evans et al. 
(1999) concluded that individuals do not search for counterexamples in syllogistic 
reasoning by default, but merely form a single mental model of the premises and stick 
with it unless there is reason to search further.  If the conclusion that is presented to 
participants is consistent with the model, then they conclude that it satisfies the current 
goals, and only when the conclusion cannot be reconciled with the model of the 
premises is it rejected.   
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Probabilistic Reasoning 
The final theory to be reviewed is a probabilistic account of deductive reasoning 
(Chater & Oaksford, 1999, 2001), which provides an explanation for reasoning 
behaviours based on probability theory, rather than on logic.  Accordingly, the errors 
and biases which have been reported in the literature across the reasoning paradigms 
are thought to occur because people import their everyday uncertain reasoning 
strategies into the experimental laboratory.  Therefore, rather than suggesting that 
people are trying, but failing to correctly evaluate or produce a conclusion to a logical 
deductive reasoning problem, it suggests that people  are drawing probabilistic 
inferences, in attempting to choose between probabilistic models of the world.  The 
theory is based upon a number of heuristic processes specific to each individual 
reasoning paradigm.  It is a complex theory, composed of computational and 
algorithmic levels; and although it is not proposed to cover all of the paradigms (see 
Oaksford & Chater, 2001), a simplified form of the probabilistic inferences for 
syllogistic reasoning is shown below.  There are five basic heuristics, of which the first 
three relate to generating a conclusion, the fourth relates to conclusion order, and the 
fifth and final one relates to testing the conclusion:   
Min-heuristic:  the quantifier selected will be the same as the quantifier 
in the least informative premise   
P-entailments (the next most preferred conclusions to those predicted by 
the min-heuristic): a conclusion will be selected that is probabilistically 
entailed by the min-conclusion so, if all C are Y, as long as there are some 
X’s, it is probable that some X are Y.   
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Max-heuristic: confidence in the min-conclusion is determined by the 
expected information conveyed by the most informative premise 
Attachment-heuristic:  If the min-premise has an end-term (A or C) as its 
subject, this will then become the subject of the conclusion. 
O-conclusions: Avoid producing or accepting these (some …. not) as they 
are uninformative relative to other forms of conclusion. 
Take for instance the following example (Chater & Oaksford, 1999):  
All Y are X  (max-premise) 
Some Z are Y  (min-premise) 
I-type conclusion (by min) 
Some Z are X  (by attachment) 
First, by the min-heuristic, the conclusion is I (some).  The min-premise has an end 
term (Z) as its subject, therefore by attachment the conclusion will have Z as its subject 
term and the form some Z are X.  If however, the order of terms in both of the premises 
were reversed, and the min-heuristic also specifies an I conclusion, the I premise does 
not have an end term (X or Y) as its subject so the conclusion would be some X are Z.  
The PHM has been found to provide an accurate account of syllogistic reasoning Chater 
and Oaksford (1999), following a meta-analysis of data from 5 earlier experiments 
(Dickstein, 1978; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978), using 
all 64 syllogistic forms.  Furthermore, it also provides an accurate account of ‘no valid 
conclusion’ responses, which is lacking in other explanations.   
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Summary of theories and materials 
The reasoning theories which have been reviewed each provide a different account of 
deductive reasoning, and although the majority of them apply the same principles 
across reasoning paradigms, the PHM (Chater & Oaksford, 1999) is paradigm-specific 
in that there is a different heuristic process for each paradigm.  Furthermore, although 
the VRH (Polk & Newell, 1995) and hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007a) are 
both model based theories, the VRH does not include a falsification process, while 
hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007a) allows that in some instances some 
individuals carry out a search for counterexamples. .On the other hand, one of the key 
principles of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991), is that the search for counterexamples is part of the default reasoning process 
when seeking to reach a conclusion as to the validity of a logically invalid conclusion.  
Evidence to support this belief will be highlighted in the following section.   
The search for counterexamples  
Over the past two decades it has been argued by many that the search for 
counterexamples as proposed by mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991) is central to the deductive reasoning process, and a large body of 
empirical evidence has been produced to support this (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; 
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 
2003; Stanovich & West, 1998a; Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999).  It is proposed 
that reasoners do not prove conclusions syntactically by applying inference rules or 
algorithms, or make judgements based on the probability of an event; but merely base 
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deductions on grasping a semantic principle, namely that a conclusion is valid if there is 
no model of the premises that excludes it.    
However, conflicting evidence has been offered (i.e. Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999; 
Newstead et al., 1999) to suggest that despite having the ability to search for 
counterexamples, many reasoners often fail to do so; instead accepting or offering a 
conclusion that is consistent with the preferred initial model that is constructed, and 
rejecting conclusions that are inconsistent with this model.  This view is also shared by 
Evans et al. (1999) who collected a large amount of experimental data using all possible 
combinations of syllogistic premise and quantifiers; when it was found that under 
instructions of logical necessity, the first model was frequently accepted by 
participants, rather than searching for counterexamples to falsify a putative conclusion.   
What was a particularly interesting finding in the study carried out by Evans et al. 
(1999), and in a sense key in facilitating the experiments reported in this thesis, is that 
while some fallacious syllogisms were endorsed as consistently as valid syllogisms; 
others were endorsed as infrequently as syllogisms which were presented with an 
impossible conclusion, or in other words one which does not follow from the premises.  
Evans et al. (1999) found that reasoning errors were more likely to occur when the 
conclusion was consistent with the first model of the premises, despite the existence of 
alternative, falsifying models, and Evans et al. (1999) termed these possible strong (PS) 
syllogisms.  In contrast, syllogisms with conclusions that were not consistent with the 
first model were termed possible weak (PW) syllogisms, as significantly fewer were 
incorrectly endorsed.  In other words, PS syllogisms are the fallacies that individuals 
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tend to make, and PW syllogisms are the fallacies they tend to avoid.  This also poses 
another question which is whether this effect is consistent across reasoning paradigms 
and types of content, such as abstract or everyday content.   
In addition to examining the inferences that individual were prepared to make under 
instructions of necessity, Evans et al. (1999) also posited that in everyday life it is just 
as important to decide whether a proposition is possibly true.  Although the majority of 
psychological studies of deductive reasoning reported in the literature have asked 
participants only to decide if a conclusion is necessary following a set of given premises, 
a small number of studies (Bell & Johnson-Laird, 1998; Evans et al., 1999; Galotti, 
Baron, & Sabini, 1986; Osheron, 1976) introduced a condition in which participants 
were asked to make judgement on the possibility of a conclusion being correct.  This 
will be discussed further in chapter 2.    
It would appear therefore that there is evidence to suggest that under some 
circumstances, some individuals do search for counterexamples; but it may well be that 
the possibility of reasoners carrying out a search for counterexamples as proposed by 
mental model theory is dependent upon having the cognitive ability to do so, which is 
another factor this thesis sets out to explore. 
Individual differences in cognitive ability   
Traditionally, in psychological studies of deductive reasoning, investigators have 
focussed on performance between groups, to explore the effects of various 
experimental manipulations; for example how performance in syllogistic reasoning is 
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affected by the structural properties of the syllogism, or the effect of content on the 
inferences that people are prepared to make.   
However, Feeney (2007) highlights the need to clarify our understanding of who does 
what in reasoning experiments, and while many interesting phenomena are reported, 
the individual differences in cognitive ability is frequently ignored, or is not taken as a 
starting point for investigations.  The relatively small group of researchers (Klaczykski 
& Daniel, 2005; Newstead et al., 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000; Torrens et al., 1999) 
involved in individual differences research, have sought to identify factors such as 
levels of cognitive ability, which facilitate and inhibit logical reasoning performance, 
although ability has not been the prime motivation behind these studies.   
Among the most frequently adopted tests used to explore cognitive ability are the AH4 
and AH5 tests of cognitive ability, which are long established, well validated tests of 
general intelligence developed by Heim (1968).  The Scholastic Assessment Test8; has 
also been extensively used in what is arguably one of the largest bodies of individual 
differences literature, published by Stanovich and West (1999, 2008; 1998a, 1998b, 
2000).  This program of research reports reliable correlations (.47 and .41, at a 
probability level of .001) between ability and logically correct performance on a 
number of reasoning tasks, most notably syllogistic reasoning, suggesting that cognitive 
ability is a good predictor of performance on syllogistic reasoning tasks.   
                                                             
8 A standardised test for college admission in the University States of America, first introduced 
in 1901; owned, published and developed by the College Board, and used to assess student’s 
readiness for college.   
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Research has also shown (i.e. Stanovich & West, 1999) that cognitive ability plays a role 
in deductive reasoning, when there is a conflict between the believability of the 
conclusion under evaluation and the logical correctness of the conclusion.  Participants 
were found to be more able to disassociate the content and the logical structure of 
deductive reasoning problems, in order to provide a logically correct response.  There 
is also evidence from the conditional reasoning literature (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & 
Over, 2007; Newstead et al., 2004) that performance on MP (if p then q, p, q), AC (if p 
then q, q, p) and DA (if p then q, not p, not q) is highly correlated with cognitive ability, 
although this effect has not been found to extend to MT (if p then q, not q, not p) 
conditionals.    
However, there is little research within the transitive inference paradigm investigating 
the relationship between cognitive ability and correct performance; as the main focus 
of studies of transitivity tends to be on how the terms are represented;  either spatially 
(De Soto et al., 1965; Huttenlocher, 1968) or linguistically (Clark, 1969).   
Each of the paradigms used in the preparation of this thesis, will explore the 
relationship between cognitive ability and reasoning performance, to enable discussion 
in the final chapter as to whether the findings are generalisable across paradigms, or 
whether they are domain specific. 
Summary and brief overview of the experimental studies 
A long history of research in the field of deductive reasoning has generated a large body 
of literature, leading to the development of a number of general theories to explain the 
findings.  However, until now, studies have tended to focus on one experimental 
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paradigm, and the majority of research has asked individuals to evaluate problems for 
logical necessity.  The program of research reported in this thesis not only compares 
logical responses across a number of paradigms, problem types and content, but it also 
looks at responses when individuals are asked to make judgements as to whether given 
conclusions are possible.   
The four experimental chapters report studies in which the participants are presented 
with a  range of problem types, under instructions of necessity, and instructions of 
possibility; following which the results are examined in terms of endorsement rates 
and reasoning times, with reference to cognitive ability.  In a replication and extension 
of previous research carried out by Evans et al. (1999), experiment 1 adopts syllogistic 
reasoning tasks, and adds to previous work by including a measure of cognitive ability 
and the collection of reasoning times.  Experiments 2 and 3 extend the methodology to 
transitive inferences, by considering the importance of training in the relational terms 
used, with respect to endorsement rates and latencies.  Experiment 4 looks at the 
conditional inferences that individuals are prepared to make when inferences are 
presented with abstract content, and experiments 5 and 6 adopt causal conditional 
inferences to look at the impact of the number of other possible causes to a given 
scenario (experiment 5), and to specific scenarios (experiment 6).  Each chapter 
provides a comprehensive review of relevant research, together with a clear rationale 
and explanation for the selection of materials.  
The research is motivated by the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991).  The general predictions are that people will search for 
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counterexamples on indeterminate deductive reasoning problems presented under 
necessity instructions, when the initial model supports the premises; and people will 
search for alternative models when the first model does not support the premises, 
under possibility instructions.   It is also predicted that higher ability participants will 
be more likely to successfully carry out this search, which will in turn lead to 
comparatively longer reasoning times.   
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Chapter 2 
The search for counterexamples & alternative 
models in syllogistic reasoning 
 
The main theories and effects in syllogistic reasoning, reported in the literature, were 
reviewed in chapter 1.  This chapter will present an experiment where participants 
were required to evaluate a number of abstract syllogistic reasoning problems, to 
explore the reasoning processes in terms of whether reasoners searched for 
counterexamples as claimed by the third stage of the mental model theory (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).  Reasoning behaviours were also recorded 
for problems requiring judgements of possibility in the light of given information, 
which is less common in the literature, but equally important in helping to establish 
whether reasoners can and do search for other models, when deciding whether to 
accept a given conclusion on an invalid syllogism.  The predictions were based on the 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), in that 
people would search for counterexamples on indeterminate syllogisms in order to 
reject a given conclusion under necessity instructions, and accept a given conclusion 
under possibility instructions to accept a given conclusion. 
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2.1  Introduction to experiment 1 
The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) 
proposes that the deduction process takes place in three stages: first, reasoners 
construct a set of models corresponding to possible state of affairs in which the 
premises are true; second, the models are inspected and an initial conclusion is drawn; 
and finally, a reasoner carries out a counterexample search, or in other words a search 
for an alternative model or models in which the premises are true but the conclusion is 
false.  If no such model is found, the conclusion is deemed valid, but if a model is found 
in which the premises are true but the conclusion is false, the conclusion is judged to be 
invalid.  Consider for instance the following invalid syllogism, which was accepted as 
valid by all but one of a group of participants in a study by Ford (1995), and from a 
mental models perspective is due to a failure to search for counterexamples: 
None of the A’s are B’s 
All of the B’s are C’s 
Conclusion:  None of the A’s are C’s 
The initial model of the premises supports the conclusion None of the A's are C's, which 
is shown below using the notational form discussed in chapter 1: 
a   
a   
 [b] c 
 [b] c 
 
Although many reasoners fail to progress past this first model, by carrying out a search 
for counterexamples, there are alternative models of the premises that falsify this 
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putative conclusion, in other words the model is consistent with an alternative 
conclusion when Some of the A's are C's: 
a   
a  c 
 [b] c 
 [b] c 
 
Furthermore, this conclusion is falsified by a third model in which All of the A's are C's: 
a  c 
a  c 
 [b] c 
 [b] c 
 
There is however a valid conclusion, which is:  Some of the C’s are not A’s.   
Since the prime concern of experiment 1 was to investigate if and under what 
circumstances, the search for counterexamples or alternative models takes place, past 
research will be reviewed on the search for counterexamples, before presenting the 
rationale for the experiment.  Although the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) is currently the most influential theory in syllogistic 
reasoning research, evidence to support the search for counterexamples is mixed, with 
studies reporting conflicting evidence (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999; Evans et al., 
1999; Newstead, Thompson, & Handley, 2002).   
One of the earlier studies which supports the notion of a search for counterexamples, 
was carried out by Byrne and Johnson-Laird (1990), who found that participants 
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fleetingly considered erroneous conclusions based on initial models, only to later reject 
them as a result of a counterexample search.  These assumptions were drawn on the 
basis that conclusions which were falsely recognised by participants, were consistent 
with an initial model of the premises, on syllogisms to which they had earlier correctly 
concluded that nothing followed.  While this is a plausible conclusion to draw, it may 
well be that there is a simpler explanation to account for the findings, and perhaps 
reasoners were merely re-solving the original syllogism and coming up with a different 
conclusion.   
In a later study by Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999), their methodology was 
extended, and participants were video-taped performing a task where they were 
instructed to make cut-out shapes to represent the different classes of individuals.  
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999) found that people constructed more models for 
multiple model syllogisms, than for single model syllogisms. While this does not 
provide firm evidence that participants were constructing alternative models in order 
to produce the correct response, it does suggest that they were able to construct more 
than one model if required.  One weakness of this study (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 
1999) is that it failed to report whether the number of models was predictive of logical 
accuracy, and it may well be that some or even many of the responses given by 
participants were logically incorrect. 
The question of whether the number of models produced was predictive of logical 
accuracy was answered in a study published at around the same time (Newstead et al., 
1999), which adopted a similar process-tracing methodology.  The results contradicted 
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those of Bucciarelli & Johnson (1999), in that not only were the number of models 
constructed by participants not predictive of logical accuracy, but the study failed to 
provide evidence that the number of models constructed for single model syllogisms 
varied from the number of models constructed for multi model syllogisms.  At the time, 
it was posited that these findings were more consistent with the VRH (Polk & Newell, 
1995) than Johnson-Laird's mental model theory.   
Although the VRH is a model based theory, where reasoners evaluate a conclusion by 
repeatedly re-encoding the problem, there is no assumption that falsification takes 
place, which of course if one of the assumptions of the mental model theory.  Instead it 
is assumed that reasoners attempt to construct only a single model or representation of 
the premises, and base their judgements of validity on that one representation.  
According to the VRH, the default reasoning mechanism is that reasoners do not 
proceed past the first model to find one that falsifies the conclusion.   
A more recent model based theory which may also explain the findings, and one which 
will be considered in the context of the current experiment, is the hypothetical thinking 
theory, proposed by Evans (2007a), which claims that reasoners can proceed beyond 
the first model but do not always do so.  Hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007a) 
allows that in some cases some people search for counterexamples to evaluate or 
provide a correct conclusion to syllogistic reasoning problems.  The theory is based on 
the belief that when evaluating a putative conclusion, reasoners do not carry out a 
search for counterexamples if the first model satisfies the requirements of the task (the 
satisficing principle).  In other words, if a model is found that is consistent with the 
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conclusion, no further reasoning takes place and the erroneous conclusion is accepted 
as being valid.  The theory does however, allow that in some instances further 
searching does take place. 
A frequently cited study which seems to provide overwhelming support for the 
hypothetical thinking theory was carried out by Evans et al. (1999).  Following the 
presentation of computer generated syllogistic reasoning problems to participants, it 
was found that reasoners seldom went beyond the initial model.  Instead participants 
chose to accept conclusions that were consistent with the preferred initial model (see 
Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird 1999), and reject conclusions that were inconsistent with 
this model.  It was also found that the frequency of errors was higher on invalid 
syllogisms, when the conclusion was consistent with the initial model when there were 
alternative falsifying models, which suggests that people can search for 
counterexamples but do so infrequently, instead preferring to accept a satisfactory 
solution which is not necessarily the optimum one.   
Further evidence to support the notion that some participants do carry out a search for 
counterexamples was provided by Newstead, Thompson and Handley (2002) who 
looked at the ability of participants to generate different representations of pairs of 
syllogistic premises.  Newstead, Thompson and Handley (2002) found that while some 
people failed to proceed beyond the one model, others did, and these differences in 
reasoning behaviours or ‘reasoning styles' as they were referred to, were predictive of 
whether or not a person searched for alternative representations. 
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To summarise, although the implications of the studies reviewed so far suggest that at 
least some reasoners are capable of constructing alternative models, they do not lead to 
the conclusion that the search for counterexamples is a compulsory component of the 
mental model theory.  However it may well be that this ambiguity can be clarified by 
inspecting reasoning times in addition to endorsement rate data.     
2.1.1  Reasoning times 
Mental model theory predicts that a reasoner will take longer on syllogisms that 
require the consideration and processing of multiple models.  More particularly, if a 
search for counterexamples is required in order to produce a logically correct response 
to a syllogism, the time course of the reasoning process should be longer than for those 
syllogisms not requiring such a search.  There are however few studies which have 
successfully collected data illustrating the time course of syllogistic reasoning.  Evans et 
al. (1999) for instance collected latency data, but because the experimental design was 
such that reasoners were asked to evaluate four possible conclusions for each problem, 
the researchers were unable to isolate the length of time that participants took on each 
possible conclusion; and for this reason the data was not included in the final analysis. 
An early study which did successfully collect latency data was run by Galotti et al. 
(1986), who found that good reasoners took proportionately longer than poor 
reasoners9 on invalid problems requiring the generation of at least two models to 
falsify the initial conclusion.  In contrast, on valid conclusions that did not require the 
                                                             
9 Reasoners were categorised by means of a pre-test condition, and those selected for the main 
study had scores either in the top third or the bottom third. 
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generation of extra models, response times were similar for good and poor reasoners.  
One aspect of this study that is noteworthy is that a training session was carried out 
prior to presentation of the problems, to ensure that participants fully understood the 
terms.  Also, participants were given a booklet in which to make notes while solving the 
problems, which is again uncommon in studies of syllogistic reasoning. 
However, more recent studies (Stupple & Ball, 2008; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, 
Gunter, & Campbell, 2003) have found that reasoners take significantly longer to 
process invalid problems than valid problems, suggesting that invalid problems require 
either more effortful reasoning, or involve more processing stages than valid problems.  
These findings support the view that valid conclusions can be accepted for logical 
correctness without spending extra time searching for alternative models, while invalid 
problems take longer because they require the construction of falsifying models in 
order to correctly falsify the initial conclusion model that comes to mind. 
Another factor which may have a bearing on whether or not there is sufficient evidence 
to support the search for counterexamples, is whether there are individual differences 
in cognitive ability.   
2.1.2  Individual differences in cognitive ability 
Although the relationship between reasoning performance and cognitive ability is well 
established in the literature (Torrens et al., 1999; Newstead et al., 1992; Stanovich & 
West, 1998b; Klaczynski, Fauth and Swanger, 1998 Galotti et al., 1986) a surprisingly 
small number of these studies have used the type of categorical syllogisms referred to 
in this chapter.  Despite being frequently taken as evidence to support a positive 
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correlational relationship between syllogistic reasoning and cognitive ability, some 
studies have employed other reasoning tasks.  For instance, Torrens et al., (1999) 
reported reliable correlations between performance and conditional syllogisms, and the 
relationship between reasoning performance and cognitive ability reported by both 
Klaczynski et al. (1998) and Stanovich and West (1998b), was found on the Wason 
selection task.   
Notwithstanding this, one study which did explore the relationship between cognitive 
ability and Aristotolean categorical syllogistic reasoning performance was carried out 
by Newstead et al., (2004), who found a significant positive correlation between 
logically correct reasoning performance and cognitive ability.  One of the claims made 
by mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) is that 
reasoners will search for counterexamples on indeterminate reasoning problems; and 
failure to do so will result in them incorrectly endorsing a conclusion that is not 
necessarily true, but merely possibly true.  It is therefore fair to assume that those 
reasoners who are better at constructing alternative models will also score more highly 
on cognitive ability tests such as Heim’s AH4/AH5 cognitive ability tests referred to in 
the first chapter of this thesis.   
 The next section will look at whether the key to reaching a clearer understanding on 
the role of counterexamples in reasoning, is to focus on judgements not just of 
necessity, but also on judgements of possibility (Evans et al., 1999).  At this point it may 
be useful to clarify the distinction between the terms ‘the search for counterexamples’ 
and ‘the search for alternative models’, as these are terms which will be used 
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throughout the thesis.  The search for counterexamples is specific to the third stage of 
the mental model theory, when a search for counterexamples under instructions of 
logical necessity serves to falsify a given conclusion.  The term alternative models, is a 
more generic term and can also be used with instructions other than necessity; or when 
not seeking to falsify a given conclusion but merely to explore other possibilities.   
2.1.3  Reasoning about Necessity and Possibility 
Studies of reasoning behaviours, using the instructions ‘is it necessary that’ and ‘is it 
possible that’, have become more common following a large syllogistic reasoning study 
which was carried out by Evans et al. (1999).  Typically in this type of study, 
participants are asked whether a conclusion necessarily follows, or whether it possibly 
follows; with a statement following necessarily if it must be true and possibly if it may 
be true.  Consider the following three arguments taken from Evans et al. (1999), which 
are based on universal premises (all or none), and presented with thematic content: 
1. All artists are beekeepers, 
Lisa is an artist 
Lisa is a beekeeper (necessarily true) 
 
(Necessary problem) 
2. All artists are beekeepers 
Lisa is a beekeeper, 
Lisa is an artist (possibly true) 
 
(Possible problem) 
3. All artists are beekeepers 
Lisa is an artist 
Lisa is not a beekeeper (impossible) 
 
(Impossible problem) 
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When considered under necessity instructions the first argument is a valid inference; if 
a reasoner assumes that Lisa is an artist, and that all of the artists are beekeepers, it 
necessarily follows that Lisa is a beekeeper.  Argument 2 is invalid because although all 
artists are beekeepers, there may be beekeepers who are not artists and Lisa may be in 
that group.  Finally, argument 3 is invalid (impossible), as there are no models that hold 
in which Lisa is not a beekeeper given she is part of the group of artists who are all 
beekeepers.   
However, under possibility instructions, again the first conclusion is both possible and 
necessary.  The conclusion to argument 2 is possible but not necessary, since although 
Lisa is a beekeeper, there are beekeepers who are artists, and beekeepers who are not 
artists, so she could be in either group.  With argument 3, there are no models that hold 
in which Lisa is not a beekeeper so it is an impossible conclusion.  
Within the framework of mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991), there are three predictions that can be made regarding performance 
under different types of instruction: First, reasoners should be more willing to judge 
that a conclusion is possible than it is necessary, based on the notion that only one 
model will suffice for a possible conclusion.  Second, it should be easier to decide that a 
conclusion is possible if it was also necessary, because necessary conclusions hold in all 
models of the premises.  Third, it should be easier to decide that a conclusion is not 
necessary if it is also not possible, because there are no models that support the 
conclusion with impossible problems. 
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When Evans et al. (1999) presented all 256 syllogisms under both necessity and 
possibility instructions, they found evidence to support all of the above predictions:  
participants more frequently endorsed conclusions as possible, as opposed to 
necessary; there were more endorsements of possibility for statements that were 
necessarily true, than for statements that were possibly true; and there were more 
endorsements of problems that were possibly true than impossible.  Evans et al. (1999) 
also found in experiment 3, that some arguments supporting possible conclusions were 
regularly taken to imply necessary conclusions, and some arguments supporting 
possible conclusions were rarely taken to imply necessary conclusions; although in 
both instances the logically correct response was not to endorse the conclusion, for 
instance: 
 None of the A’s are B’s 
All of the B's are C’s 
 
 
is it necessary that None of the A’s are C’s 77% of people endorsed the conclusion 
  
 
 
None of the B’s are A’s 
All of the B’s are C’s 
 
 
is it necessary that All of the A’s are C’s 10% of people endorsed the conclusion 
 
These two types of problems were termed Possible strong (PS) and Possible weak (PW) 
and results indicated that PS problems were endorsed almost as frequently as 
Necessary problems, while PW problems were endorsed almost as infrequently as 
Impossible problems.  The two groups were thought to have emerged because many 
people reason based upon the first model that comes to mind, and PS syllogisms have 
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an initial model that supports the given conclusion; whereas the PW syllogisms have an 
initial model that does not.  This suggests that people do not go beyond the first model, 
leading to high endorsement rates when the conclusion is consistent with the first 
model (PS), and low endorsement rates when the conclusion is not supported by the 
first model (PW).   
2.1.4  Aims and rationale 
The main aim of experiment 1 was to investigate whether people spontaneously search 
for counterexamples as proposed by the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983), 
and the extent to which this search is mediated by cognitive ability.    
The experiment is a replication and extension of the third experiment carried out by 
Evans et al. (1999), and the construction of problem types is strongly informed by this 
work.  A similar methodology in terms of problem type, instruction and presentational 
methods was used, but with the addition of a measure of cognitive ability.  The time 
course of the reasoning process was recorded, but in contrast to Evans et al. (1999) 
participants were only required to evaluate one conclusion, as opposed to four 
conclusions; resulting in only one overall reasoning time being recorded.  This latency 
measure enabled the detection of instances where extra processing was required to 
search for additional models, in order to correctly evaluate a given conclusion.  The 
following four problem types identified by Evans et al. (1999) were Necessary, PS, 
Impossible and PW, and when presented under necessity (is it necessary that) and 
possibility (is it possible that) instructions, their properties were (see following page):   
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Necessary - the conclusion must be true  
Possible strong - the conclusion may be true (frequently endorsed) 
Impossible - the conclusion must be false    
Possible weak - the conclusion may be true (infrequently endorsed)   
The key comparisons of interest were Necessary and PS problems under necessity 
instructions, and Impossible and PW problems under possibility instructions.  This is 
because in order to give the correct response to a PS problem under necessity 
instructions, a search for counterexamples is needed to find a model that negates the 
initial conclusion; whereas on Necessary problems a search is not required, since all 
models support the conclusion.  Similarly, on PW problems under possibility 
instructions, a search for alternatives is necessary in order to produce a correct 
conclusion, because the first model negates the conclusion; while on Impossible 
problems no models support the conclusion.  In this way it was possible to determine 
whether the required search for counterexamples or alternatives took place, and the 
measure of ability allowed comparisons to be made as to whether this was mediated by 
cognitive ability in terms of higher ability people being more likely to carry out this 
search.  The problem categories are shown in table 2.1; where problems requiring a 
search for alternative models are marked with an asterisk.   
It is important to clarify at this stage, that although there is no evidence to suggest that 
people know in advance whether they need to search for counterexamples on 
Necessary syllogisms under necessity instructions, we do know that they only need to 
confirm that a given conclusion in a conclusion evaluation task is correct.  On the other 
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hand, for syllogisms with a PS structure, people need to take action in terms of 
searching and finding counterexamples to provide the correct response. 
Table 2.1 
Problem types and logical definitions for each of the four problem categories 
necessity 
instructions 
Necessary 
no search 
required 
PS* 
the first model 
supports the 
conclusion 
Impossible  
no models 
support the 
conclusion 
PW*  
the first model 
negates the 
conclusion 
possibility 
instructions 
Necessary  
no search 
required 
PS  
the first model 
supports the 
conclusion 
Impossible 
no models 
support the 
conclusion 
PW*  
the first model 
negates the 
conclusion 
 
correct response is ‘yes’       correct response is ‘no’ 
 
Similarly, under possibility instructions, we know that although people may not know 
that they do not need to search for alternative models on Impossible problems, we 
know that if they search for and find alternative models on PW problems, this will 
allow them to provide the correct response. 
The follow on from this is that if people are searching for counterexamples or 
alternative models; detecting them and making judgements as predicted by the mental 
model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) is more demanding 
in cognitive resources and time, because finding a counterexample or alternative 
model, and rejecting a conclusion will take longer.  This is strongly supported by work 
carried out by Stupple and Ball (2008), referred to previously, when conclusion 
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inspection times increased for invalid syllogisms over valid syllogisms, and conclusion 
inspection times increased for invalid problems as opposed to valid problems.   
Earlier work by Clark and Chase (1974; Clark & Clark, 1977) also supports the claims 
made by mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1992, p. 52) that fleshing out 
and constructing a full set of models takes time.  Clark and Chase (1974; Clark & Clark, 
1977) employed sentence picture verification tasks, and found that participants took 
longer to make judgements where the conclusion was false, as opposed to when the 
conclusion was true.  They attributed this to the time it took to detect  alternative 
models.   
2.1.5  Predictions  
There are a number of specific predictions that can be made within the framework of 
the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and the 
work carried out by Evans et al. (1999).  These relate to the search for counterexamples 
or alternatives, in terms of the relationship between performance and cognitive ability, 
and how these interact with the time course of the reasoning process: 
1. In line with previous research (Evans et al., 1999), conclusions will be more 
frequently endorsed under possibility instructions than under necessity 
instructions. 
2. If participants search for counterexamples: under necessity instructions, there 
will be fewer endorsements of PS problems than Necessary problems because a 
search for alternatives will lead to a greater number of logically correct 
responses.  It is expected that this will result in an interaction between 
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instruction and problem type (Necessary and PS), since under possibility 
instructions no search is required for either type of problem. 
3. If participants search for alternatives:  under possibility instructions there will be 
a greater number of endorsements of PW problems than Impossible problems, 
because although the first model does not support the conclusion, a search for 
alternatives will reveal an instance that will allow the reasoner to accept the 
conclusion.  This will also result in an interaction between instruction and 
problem type (Impossible and PW), since under necessity instructions no search 
is required, and the conclusion will be rejected on the basis of the first model.   
4. If participants search for alternatives:  PS problems under necessity instructions, 
and PW problems under possibility instructions, will take longer.  This is because 
a search for alternatives is required in both cases to provide the correct 
conclusion.   
5. It is anticipated that the effects in predictions 2, 3 and 4 will be mediated by 
ability, in that higher ability participants will produce more correct responses 
where a search is required, because of their ability to carry out this search. 
6. On problems that require a search for counterexamples or alternatives (PS 
problems under necessity instructions and PW problems under possibility 
instructions), high ability participants will take longer.  This is a cautious 
prediction as these effects may be confounded by general reasoning speed, such 
as high ability reasoners having faster processing skills. 
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2.2  Method  
Design 
This experimental study was carried out using a within-subjects design, when initially 
participants completed an AH4 cognitive ability test.  This was followed by the 
syllogistic reasoning task, where participants were presented with one block of 32 
randomised abstract syllogistic reasoning problems under necessity instructions, and 
one block of 32 abstract syllogistic reasoning problems under possibility instructions, 
the order of which was counterbalanced to minimise order effects. 
Participants 
A total of 60 undergraduate students at the University of Plymouth took part in the 
study, in return for either payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 26 males 
and 34 females with a mean age of 20 years, and they were all native English speakers.  
No participants were dyslexic, or had received formal training in logic. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were run in groups of between 4 and 6 in a laboratory containing several 
computers.  Each participant was seated at their own workstation, to avoid distraction. 
Cognitive Ability Test 
Initially participants completed Parts I and II of the AH4 cognitive ability test.  This 
pencil and paper test, which was developed by Heim (1968) as a measure of general 
intelligence for use with a cross-section of the adult population, is widely used in 
studies of deductive reasoning (e.g. Newstead et al., 2004).  Test-retest reliability has 
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been recorded at 0.919, with retesting after one month (Alexopoulos, 1997).  The test 
consists of two 65 item sections, each of which is presented to participants in separate 
10 minute sessions; and in both parts the test items become increasingly difficult.  
Correlations between scores on parts I and II have been reported to range between 
0.60 and 0.81 (Alexopoulos, 1997; Heim, 1968).  Part I is made up of verbal items 
concerning direction, verbal opposites, numerical series, verbal analogies, simple 
arithmetic computations, and synonyms, for example: 
 
          
Part II contains diagrammatic items requiring judgments about analogies, sames, 
subtractions, series, and superimpositions, for example: 
 
                  
The test was administered in accordance with the test instructions, and question 
booklets and answer sheets were collected by the experimenter before moving on to 
the reasoning task.   
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Syllogistic reasoning task 
A set of 32 abstract syllogisms was selected from a list of all 512 distinct problems 
based upon their endorsement rates under necessity instructions, recorded in previous 
research (Evans et al., 1999).   The problem set was made up of 8 problems in each of 
four categories: Necessary, PS, Impossible, and PW.  Problems were selected on the 
basis of endorsement rates reported under necessity instructions (Evans et al., 1999), 
as shown on the following page.   
Necessary   ≥ 70% 
PS  ≥ 70% 
Impossible  ≤ 30% 
PW ≤ 30% 
 
Examples of the problems, with their logical definitions, are shown in table 2.2.   
Table 2.2 
Examples and logical definitions for each of the four problem categories 
Category Example Logical definition 
Necessary  
All of the A’s are B’s 
None of the C’s are B’s 
None of the A’s are C’s 
The conclusion statement must be true 
given that the premises are true 
PS 
All of the A’s are B’s 
All of the B’s are C’s 
All of the C’s are A’s 
The conclusion might be true given 
that the premises are true (frequently 
endorsed) 
Impossible  
All of the B’s are A’s 
None of the B’s are C’s 
All of the A’s are C’s 
The conclusion statement cannot be 
true given that the premises are true 
PW  
Some of the B’s are A’s 
All of the C’s are B’s 
None of the C’s are A’s 
The conclusion might be true given 
that the premises are true (less 
frequently endorsed) 
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In order to present a range of problem types and difficulty, each category had two 
problems from each of the four syllogistic figures; and within each figure one of the two 
syllogisms had a conclusion in direction a - c, and the other had a conclusion in 
direction c - a.    In all but once instance (Impossible problems; c - a direction) every 
problem type had one problem of each mood in a - c direction syllogisms, and one in  c - 
a direction syllogisms.  Randomly chosen letters of the alphabet (excluding I and O) 
were used for the premise terms.  A complete set of the problems used in this 
experiment, together with figure, conclusion, and percentage endorsement rates 
previously recorded (Evans et al., 1999) under both necessity and possibility 
instructions  is presented in appendix 2A.  A list of all 512 problems and endorsement 
rates used in the selection process can be found in Evans et al. (1999). 
A computer with a 15” monitor screen was used to present the problems, with a 
computer program written in visual basic.  The keyboard was adapted to include yes 
and no keys, which were systematically counterbalanced, so that half the participants 
had the yes key on the left of the keyboard and the no key on the right, while the other 
half had these positions reversed.    
The two sets of written task instructions modelled on the instructions used by Evans et 
al. (1999) were printed on A4 paper, included examples of the screen layouts, and were 
related to whether problems were being evaluated for either necessity or possibility 
correctness (see table 2.3 and table 2.4).  A complete set of instructions is presented in 
appendix 2B and appendix 2C.  
64 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Written instructions presented to participants (necessity) 
 
Necessity instructions 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate how people solve logical 
reasoning problems.  A number of problems will be presented on the 
screen one at a time.  Each problem consists of two statements which 
describe the relationship between three letters, followed by a conclusion.  
Your task is to indicate whether the conclusion necessarily follows from 
the sentence that precedes it.  A necessary conclusion is one that must be 
true given the truth of the preceding premises.  Below are examples of 
the screen layouts. 
 
 
 
First you will be shown two statements, and you should press the space 
bar to indicate your understanding of these.  A conclusion will then be 
added, and your task is to decide whether this conclusion must be true.  
Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the conclusion 
necessarily follows and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow.  You will then be asked to press the space bar when 
you are ready to continue to the next problem. 
 
 
 
 
Given that 
All of the M’s are F’s 
None of the D’s are F’s 
press space bar to continue 
 
 
Given that 
All of the M’s are F’s 
None of the D’s are F’s 
Is it necessary that 
None of the D’s are F’s 
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Table 2.4 
Written instructions presented to participants (possibility) 
 
 
Possibility instructions 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate how people solve logical 
reasoning problems.  A number of problems will be presented on the 
screen one at a time.  Each problem consists of two statements which 
describe the relationship between three letters, followed by a conclusion.  
Your task is to indicate whether the conclusion possibly follows from the 
sentence that precedes it.  A possible conclusion is one that could be true 
given the truth of the preceding premises.  Below are examples of the 
screen layouts. 
 
 
 
First you will be shown two statements, and you should press the space 
bar to indicate your understanding of these.  A conclusion will then be 
added, and your task is to decide whether this conclusion is possible.  
Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the conclusion is 
possible and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion is not possible.  You will 
then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to 
the next problem. 
 
Given that 
All of the P’s and D’s 
All of the D’s are T’s 
press space bar to continue 
 
 
Given that  
All of the P’s are D’s 
All of the D’s are T’s 
Is it possible that 
All of the P’s are T’s 
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The instructions were distributed (necessity or possibility) for the first block of 
problems and after a short reading period, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions on any points about which they were unclear.  The participants were also 
told that they must ask the experimenter for the second set of instructions (necessity or 
possibility) as soon as a message appeared on the screen, and reminded that the start 
of each block there were two practice questions. 
Participant responses, yes or no, were recorded by the program, together with the time 
taken to indicate understanding of the problem (screen 1) and the time taken to 
complete the reasoning process (screen 2).  These were saved to disc. 
2.3  Results 
The AH4 test sheets were scored in accordance with the test instructions, when one 
mark was given for each correct answer.  There was a significant positive correlation 
between Parts I and II (r = .49, p < .01), and in line with previous research (Newstead et 
al., 2004) the scores from both parts were totalled to give an overall general ability 
score for each participant.  The observed mean for participants was 98.30 (SD = 12.90), 
which was slightly higher than the available norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) for university 
students (Heim, 1968).  The sample was divided into high and low cognitive ability 
groups, on the basis of a median split on the AH4 test scores; cases below the median of 
100.5 were classified as low ability and those above the median were classified as high 
ability.  
All participants evaluated conclusions under both necessity instructions and possibility 
instructions.  The first dependent variable was the mean percentage endorsement rates 
67 
 
for each problem category, i.e. the number of yes responses.  A breakdown of 
endorsement rates into syllogistic figures and conclusion direction can be found in 
appendix 2D.  The second dependent variable was the time course of the reasoning 
process; that is to say both premise processing and response times together.  These 
were totalled for each problem type and instruction group to produce a mean 
reasoning time (in milliseconds)10.  The approach taken was that which was adopted by 
Thompson et al. (2003) when the reasoning time was  taken to be from presentation of 
the problem, to the generation of  a response (in this case by hitting a key); and this  
approach will be adopted throughout the thesis.  The results from the endorsement 
rate data are reported first; followed by the results from the reasoning time data.  All 
ANOVA tables for experiment 1 are shown in appendix 2E. 
2.3.1  Conclusion endorsement rates  
The mean percentage endorsement rates for each of the four problem types are shown 
in table 2.5; broken down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low 
ability group and the high ability group each represent the mean percentage 
endorsement rates for responses from 30 participants.  A breakdown of mean 
percentage endorsement rates for a - c and c - a conclusions can be found in appendix 
2F.  
                                                             
10 The pattern of responding was identical when two individual analyses were carried out, on 
both the time taken to understand the problem, and the time taken to complete the reasoning 
process. 
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Table 2.5 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for all problem types (N = 60, SD in 
brackets) 
 Necessary  PS  Impossible  PW 
Necessary               
Low 78 (21.94)    74 (24.64)  22 (23.60)  32 (24.93) 
High 78 (27.35)  68 (31.93)  12 (14.28)  25 (18.42) 
M 78 (25.58)  71 (28.45)  17 (20.04)  29 (21.99) 
Possibility            
Low 85 (22.67)  82 (22.90)  22 (22.19)  35 (20.26) 
High 84 (22.73)  79 (23.06)  28 (28.69)  46 (25.67) 
M 84 (22.51)  81 (22.83)  25 (25.58)  41 (23.57) 
 
Necessary and PS problems 
The predictions were that there would be more endorsements of possibility than of 
necessity problems, more endorsements of Necessary problems than PS problems; 
and if reasoners searched for counterexamples there would be an interaction between 
instruction and problem type.  It was also predicted that these results would be 
mediated by ability.  A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test revealed a main effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 
9.02, p < .005, p
2 
= .14], reflecting higher endorsement rates under possibility 
instructions than necessity instructions. There was also a main effect of problem type 
[F(1,58) = 7.14,  p < .05, p
2
 = .11], whereby Necessary problems were more 
frequently endorsed than PS problems; however, the main effect of ability [F(1,58) = 
.24, p = .63] was not significant.  The interaction between instruction and problem 
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type was not significant [F(1,58) = 1.00,  p = .32, p
2
 = .02], and there were no other 
significant interactions. 
The main effect of instruction confirmed previous research (Evans et al., 1999), but 
more importantly it suggests that there was at least some understanding of the 
differences between necessity and possibility instructions.  The differences in 
endorsement rates for Necessary and PS problems indicate that some participants were 
able to distinguish between problem types, but the lack of interaction with instruction 
or ability does not allow us to draw any other conclusions, particularly in terms of 
providing evidence to support the search for counterexamples.   
Impossible and PW problems 
It was predicted that there would be more endorsements of possibility than of 
necessity, more endorsements of PW problems than of Impossible problem; and if 
reasoners carried out a search for counterexamples there would be an interaction 
between instruction and problem type.  It was also predicted that these results would 
be mediated by ability.  A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA 
test revealed a main effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 12.08, p < .005, p2  = .17], reflecting 
higher endorsement rates under possibility instructions, and a main effect of problem 
type [F(1,58) = 48.40, p < .001, p2 = .46], when PW problems were endorsed more 
frequently than Impossible problems.  There was no main effect of ability [F(1,58) = 
.02, p = .96]. 
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Figure 2.1.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for both ability groups, under 
necessity and possibility instructions 
There was a significant interaction between instruction and ability [F(1,58) = 8.39, p < 
.005, p2 = .13], which suggests that participants in the high ability group were more 
able to differentiate between necessity and possibility instructions (see figure 2.1).   
This was confirmed by follow up within subjects t-tests, when there was found to be a 
significant difference of instruction for the high ability group [t(29) = 4.18, p < .001], 
but not for the low ability group [t(29) = .45, p = .66].  The interactions between 
instruction and problem type [F(1,58) = 1.35, p = .25] and problem type and ability 
[F(1,58) = 1.30, p = .26] were not significant.  
Again, the main effect of instruction was consistent with previous research (Evans et 
al., 1999), and indicated that there was some understanding of the differences between 
necessity and possibility instructions.  The main effect of problem type suggests that 
participants understood the differences between the two types of problem, but there is 
no evidence to suggest that they were more able to discriminate between PW and 
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Impossible problems under possibility instructions, than under necessity instruction.  
The lack of interaction between instruction and problem type failed to provide 
evidence for a search for alternatives on PW problems under possibility instructions. 
2.3.2  Reasoning times  
The mean reasoning times for all four types of problem are shown in table 2.6; broken 
down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low ability group and 
the high ability group each represent the mean reasoning times for responses from 30 
participants, and are shown in milliseconds. 
Table 2.6 
Mean reasoning times (milliseconds) for all problem types (N = 60, SD in brackets) 
 Necessary  PS  Impossible  PW 
Necessary            
Low 14558 (7962)  14574 (8422)  13449 (5535)  14562 (8218) 
High 11918 (4476)  11890 (5242)  10641 (3106)  10858 (3486) 
M 13238 (6541)  13232 (7085)  12045 (4670)  12710 (6531) 
Possibility            
Low 14570 (7323)  14985 (7470)  14885 (7771)  14309 (7178) 
High 12093 (5242)  11975 (5058)  11605 (4647)  12067 (4813) 
M 13331 (6436)  13480 (6504)  13245 (6560)  13188 (6164) 
 
Necessary and PS problems 
It was predicted that reasoning times would be quicker under possibility instructions, 
and on Necessary problems; and if reasoners carried out a search for counterexamples 
this would result in an interaction between instruction and problem type.  It was also 
predicted that these results would be mediated by ability.  A 2 (instruction) x 2 
(problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test was carried out, but there were no main 
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effects of instruction [F(1,58) = .06, p = .81], problem type [F(1,58) = .07, p = .80], or 
ability [F(1,58) = 3.33, p = .07], and no significant interactions11.  There was no 
evidence to provide support for the prediction that problems requiring a search for 
counterexamples (PS under necessity instructions) would take longer, and the lack of 
main effect on instruction suggests that participants did not engage in more complex 
processing when asked to make judgements of necessity. 
Impossible and PW problems 
It was predicted that reasoning times would be quicker under necessity instructions; 
and on Impossible problems; also if reasoners were carrying out a search for 
counterexamples there would be an interaction between instruction and problem type.  
It was also predicted that these results would be mediated by ability.  A 2 (instruction) 
x 2 (problem type) 2 x (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main effect of ability 
[F(1,58) = 5.09, p < .05, p2 = .08], suggesting that high ability participants were 
generally quicker reasoners than low ability participants. There were no main effects of 
instruction [F(1,58) = 2.00, p = .16] or problem type [F(1,58) = 0.88, p < .35] and no 
significant interactions12.  Again, the data did not support the prediction that problems 
requiring a search for alternatives (PW under possibility instructions instruction) 
would take longer, and the lack of a main effect of instruction suggests that participants 
                                                             
11 An equivalent analysis was repeated with log-transformed reasoning times, because of the 
number of outliers, but there were no significant effects. 
12 An equivalent analysis was repeated with log-transformed reasoning times, because of the 
number of outliers, but in line with the untransformed data, the only significant result was a 
main effect of ability [F(1.58) = 4.50, p < .05, p2 = .07]. 
73 
 
were not engaging in more complex processing when asked to make judgements of 
necessity.   
2.4  Discussion 
The primary aim of this experiment was to evaluate the claim that syllogistic reasoning 
involves a search for counterexamples, as proposed by the third stage of the mental 
model theory, and to investigate whether the likelihood of reasoners carrying out this 
search can be predicted by cognitive ability.  This was done by first asking participants 
to complete an AH4 Cognitive Ability test, which enabled them to be categorised as 
either low ability or high ability.  Following this they evaluated four different types of 
syllogistic reasoning problems (Necessary, PS, Impossible, and PW), under both 
necessity and possibility instructions.  The analysis was directed at making 
comparisons between Necessary and PS problems, and Impossible and PW problems, 
under both types of instruction.  Endorsement rates and reasoning times were 
recorded to detect where there was evidence of extra processing on items which 
required a search for additional models.  The syllogisms were selected so that there 
was a range of problem types, figures, and direction of conclusion, to ensure as far as 
possible that the results were not due to biases such as the figural effect or conclusion 
direction bias.   
It was predicted that there would be fewer endorsements of PS than Necessary 
problems under necessity instructions; together with an interaction between problem 
type and instruction, and that there would be a greater number of endorsements of PW 
than Impossible problems under possibility instructions, and an interaction between 
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problem type and instruction.  It was also predicted that those problems requiring a 
search for counterexamples or alternatives would take longer in terms of problem 
processing times, because of the extra time required for the search process, and that 
participants in the high cognitive ability groups would be more accurate and would 
take proportionately extra time on problems requiring a search for counterexamples or 
alternatives. 
However, despite the above predictions based upon previous research (Evans et al., 
1999; Galotti et al., 1986; Newstead et al., 2004; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Thompson et al., 
2003), and the assumptions of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991), analysis of the endorsement rate data failed to support the 
predictions which related specifically to the search for counterexamples.   
There was a main effect of instruction for both sets of analysis carried out, which 
suggests that participants understood the differences between instructions of necessity 
and instructions of possibility, and the different types of problem.  The interaction 
between instruction and ability on Impossible and PW problems suggests that it was 
the higher ability participants who had a better understanding of the differences in 
instruction types.  The results implied that generally, when the initial model supported 
the conclusion (PS problems under necessity instructions), no further reasoning took 
place.  Similarly, when the first model failed to support the conclusion, as was the case 
with PW problems under possibility instructions, reasoners did not look past the initial 
model to find one that validated the conclusion.   
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 With regard to the latency data, there was no evidence to support the predictions that 
a search for counterexamples of alternative models took place; and no evidence that 
participants understood the differences between necessity and possibility instructions, 
or of the different problem types.  However, it may be that because people were not 
discriminating between necessity and possibility instructions, they were treating PS 
problems under necessity instructions and PS problems under possibility instructions 
in the same way.  This may also be the case with PW problems under both types of 
instructions.      
Given the lack of evidence to support the search for counterexamples or alternative 
models, it may well be that reasoners were settling for what is ‘good enough’ unless 
there was good reason to reject, modify or replace it, which is consistent with the 
satisficing principle of hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007a).  Hypothetical 
thinking theory (Evans, 2007a) defines the general characteristics of hypothetical 
thought such that, while the search for counterexamples in invalid problems is not 
spontaneous, more effortful processing can be encouraged by manipulating the task 
instructions.  This is clear in the analysis of endorsement rates, which showed main 
effects of problem types for both Necessary and PS problems, and Impossible and PW 
problems.    
Despite the lack of support for the search for counterexamples, the findings do suggest 
that at least some people are more sensitive to instructions, in terms of modifying and 
reducing their threshold for endorsing conclusions under possibility instructions.  
However given that previous research (i.e. Newstead et al., 2004) has reported ability 
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to be a good predictor of performance on syllogistic reasoning problems, we might also 
have expected these response rates to be mediated by ability on Necessary and PS 
problems, with a bigger difference for the high ability group.  Nevertheless, there was 
an interaction between instruction and ability on endorsement rates for Impossible and 
PW problems, suggesting that people in the high ability group were generally more 
conservative when asked to evaluate conclusions under necessity instructions.    
While it may be that a general increase in endorsement rates for problems presented 
under possibility instructions is due to response bias, such as a caution effect, this 
would seem unlikely given the interaction that was found.  Instead it suggests that it is 
the higher ability participants who consciously modify their response threshold 
according to the instructions.   
In conclusion, although there is no evidence to support the search for counterexamples 
in terms of it being the default setting; syllogisms are complex reasoning problems, and 
the first solution that comes to mind is perhaps more attractive than searching for 
alternatives.  It may also be the case that due to the structural complexities of 
syllogisms, and the suggestion put forward by Grice (1975) that quantifiers which have 
multiple meanings may be hard because of linguistic complexity, participants were 
willing to put more effort into integrating the premises, leaving little in respect of 
cognitive resources to carry out a search for alternative models.   
Furthermore, Bell and Johnson-Laird (1998) also suggest that the ability to search for 
counterexamples may well be influenced by the nature of the task; some paradigms 
such as syllogistic reasoning using complex arguments which involve understanding 
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the meaning of quantifiers and integration of premises, leaving few resources available 
for considering alternative representations of the premises.  On the other hand, if the 
lack of support for the search for counterexamples was due to the structural and 
linguistic complexity of syllogisms, we might have expected there to have been some 
effects of cognitive ability, as suggested in the literature (Evans et al., 1983; Newstead 
et al., 2004; Newstead et al., 1992; Stanovich & West, 1998b; Torrens et al., 1999).    
The following chapter presents two experiments adopting a similar methodology, 
which is applied to a range of transitive inference problems; to explore whether the 
findings in experiment 1 remain specific to abstract syllogistic reasoning tasks, or 
whether the absence of a search for counterexamples or alternatives is present in other 
paradigms. 
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Chapter 3 
The search for counterexamples & alternative 
models in spatial transitive inference tasks 
 
Experiment 1 revealed clear evidence to suggest that participants with higher cognitive 
ability were more able to modify their response when evaluating syllogistic reasoning 
problems, dependant on to whether the problems were presented under necessity 
instructions or under possibility instructions.  This effect was found when reasoners 
were required to evaluate PW problems where the first model did not support the 
conclusion, and Impossible problems where no models supported the premises.  There 
was however, no evidence to suggest that reasoners were searching for 
counterexamples or alternatives. 
One possible explanation for the lack of evidence to support the search for 
counterexamples or alternatives, may be because reasoners settled for the first model 
that came to mind, or in other words a conclusion that is ‘good enough’, without making 
an effort to amend their initial conclusion.  This view is consistent with hypothetical 
thinking theory (Evans, 2007a), which claims that when we think hypothetically, we 
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consider only one possible model at a time and use a heuristic or pragmatic process 
relevant to content and context given the goals of the task.  Unless there is good reason 
to reject, modify or replace it, the theory claims that the decision is then accepted 
(satisficing principle). 
However, an alternative explanation is that these findings are specific to syllogistic 
reasoning, predominantly because of problem complexity and linguistic structure.  It is 
widely acknowledged that syllogisms are complicated reasoning problems with two 
premises which may or may not lead to a logically valid conclusion, and it is 
consistently reported in the literature (e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) that some 
problems yield as few as 15% correct responses.  The structure of syllogisms is such 
that the storage and manipulation of the 3 terms (A, B and C) is required, together with 
the application of two out of four quantifiers (all, none, some, or some …. not), so that a 
conclusion may be produced which may or may not include one of those already 
mentioned in the premises.  This processes places a high demand on cognitive 
resources.   
The motivation behind the use of the transitive inference paradigm in the two 
experiments reported in this chapter, is primarily to consider whether the absence of 
evidence to support the search for counterexamples or alternatives is unique to 
syllogistic reasoning, or whether it extends to other reasoning paradigms, which are 
not only less structurally complex, but are also not affected by linguistic ambiguity. 
81 
 
3.1  Introduction to experiments 2 and 3  
Decisions based on our ability to make transitive inferences between two or more 
entities are part of everyday life.  Reasoning behaviours are typically studied using 3-
term series problems, and experimental studies generally require participants to infer 
the direction of a relation between two items (A and C), based on the relationship of 
each to the common term (B), when all differ along a single dimension such as length, 
size or spatial proximity.  Take for example the following statements about Anne, Brian 
and Colin: 
Anne is taller than Brian 
Brian is taller than Colin 
 
which invite the inference that: 
Anne is taller than Colin 
Transitivity is a logical property of some but not all relations, and everyday 
relationships such is next to, are atransitive, in that the premises cannot be arranged on 
a linear scale.  Consider therefore, the following premises James is next to Harry, Harry 
is next to Charlie, to which many reasoners would conclude that Harry is in the middle 
of James and Charlie; when the conclusion is in fact erroneous, since despite the fact 
that James may well be standing next to Charlie, they might be standing in a triangle.  
Yet another group of relations are intransitive, such as Angela is the mother of Bella, 
Bella is the mother of Catherine; because no inference can be made on the transitivity 
of the relationship between Angela and Catherine.   
In the same way that some arrangements and combinations of the quantifiers used in 
syllogisms are easier than others, this is also true for transitive inference problems, 
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although the difficulty tends to be measured using reasoning times rather than error 
rates.  For instance, those which include transforming relational terms to their 
opposites, or resolving negatives, have been found to take longer.  Consider the 
following two problems, this time using abstract terms: 
B is better than C 
A is better than B 
and 
C is worse than B 
B is worse than A 
 
Most people take a relatively short time to provide the correct response to the first of 
these problems but other problems such as the second one, generally take longer, and 
studies (i.e. Evans et al.,1993), have recorded longer reasoning times, with more 
incorrect responses. 
As reviewed in chapter 1, the two most popular theories in relational reasoning over 
the past ten years, have been Imagery theories and Linguistic theory.  Imagery theories 
(De Soto et al., 1965; Huttenlocher, 1968) propose that individuals carry out transitive 
inferences by constructing a visual image of the terms on a horizontal or vertical axis.  
For example, given the relation A is better than B, would put A towards the good end of 
the scale, and given the relation B is worse than A, would put B towards the bad end of 
the scale; and individuals tend to either represent items on a vertical scale with good at 
the top, or on a horizontal scale with good at the left.   
The more linguistic explanation offered by Clark (1969), suggests that certain relational 
terms are lexically marked, and because of this are harder to understand and 
remember.  Unmarked comparatives, such as taller than, can be used in a neutral way 
to convey the relative degrees of the two items on a scale, but in contrast, marked 
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comparatives such as shorter than, can be used to refer only to items towards the 
shorter end of the scale.  It is the unmarked terms which give their names to the scale; 
for example the dimension is called length rather than shortness, and Clark (1969) 
proposes that inferences should be easier with unmarked relational terms than marked 
relational terms, and given the statement A is worse than B, reasoners understand that 
both A and B are bad more quickly than their relative degrees of badness and the 
congruency of the statements, so if the statements both use the relation is better than, 
there is incongruity between the response when asked ‘who is best’. 
Although both Imagery theories and Linguistic theory offer plausible and testable 
accounts of what the mind computes, imagery or spatial array theories such as those 
proposed by DeSoto et al., (1965) and Huttenlocher (Huttenlocher, 1968) more readily 
transfer to the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991), when terms are represented spatially rather than linguistically.  The mental 
model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) proposes that 
reasoners build an initial model representing the information given in the premises, 
from which they form a putative conclusion based on this information.  If the initial 
model supports the conclusion, a search for counterexamples is carried out to find a 
model in which the premises hold, but in which the conclusion is not supported. 
The search for counterexamples has not been widely explored using the transitive 
inference paradigm, perhaps because 3-term series problems are relatively simple 
compared to syllogistic reasoning; and researchers have concentrated more on how the 
terms are represented.  However a small number of studies (Rauh et al., 2000; 
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Vandierendonck, 2000; Vandierendonck et al., 2004) have investigated transitive 
inferences, in relation to whether individuals searched for counterexamples using 
indeterminate multi-model problems.  The results from these studies, led to the 
conclusion that people do not immediately construct all models in multi-model 
problems, but merely construct one integrated model, which is annotated in terms of 
there being a further model or models.  This conclusion was reached by collecting 
latency data, under the premise that multi-model problems would take longer than 
single model problems if models were represented individually, or less time if they 
were represented simultaneously. 
In order to extend the mental model theory which was initially developed within the 
syllogistic reasoning paradigm, so that it provided an explanation for experimental 
findings in transitive inference, Goodwin and Johnson-Laird (2005) introduced a 
revised model theory, with five main principles: 
Iconicity:  The structure of the models is iconic in that it is independent 
from images, while still corresponding to the situation that is 
represented. 
Emergent consequences:  The conclusion emerges from models that 
satisfy their premises. 
Parsimony:  Individuals tend to construct only a single simple, model.   
Strategic assembly:  Individuals develop different strategies which reflect 
the given problem - this assumption was based on the collection of ‘think 
aloud’ protocol; which showed that individuals try out various strategies 
when faced with solving transitive inference problems.   
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Complexity of integration:  The difficulty of relational reasoning depends 
on the number of entities that have to be integrated; therefore the ability 
to reason correctly is affected by the number of models required.  
This extended model theory has been well researched, and the principle of iconicity is 
supported by Knauff and Johnson-Laird (2002) who found that materials eliciting vivid 
imagery as opposed to spatial representations, served to impede rather than aid 
reasoning.  Similarly, the principle of strategic assembly is supported by research 
(Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2006), where the collection of think-aloud protocol 
suggests that individuals develop different strategies reflecting the task in hand. 
However, although Goodwin and Johnson-Laird’s (2005) model based theory supports 
the claims that conclusions are emergent properties of models, it does not support the 
notion of a search for counterexamples as normative behaviour.  Therefore, rather than 
searching for counterexamples, the theory employs the satisficing principle, where 
individuals meet the criteria for adequacy rather than seeking to identify an optimal 
solution13.  The experiment reported in this chapter however, will use the original 
interpretation of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991), which includes a search for counterexamples component. 
3.1.1  Aims and rationale for experiments 2 and 3 
Anderson (1978) argued that the key to understanding our representational system is 
having an unambiguous understanding of both the content and format of the premises, 
                                                             
13  The term satisfice was a originally coined by Simon (1983), who claims that this is because 
human beings lack the cognitive resources to maximise or consider all the relevant possibilities 
with sufficient precision. 
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and posited that the geometric semantics of the materials used in traditional transitive 
inference studies are unclear.  Recently, some researchers (Knauff, Rauh, & Schlieder, 
1995; Knauff et al., 1998; Rauh, Schlieder, & Strube, 1998; Rauh et al., 2000) have 
suggested that the materials used in older studies of transitive inference and relational 
reasoning, such as ‘to the left-of’ and ‘to the right-of’ may be open to ambiguous 
interpretation.  They suggest that when attempting to represent the terms as visual 
images, individuals find the spatial relationships semantically unclear.  For instance the 
premise A is to the left of B might be represented spatially as: 
               A                       B 
Or alternatively, where A is to the left of B, but is also above B. 
                                                               A 
                                                                                           B 
In a bid to overcome possible interpretational problems, such as those illustrated 
above, Knauff, Rauh, & Schlieder (1995) developed a set of materials with clear spatial 
relationships, taken from the area of Artificial Intelligence.  The aim of their study was 
to look at differences in model formation, using the mental model theory (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) as a framework; and as expected, Knauff et 
al. (1995) found that there were preferred conclusions on indeterminate spatial 
transitive inference problems.   
The materials used by Knauff et al. (1995) were founded on Allen’s (1983) algorithmic 
interval-based calculus, which consists of 13 interval-based relations with clear start 
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points and end points, as shown together with their algorithmic symbol and natural 
language description in table 3.1.   
The 13 qualitative relations allow 144 possible14 3-term series compositions, of which 
72 are determinate combinations, in that there is only a single possible logically correct 
response; and the other 72 combinations which yield an indeterminate conclusion fall 
into 4 classes:  42 problems with 3 possible solutions (models), 24 with 5 possible 
solutions (models), 3 problems with 9 possible solutions (models), and 3 problems 
with 13 possible solutions (models). 
Spatial transitive inference problems similar to those developed by Knauff et al. (1995) 
were adopted and modified for experiment 2.  These were presented to participants 
using what is a novel methodology within the paradigm of transitive inference, in terms 
of collecting responses under instructions of necessity and possibility; with the aim of 
further exploring the role of counterexample search and the search for alternative 
models. 
The aim of experiments 2 and 3 was to test the claim made by Mental Model Theorists 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), that reasoners search for 
counterexamples to falsify the first model that comes to mind on indeterminate spatial 
transitive inference problems.  It will also look at whether reasoners search for 
alternative models on indeterminate problem structures when asked if a conclusion is 
possible, and where the first model does not support the conclusion.  
                                                             
14 Although equals is included in Allen's calculus, and as such is a possible answer, this was not 
used in the composition of the 3-term series problems. 
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Table 3.1 
The 13 qualitative interval relations according to Allen (1983), together with 
natural language description and algorithmic symbol 
Relation 
symbol 
Natural language 
description 
        Graphical example 
X < Y X lies to the left of Y  
 
X m Y X touches Y at the left  
X o Y X overlaps Y from the left 
 
X s Y X lies left justified in Y 
 
X d Y X is completely in Y 
 
X f Y X lies right justified in Y 
 
X = Y X equals Y 
 
X fi Y X contains Y right justified 
 
X di Y X surrounds Y 
 
X si Y X contains Y left justified 
 
X oi Y X overlaps  Y from the right 
 
X mi Y X touches Y at the right 
 
X > Y X lies to the right of Y 
 
X  =  Y  = 
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When Knauff et al. (1995) carried out the data collection, a complete set of 3-term term 
series problems was presented to participants (144 problems, excluding equals), using 
natural language descriptions, and instructions to provide a conclusion.  This enabled 
the collection of the percentage number of correct responses; a complete set of 
preferred conclusions for indeterminate problems, together with any subsequent 
models produced (also with percentage response rates), can be found in Knauff et al. 
(1995). This data base of preferred models facilitated the construction of PS and PW 
problems for experiments 2 and 3; where PS problems are those in which the first 
model supports the conclusion, and PW problems have an initial model that negates the 
conclusion.  Examples of these are shown in table 3.2.   
Table 3.2 
Examples and logical definitions for each problem category 
Problem 
category 
Example 
Necessary  
The red line is surrounded by the blue line 
The blue line is to the left of the green line 
The red line is to the left of the green line 
PS 
The red line overlaps the green line from the left 
The green line touches the blue line at the right 
The red line overlaps the blue line from the right 
Impossible  
The red line is surrounded by the blue line 
The blue line is to the left of the green line 
The red line is to the right of the green line 
PW  
The red line overlaps the green line from the left 
The green line touches the blue line at the right 
The red line surrounds the blue line 
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When presented under necessity instructions the first problem category (Necessary) is 
a valid inference; both PS and PW are invalid as more than one conclusion can be 
drawn from the premises; and Impossible problems have a conclusion that is not 
possible. Similarly, under possibility instructions, the first problem category 
(Necessary) is both possible and necessary; this time both PS and PW problems are also 
possible; and the conclusion given for Impossible problems is again not possible. 
In line with experiment 1, a measure of cognitive ability was also taken to look at the 
influence of individual differences in ability.  While the findings to date would generally 
suggest that the search for counterexamples in transitive inference is not the default 
mechanism, it may well be that cognitive ability is a determinant of whether or not this 
mechanism is activated. 
3.1.2  Predictions for experiments 2 and 3 
The predictions relating to endorsement rates, reasoning times and ability are based on 
the general assumptions of the third stage of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991); and are similar to those more explicitly set out for 
experiment 1. 
1. If participants search for counterexamples, under necessity instructions there 
will be fewer endorsements of PS problems than Necessary problems; and if 
participants search for alternatives, under possibility instructions there will be a 
greater number of endorsements of PW problems than Impossible problems. 
2. On problems requiring a search for counterexamples or alternatives, participants 
will take longer. 
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3. The results will be mediated by cognitive ability, in that those participants with 
higher cognitive ability will produce more correct responses, as well as being 
quicker reasoners.  Also participants with higher cognitive ability will take 
proportionately longer on problems requiring a search for counterexamples or 
alternatives, than participants with lower cognitive ability. 
3.2  Pilot study for experiments 2 and 3 
A short pilot study was carried out prior to experiment 2, to identify a set of easily 
understood interval relations with clear geometric semantics, for the relational 
inference task, which with training avoided interpretational ambiguity.  A number of 
studies (Knauff, 1999; Knauff et al., 1995; Rauh et al., 2000) have used all 13 interval 
relations, however some of these relations may be less easily understood as they are 
terms that are not frequently used in everyday English language (e.g. those using the 
terms left justified and right justified).    
Participants 
The participants, who were run individually, were 6 undergraduate and postgraduate 
volunteers from the University of Plymouth; they were all native English speakers, and 
none had formal training in logic.  None of the participants were dyslexic.   
Procedure 
The 13 interval relations used by Knauff et al. (1995) referred to in the introduction,  
together with their natural language description, were presented to participants on an 
A4 sheet of paper (see table 3.3).   The word ‘line’ was used instead of ‘interval’ as this 
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is more commonly used in the English language.  After a short reading period, 
participants were asked for qualitative feedback regarding any interpretational 
problems they encountered; more specifically if they felt that any of the intervals 
relations were ambiguous or difficult to understand. 
Table 3.3 
The 13 qualitative interval relations 
1. The red line lies to the left of the blue line  
 
2. The red line touches the blue line at the left 
 
3. The red line overlaps the blue line from the left 
 
4. The red line lies left justified in the blue line 
 
5. The red line is completely in the blue line 
 
6. The red line lies right justified in the blue line 
 
7. The red line contains the blue line right justified 
 
8. The red line surrounds the blue line 
 
9. The red line contains the blue line left justified 
 
10. The red line overlaps the blue line from the right 
 
11. The red line touches the blue line at the right 
 
12. The red line lies to the right of the blue line 
 
13. The red line equals the blue line 
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Qualitative feedback and discussion 
There was a general consensus that the natural language definitions which included the 
words left justified, or right justified, as in interval relations 4, 6, 7 and 9 (table 3.4) 
were infrequently used in everyday language, and may be less clearly understood; and 
also that the term the red line is completely within the blue line (interval relation 5) 
might be best defined using the words is surrounded by.   
Interval relations 4, 6, 7 and 9 were therefore removed from the list of materials for the 
main study, and interval relation number 5 was amended to read the red line is 
surrounded by the blue line instead of the red line is completely in the blue line.  
3.3  Method for experiment 2  
Design 
This experimental study was carried out using a within-subjects design, when initially 
participants completed an AH4 cognitive ability test.  This was followed by the 
relational inference task, which consisted of three phases: the definition phase, the 
learning and practice phase, and finally the inference phase where participants were 
presented with one block of 32 randomised relational inference problems under 
necessity instructions, and one block of 32 relational inference problems under 
possibility instructions, the order of which was counterbalanced to minimize order 
effects.  
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Participants 
A total of 60 undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth took part in the 
study, in return for either payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 19 males 
and 41 females with a mean age of 25 years, and they were native English speakers.  No 
participants were dyslexic, had received formal training in logic, or were colour blind.  
The exclusion of colour-blind participants is particularly relevant, since participants 
needed to be able to distinguish between red, blue and green lines, and it has been 
reported that approximately 99% of people suffering from colour blindness (8% - 12% 
of males of European origin and about one-half of 1% of females) have problems in 
distinguishing between red and green.   
Materials and procedure  
The procedure adopted was broadly similar to the experiment using syllogisms, which 
was reported in chapter 2.  Participants were run in groups of between 4 and 7 in a 
laboratory containing several computers.  Each participant was seated at their own 
workstation, to avoid distraction.  
Cognitive Ability Test 
Initially, as a measure of ability, participants completed Parts I and II of the AH4 Test of 
Cognitive Ability (Heim, 1968), which was administered in accordance with the test 
instructions and followed the procedure used in experiment 1.  Question booklets and 
answers sheets were collected by the experimenter before moving on to the relational 
inference task.   
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Relational inference task:   
This task consisted of three phases, and used the materials identified in the pilot study.   
The first was the definition phase, was when pictures depicting the location of 9 red and 
a blue interval relations were presented to participants, along with a short commentary 
about the location of the beginnings and endings of these intervals; in the learning and 
practice phase, participants were tested on their understanding of these interval 
relations; and the inference phase involved presenting participants with one block of 
randomised 32 relational inference problems under necessity instructions, and one 
block of randomised 32 relational inference problems under possibility instructions.  
Table 3.4 
The 9 interval relations used for the study, together with an explanation of the 
semantics relating to the ordering of starting points and ending points 
Semantic description Graphical definition 
The red line lies to the left of the blue line  
 
The red line touches the blue line at the left 
 
The red line overlaps the blue line from the left 
 
The red line is surrounded by the blue line 
 
The red line surrounds the blue line 
 
The red line overlaps the blue line from the right 
 
The red line touches the blue line at the right 
 
The red line lies to the right of the blue line 
 
The red line equals the blue line 
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Definition phase:  Participants read descriptions of the semantic relationships between 
a red and a blue line, in order to familiarise themselves with the terminology that was 
going to be used in the inference task. These descriptions were printed on A4 paper, 
when each depiction was accompanied by a graphical representation that matched the 
relationship between the two lines (see table 3.4).  After a period of 2 minutes this 
information was removed. 
Learning and practice phase:  At the start of this phase, participants were given an A4 
sheet of paper showing the semantic description of the same 9 interval relations used 
in the definition phase; these were numbered 1 – 9.  This was to test how well 
participants understood the terminology in the relational inference phase.  For 
example: 
Graphical definition:                5. 
Participants were also given a list of the 9 graphical definitions in randomized order 
and instructed to write the number of the interval relation that correctly depicted the 
description in the box at the side.  An example is shown below, and a full set of the 
semantic descriptions and definitions can be found in appendix 3A and appendix 3B. 
Semantic description:   The red line is surrounded by the blue line   
After confirmation of his/her final choices, each participant was told whether the 
choices were correct or incorrect.  The learning and practice criterion was 
accomplished when participants had worked through two such lists consecutively, 
without error; and the graphical definitions were randomized in 8 different ways, so 
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that even if participants took several attempts to complete the learning and practice 
phase, the order of the graphical definitions was different. 
Inference task:  The set of 32 3-term series problems and conclusions was constructed 
using the 8 (9 including ‘equals’) interval relations which had been identified in the 
pilot phase and which participants had become familiar with during the learning and 
practice phase.  The 8 interval combinations in each category (Necessary, PS, 
Impossible, and PW) were selected from the correct and preferred responses to 64 
possible combinations of these interval relations, using the following criteria: 
Necessary problems:  the percentage correct responses were rank 
ordered, from which the top 8 were selected, with mean endorsement 
rates of between 90% and 97%. 
PS problems:  The correct response percentages for multiple model 
(indeterminate) problems were rank ordered by the most common 
response, from which the top 8 were selected, with mean endorsement 
rates of between 63% and 91%.  
Impossible problems:  the conclusions for the Necessary problems were 
reversed to provide 3-term Impossible problems. 
PW problems:  the same problem structures were used as for PS 
problems, but one of the other less preferred possible responses was 
used, as a conclusion for evaluation.  The selection of these was arbitrary 
as the percentage endorsement rates for the other options were not 
given individually  
 
A computer with a 15” monitor screen was used to present the problems, with the 
computer program.  The keyboard was adapted to include yes and no keys, which were 
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systematically counterbalanced, so that half the participants had the yes key on the left 
of the keyboard and the no key on the right, while the other half had these positions 
reversed.    
The two sets of written task instructions which included examples of the screen layout, 
were printed on A4 paper, and were similar to those used in experiment 1.  These 
related to whether problems were being evaluated for either necessity correctness, or 
possibility correctness.  Examples of the screen layouts are shown in table 3.5, and a 
complete set of instructions is presented in appendix 3C and appendix 3D.  
The instructions were distributed (necessity or possibility) for the first block of 
problems and after a short reading period, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions on any points that they were less clear about.  The participants were also 
told that they should ask the experimenter for the second set of instructions (necessity 
or possibility) as soon as a message appeared on the screen, and reminded that at the 
start of each block there were two practice questions.  Participant responses, yes or no, 
were recorded by the program, together with the time taken to indicate understanding 
of the problem (screen 1) and the time taken to complete the reasoning process (screen 
2).  These were saved to disc. 
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Table 3.5 
Screen layouts included in task instructions 
    
   Screen 1 
 
 
    Screen 2 
 
    Screen 1 
 
 
    Screen 2 
 
 
3.4  Results for experiment 2  
The AH4 test sheets were scored in accordance with the test instructions, when one 
mark was given for each correct answer.  There was a significant positive correlation 
between Parts I and II (r = .57, p < .01), and in line with previous research (Newstead et 
al., 2004) the scores from both parts were totalled to give an overall general ability 
Given that 
The red line surrounds the green line 
The green line touches the blue line at the left 
Given that: 
The red line surrounds the green line 
The blue line lies to the left of the green line 
Given that:                 
The red line surrounds the green line 
The blue line lies to the left of the green line 
Is it necessary that  
The red line lies to the left of the blue line 
Given that:                 
The red line surrounds the green line 
The blue line lies to the left of the green line 
Is it possible that  
The red line lies to the left of the blue line 
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score for each participant.  The observed mean for participants was 89.68 (SD = 15.54), 
which was considerably lower than the mean reported for experiment 1 (M = 98.30; SD 
= 12.90) and for the available norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) for university students (Heim, 
1968).  The sample was divided into high and low cognitive ability groups, on the basis 
of a median split on the AH4 test scores; cases below the median of 91 were classified 
as low ability and those above the median were classified as high ability. None of the 
participants recorded a score of 91.  The median was also considerably lower than for 
experiment 1 (median = 100.5). 
All participants evaluated conclusions under both necessity instructions and possibility 
instructions.  The first dependent variable was the mean percentage endorsement rates 
for each problem category, i.e. the number of yes responses.  The second dependent 
variable was the time course of the reasoning process; that is to say both premise 
processing and response times together.  These were totalled for each problem type 
and instruction group to produce a mean reasoning time (in milliseconds).  The results 
from the endorsement rate data are reported first; followed by the results from the 
reasoning time data.  All ANOVA tables for experiment 2 are shown in appendix 3E 
3.4.1  Conclusion endorsement rates  
The mean percentage endorsement rates for all four types of problem are shown in 
table 3.6, broken down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low 
ability group and the high ability group represent the mean percentage endorsement 
rates for the responses from 30 participants. 
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Table 3.6 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 2, on all problem types (N 
= 60, SD in brackets) 
 Necessary  PS  Impossible  PW 
Necessary            
Low 71 (20.00)  61 (22.35)  32 (22.43)  35 (23.92) 
High 77 (19.16)  66 (21.76)  26 (20.86)  31 (30.04) 
M 74 (19.65)  64 (21.99)  29 (21.68)  33 (27.02) 
Possibility            
Low 74 (20.06)  63 (21.67)  28 (19.68)  59 (23.48) 
High 73 (18.10)  71 (25.29)  28 (18.26)  68 (28.76) 
M 73 (18.95)  67 (23.68)  28 (18.82)  64 (26.47) 
 
Necessary and PS problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of problem type [F(1,58) = 11.93, p < .001, p2 = .17], reflecting higher 
endorsement rates for Necessary problems than for PS problems.  The main effects of 
instruction [F(1,58) = .29, p = .59], and ability [F(1,58) = 1.17, p = .28], were not 
significant, and there were no significant interactions. 
The main effect of problem type confirms that some participants were able to 
discriminate between problem structures, but there was no evidence to suggest that 
participants understood the differences between instruction types, and the lack of 
interaction between instruction and problem type failed to support a search for 
counterexamples.  These results were consistent with experiment 1.    
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Impossible and PW problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 22.75, p < .001, p2 = .28], and problem type [F(1,58) = 
33.79, p < .001, p2 = .37].  This reflected higher endorsement rates under possibility 
instructions than endorsement rates under necessity instructions, and more 
endorsements of PW problems than Impossible problems.  Both of these results are 
consistent with experiment 1, and suggest that participants had an understanding 
between instructions, and problem types.  The main effect of ability was not significant 
[F(1,58) = .01, p = .94]. 
 
Figure 3.1.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 2, on Impossible and 
PW problems under necessity and possibility instructions 
There was a significant interaction between instruction and problem type [F(1,58) = 
32.44, p < .001, p2 = .36], which supported the search for alternatives, when 
participants went past the first model on PW problems under possibility instructions 
(see figure 3.1).  This interaction was not found in experiment 1.  A repeated measures 
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t-test confirmed that there was a significant difference between Impossible and PW 
problems under possibility instructions, but the difference was not significant when 
problems were presented under instructions of necessity [t(59) = .99, p = .32].     
3.4.2  Reasoning times 
The mean percentage reasoning times for all types of problem are shown in table 3.7, 
broken down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low ability 
group and the high ability group represent the mean reasoning times for the responses 
from 30 participants, and are shown in milliseconds.   
Table 3.7 
Mean reasoning times in milliseconds for experiment 2, on all problem types (N = 60, 
SD in brackets) 
 Necessary PS Impossible PW 
Necessary         
Low 20891 (10024) 20843 (8233) 22845 (12003) 21300 (9868) 
High 16731 (5160) 19935 (6421) 19479 (6163) 19015 (5722) 
M 18811 (8178) 20389 (7334) 21162 (9611) 20158 (8080) 
Possibility         
Low 21069 (9305) 19666 (7506) 20331 (9866) 20228 (10999) 
High 20130 (5247) 21100 (6040) 19834 (5394) 19701 (4527) 
M 20600 (7504) 20383 (6793) 20083 (7887) 19964 (8343) 
 
Necessary and PS problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test was carried out, 
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but there were no main effects of instruction [F(1,58) = .56, p = .46], problem type 
[F(1,58) = 1.59, p = .21], or ability [F(1,58) = .73, p = .40]15.    
There was however a significant interaction between instruction and problem type 
[F(1,58) = 4.10, p < .05, p2 = .07], when under necessity instructions, participants took 
longer on PS problems than on Necessary problems (see figure 3.2) supporting the 
search for counterexamples.  Follow up repeated measures t-tests confirmed there was 
a significant difference between reasoning times on Necessary and PS problems under 
necessity instructions [t(59) = 2.14, p < .05], but the difference was not significant 
under possibility instruction [t(59) = .31, p = .76]. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Mean reasoning times (in milliseconds) for experiment 2, on Necessary and 
PS problems under necessity and possibility instructions 
                                                             
15 An equivalent analysis was repeated with log-transformed reasoning times for Necessary and 
PS inferences, because of the number of outliers, but there were no significant main effects.   
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There was also a significant interaction between problem type and ability [F(1,58) = 
6.77, p < .05, p2 = .11], which is illustrated in figure 3.3.  The high ability group took 
significantly longer on PS problems, which is confirmed by a repeated measures t-test 
[t(29) = 2.75, p <.01]; while the low ability group took less time on PS problems [t(29) = 
.94, p = .35].   
 
Figure 3.3.  Mean reasoning times (in milliseconds) for experiment 2, on Necessary and 
PS problems for low and high ability groups  
The increased reasoning times recorded by the high ability group may be because of a 
search for counterexamples; although no firm conclusions can be drawn as this was 
across both types of instruction.   
Impossible and PW problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test was carried out, but 
there were no main effects of instruction [F(1,58) = .19, p = .66], problem type [F(1,58) 
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= .79, p = .38], or ability [F(1,58) = .31, p = .26]; and there were no significant 
interactions16. 
3.5  Discussion for experiment 2 
The purpose of this experiment was to explore whether the lack of evidence to support 
the search for counterexamples and alternatives in experiment 1 was because 
participants were merely satisficing and accepting a 'good enough' conclusion without 
seeking the optimum solution.  Alternatively the lack of evidence may be because the 
results were specific to syllogistic reasoning, when problem complexity and structure 
produced results that are uncharacteristic of deductive reasoning processes on other 
paradigms.   
Although the evidence is limited, there is some support from experiment 2 for the 
search for alternative models in relational reasoning, as envisaged by the third stage of 
the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1994), 
specifically in terms of the endorsement rate data, there was evidence of a search for 
alternative models on PW problems under instructions of necessity.  These findings are 
in sharp contrast to experiment 1, where there was no evidence to support either the 
search for counterexamples, or the search for alternatives.  However, in line with 
experiment 1, the endorsement rates for PS problems under necessity instruction did 
not provide evidence of a search for counterexamples.   
                                                             
16 An equivalent analysis was repeated with log-transformed reasoning times for Impossible and 
PW inferences, because of the number of outliers, but there were no significant effects.   
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The endorsement rate data also suggests that participants understood the differences 
between Necessary, PS, Impossible and PW relational inference problems, because 
there were significant differences in endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
problems, and Impossible and PW problems.  The data also suggests that participants 
understood the difference between being required to make judgements of necessity 
and judgements of possibility.  This support was in line with experiment 1, which in 
turn confirmed previous research (Evans et al., 1999), and it was particularly important 
to explore and establish this in experiment 2, because this is a novel experiment in 
relational inference studies. 
The key findings to support the search for counterexamples were provided by the 
latency data; when reasoners spent extra time on PS problems under necessity 
instructions, as would be expected if a search was carried out for counterexamples to 
correctly invalidate the given conclusion.  This was further clarified by the interaction 
between problem type and ability, where there was evidence that it was the high ability 
group who were more likely to search for counterexamples.  Nevertheless, these results 
were not supported to the endorsement rate data, but this may be because despite a 
search being carried out, this search was unsuccessful; despite it being reasonable to 
expect that at least the higher ability group were able to do so.   
One possible reason for the lack of effects on endorsement rates for PS problems under 
necessity instructions, is that all (low and high ability) participants were employing the 
satisficing principle on PS problems, where participants met the criteria for adequacy 
rather than looking for the optimum solution (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005).  A 
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problem with this explanation is that the satisficing principle claims human beings lack 
the cognitive resources to consider all relevant possibilities; when clearly there is some 
evidence to suggest that the participants had, and were using, additional cognitive 
resources to search for alternative models on PW problems under possibility 
instructions.  Furthermore, the findings are a poor fit with Goodwin and Johnson-
Laird's (2005) principle of parsimony, when the suggestion is that individuals 
construct only a single simple model; because if this was the case, again there would 
have been no evidence, from either endorsement rates or latencies, of reasoners 
carrying out a search for counterexamples or alternatives.   
The results are also inconsistent with previous research (Rauh et al., 2000; 
Vandierendonck, 2000; Vandierendonck et al., 2004), claiming that reasoners do not 
search for counterexamples on indeterminate problems; based on findings that there 
were no differences in latencies between multi-model problems and single model 
problems.  While with the latency data it may be fair to conclude from experiment 2 
that under possibility instructions, participants did not take longer on PW problems 
therefore they did not search for alternative models, there was evidence of a search for 
counterexamples on PS problems suggesting that reasoners did not merely annotate 
one integrated model as posited by Vandierendonck et al. (2004.)   
It is important to note that the observed mean for experiment 2 (M = 89.68) was 
considerably lower than the available norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) and the mean for 
experiment 1 (M = 98.30; SD = 12.90).  Furthermore, it is interesting that previous 
research (Knauff et al., 1995) reported very high percentage endorsement rates on 
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determinate problems presented under instructions of necessity (between 90% and 
97%), from which the Necessary problems were taken, but the mean percentage 
endorsement rates recorded in experiment 2 were much lower at 71% for the low 
ability group and 77% for the high ability group.  Therefore, we should not discount the 
fact that the results may have been influenced simply by the sample being less able to 
search for counterexamples, but nevertheless able to discriminate between necessity 
and possibility instructions, and problem types. 
Other explanations which may be responsible for the lack of conclusive findings to 
support the search for counterexamples, and the disparity between the endorsement 
rate and latency results, is that the success of the learning and practice phase (which 
includes training) was limited.  Anderson (1978) argued that reasoners need to have a 
clear understanding of the content and format of the spatial compositions in a problem, 
and if this is not achieved it leads to what Evans (1972) refers to as interpretational 
problems, where the results deviate from the researchers expectations because 
reasoners have a different understanding of the semantics of the premises from that of 
the experimenter, or at least a lack of clarity in the terminology used.   Furthermore, 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) argued that individuals who are unfamiliar with a 
particular domain may lack the skills to prevent poor performance, and found that 
individuals, who were trained with the necessary skills to carry out deductive 
reasoning tasks, increased the accuracy of judgements on a number of Wason selection 
tasks.  Prowse, Turner and Thompson (2009) reported also, that immediate feedback 
was more effective in remedying misunderstandings found in syllogistic reasoning 
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tasks, leading to improved performance on a number of determinate and indeterminate 
syllogistic reasoning problems.   
In view of the somewhat inconclusive evidence to support the search for 
counterexamples or alternatives, concerns about the lower than average ability rates, 
and the effectiveness of the learning and practice phase which was responsible for 
training participants to a similar level of understanding of the terms used, it was 
decided to run a second transitive inference experiment.  This was also influenced by 
observations that during the pencil and paper learning and practice phase in 
experiment 2, a number of participants did not appear to engage with the task, 
resulting in a considerable delay for those participants who provided the correct 
response at the first presentation.   
A further consideration in the planning of a second transitive inference experiment, 
was that although the procedure for our training phase was loosely based on previous 
work by Knauff (1995), the feedback in experiment 2 was given verbally at the end of 
each presentation of 2 complete sets of line relationships.  On the other hand, Knauff 
(1995) carried out the testing phase electronically, with immediate feedback after each 
individual line relationship, and this may have had a bearing on the results.   
The next section of this chapter will discuss relevant research on learning and practice, 
and the need for participants to have a clear understanding of the materials and 
instructions.  Following this experiment 3 will be reported, which is broadly similar to 
experiment 2, but with a modified learning and practice phase, and it is predicted that 
this will facilitate the search for counterexamples and alternatives. 
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3.6  Introduction and rationale for experiment 3  
The reasoning times from experiment 2 revealed evidence to suggest that under 
instructions of necessity, individuals carried out a search for counterexamples on 
indeterminate problems that are frequently erroneously endorsed as being valid (PS).  
There was also evidence from the endorsement rate data that under possibility 
instructions, individuals searched for alternative models when the first model did not 
support the conclusion (PW).  However as discussed in the previous section, the results 
are inconclusive, and the observed reasoning behaviours may be due to an ineffective 
learning and practice phase. 
Early research into human performance (Fitts & Posner, 1967) suggests that the first 
stage of acquiring a cognitive skill, thus permitting the learner to generate the desired 
normative behaviour, is the cognitive stage; during which learners rehearse the 
information required for the execution of the behaviour.  It is at this stage where the 
learner receives instruction and information about the behaviour in order to be able to 
perform a cognitive task, which in this study was a spatial relational inference task.  
Anderson (1982) further breaks this down into the declarative stage and the 
interpretive stage.  First they claim that the initial knowledge is integrated into the 
system by being encoded declaratively, in other words understanding what should be 
done rather than how to do it.  In order to successfully translate this into normative 
behaviour, the knowledge then needs to move into the interpretive stage which is when 
the information is learned.  Within the context of experiment 2, it may be that although 
participants successfully encoded the materials declaratively, the interpretive stage 
was not successfully accomplished by the learning and practice phase. 
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Studies looking at the impact of training and instruction on both logical and statistical 
reasoning tasks (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980); report significant improvements in the reasoning skills of 
individuals after training and practice.  For example, Fong et al. (1986) found that 
statistical and conceptual training improved statistical reasoning performance on a 
variety of reasoning problems, and also that participants were able to successfully 
apply the training they had been given to a number of problems in different domains.  It 
is not clear if the results reported by Fong et al. (1986) took into account whether all 
participants understood the concepts involved; and one of the key concerns with 
experiment 2 is whether all participants reached a similar level of understanding, in 
order to be able to apply their understanding of the terms to the reasoning problems. 
More recently, Neilens (2004) explored the role of individual differences in mediating 
the effectiveness of training; and reported that participants of higher ability were more 
able to understand and apply the principles they had been taught to a number of 
reasoning tasks.  Again there is no indication whether all participants reached a similar 
level of understanding, but this point is relevant given the concerns about the mean 
AH4 scores which were recorded.       
Clearly it is important for all participants to understand the terms used, and to learn 
the terms, in order to understand how to apply this knowledge.  As discussed at the end 
of experiment 2, the results were inconclusive, and there was disparity between the 
results from the endorsement rates and the latencies.  Therefore, to encourage 
normative responding on the 3-term series spatial inference problems, the learning and 
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practice phase was changed to reflect the electronic presentation used by Knauff 
(1995), which included immediate feedback on the correctness of the judgement made 
by the participants (Prowse, 2009) .          
3.6.1  Predictions for experiment 3 
The predictions are based on the general assumptions of the third stage of the mental 
model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and the success of 
the revised learning and practice phase.  These are set out in experiment 2, and more 
explicitly explained in experiment 1.    
3.7  Design and method for experiment 3 
The design of experiment 3 was the same as experiment 2, in that it was an 
experimental study employing a within-subjects design.  Initially participants 
completed an AH4 cognitive ability test, followed by the relational inference task, which 
consisted of three phases: the definition phase, the learning and practice phase.  The 
final phase was the inference phase where participants were presented with one block 
of 32 relational inference problems under necessity instructions, and one block of 32 
relational inference problems under possibility instructions, the order of which was 
counterbalanced to minimize order effects.  
Participants 
A total of 60 undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth took part in the 
study, in return for either payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 14 males 
and 46 females with a mean age of 24 years, and they were all native English speakers.  
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No participants were dyslexic, had received formal training in logic, or were colour 
blind (see experiment 2). 
Materials and procedure for experiment 3 
The procedure was similar to experiment 2, but with changes to the learning and 
practice phase in order to maximise the effectiveness.  Participants were run in groups 
of between 2 and 5 in a laboratory containing several computers.  Each participant was 
seated at their own workstation, to avoid distraction.   
Cognitive Ability Test 
Initially, as a measure of ability, participants completed Parts I and II of the AH4 Test of 
Cognitive Ability (Heim, 1968), which was administered in accordance with the test 
instructions and followed the procedure used in experiments 1. Question booklets and 
answers sheets were collected by the experimenter before moving on to the inference 
task.      
Relational inference task   
Participants then went on to complete the three phases of the main task: the definition 
phase when the graphical relationships and semantic explanation between two lines 
were defined; the revised learning and practice phase when participants were tested for 
their understanding of these terms, and the inference phase, where a number of 
inference problems were presented.   
Definition phase:  This phase remained unchanged, in that participants read 
descriptions of the semantic relationships between a red and a blue line together with a 
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graphical description; this was to familiarise them with the terminology that was going 
to be used in the inference task.  After a period of 2 minutes the graphical definitions 
were removed, and the participants moved on to the improved learning and practice 
phase, followed by the inference phase, both of which were presented and executed on  
a computer with a 15” monitor screen, using the computer program.  
Learning and practice phase: This phase was improved from that used in experiment 2 
to assist learning, and to practice the relational terms to facilitate the inference task.  It 
consisted of blocks of trials of all 9 relations, in which participants were presented with 
a one-sentence description of the red and blue line.  Participants were given an A4 
sheet of paper showing the semantic descriptions of the same 9 interval relations used 
in the definition phase, numbered 1 – 9, and required to select the appropriate number 
from the list of graphical representations, by pressing the associated number at the top 
of the computer keyboard.  Feedback was given by computer program as to whether 
their choice was correct or false.  Participants were told that there were no time 
restrictions; and if the correct response was provided the program would move onto 
the next graphical definition, but if the response was incorrect an error message would 
appear on screen and the program would spool back to the first randomized problem.  
See table 3.8 for examples of the screenshots.  The graphical relations were randomised 
within each trial, and the learning and practice criterion was accomplished as soon as 2 
consecutive complete sets (9 definitions) were correctly identified.  
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Table 3.8   
Examples of the screenshots used in the learning and practice phase for experiment 3 
  
 
Inference task:  The set of 32 3-term series problems and conclusions were the same as 
the ones used in experiment 2, and identified in the pilot study.  The problems 
consisted of the 8 (9 including equals) interval relations that participants had become 
familiar with during the learning and practice and training phase.  The two sets of task 
instructions and the procedure were also the same as those used in experiment 2.   
The computer keyboard was adapted to include yes and no keys for the inference phase, 
which were systematically counterbalanced, so that half the participants had the yes 
key on the left of the keyboard and the no key on the right, while the other half had 
these positions reversed.  Participant responses, yes or no, were recorded by the 
program, together with the time taken to indicate understanding of the problem and 
the time taken to complete the reasoning process.  These were saved to disc. 
 
 
 
 
The red line is surrounded by the blue line 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8    9 
 
False 
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3.8  Results for experiment 3 
The AH4 test sheets were scored in accordance with the test instructions, when one 
mark was given for each correct answer.  There was a significant positive correlation 
between Parts I and II (r = .44, p < .01), and in line with previous research (Newstead et 
al., 2004) the scores from both parts were totalled to give an overall general ability 
score for each participant.  The observed mean for participants was 95.56 (SD = 14.28), 
which was similar to the available norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) for university students 
(Heim, 1968).  This was considerably lower than that reported for experiment 1 
(102.78), but higher than the mean reported for experiment 2 (89.68).  The sample was 
divided into high and low cognitive ability groups, on the basis of a median split on the 
AH4 test scores; cases below the median of 95 were classified as low ability and those 
above the median were classified as high ability. None of the participants recorded a 
score of 95.  The median was lower than recorded for experiment 2 (median = 91), and 
considerably lower than for experiment 1 (median = 100.5). 
All participants evaluated conclusions under both necessity instructions and possibility 
instructions.  The first dependent variable was the mean percentage endorsement rates 
for each problem category, i.e. the number of yes responses.  The second dependent 
variable was the time course of the reasoning process; that is to say both premise 
processing and response times together.  These were totalled for each problem type 
and instruction group to produce a mean reasoning time (in milliseconds).  The results 
from the endorsement rate data are reported first; followed by the results from the 
reasoning time data (see appendix 3F for ANOVA tables).  One participant was excluded 
before analysis, because it was observed that he did not engage with the task, the yes 
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response was selected in most instances, and latencies were excessively long due to 
frequent questions directed at the experimenter.   
3.8.1  Conclusion endorsement rates  
The mean percentage endorsement rates for all four types of problem are shown in 
table 3.9, broken down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low 
ability group represent the mean percentage endorsement rates for the responses from 
30 participants, and the cells for the high ability group represent the mean percentage 
endorsement rates for the responses from 29 participants. 
Necessary and PS problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,57) = 7.62, p < .001, p2 = .12], reflecting higher endorsement 
rates when problems were presented under possibility instructions than when they  
were presented under necessity instructions, and of problem type [F(1,57) = 23.34,  
.001, p2 = .29], whereby Necessary problems were endorsed more frequently than PS 
problems.  This suggests that not only were participants able to discriminate between 
problem types, which is consistent with experiments 1 and 2, but also that they were 
able to distinguish between instructions.  There was no main effect of ability [F(1,57) = 
1.66, p = .20]. 
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Table 3.9 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment, 3 on all problem types (N 
= 59, SD in brackets) 
 Necessary  PS  Impossible  PW 
Necessary            
Low 75 (16.24)  64 (20.33)  24 (21.36)  31 (26.00) 
High 80 (17.76)  51 (26.80)  22 (19.301  14 (18.40) 
M 77 (17.03)  58 (24.35)  23 (20.21  23 (24.06) 
Possibility            
Low 68 (21.96)  66 (23.01)  26 (19.24)  58 (29.65) 
High 84 (16.67)  76 (16.48)  24 (22.89)  69 (26.85) 
M 76 (20.93)  71 (20.96)  25 (20.96)  63 (28.70) 
 
There were three significant interactions.  The first of these was between instruction 
and problem type [F(1,57) = 14.64, p < .001, p2  = .20], which provided support for the 
search for counterexamples, suggesting that participants went past the first model on 
PS problems under necessity instructions (see figure 3.4).   
 
Figure 3.4.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 3, on Necessary and PS 
problems under necessity and possibility instructions  
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Follow up between subjects t-tests confirmed that there was a significant difference in 
endorsement rates for Necessary and PS problems under necessity instruction [t(58 = 
5.27, p < .001], but not under possibility instructions [t(58 = 1.77, p = .08].  These 
effects were not found in experiments 1 or 2 
The second interaction was between instruction and ability [F(1,57) = 12.65, p < .001, 
p2 = .18], when the high ability endorsed fewer problems under necessity instructions 
than the low ability group; but more problems under possibility instructions than the 
low ability group (see figure 3.5).  This was confirmed by follow up between subjects t-
tests when high ability participants endorsed significantly more problems under 
possibility instructions than under necessity instructions [t(28) = 4.08, p < .001], but 
the low ability group did not appear to make this distinction [t(29) = .63, p = .54].  
 
Figure 3.5.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 3, for the low and high 
ability groups under necessity and possibility instructions 
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Figure 3.6.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 3, for the low and high 
ability groups on Necessary and PS problems 
The third interaction was between problem type and ability [F(1,57) = 5.14, p < .05, p2 
= .08] suggesting that high ability participants were more able to distinguish between 
problem types (see figure 3.6).  This was confirmed by follow up within subjects t-tests 
when high ability participants endorsed significantly more Necessary problems than PS 
problems [t(29) = 5.10, p < .001], but the low ability group treated both types of 
problem in a similar way [t(29) = 1.79, p = .08].  This is consistent with experiment 1, 
but not with experiment 2. 
Impossible and PW problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,57) = 58.33, p < .001, p2 = .51], and of problem type [F(1,57) = 
31.76, p < .001, p2 = .36], reflecting higher endorsement rates when problems were 
presented under possibility instructions than under necessity instructions, and higher 
endorsement rates for PW problems than for Impossible problems.  This was consistent 
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with experiments 1 and 2, and suggests that participants understood the differences 
between both instruction and problem type.   There was no main effect of ability 
[F(1,57) = .48, p = .48].  
There was a significant two way interaction between instruction and problem type 
[F(1,57)] = 52.53, p < .001, p2 = .48], when endorsement rates were significantly 
different under possibility instructions but not under necessity instructions (figure 
3.7).  This was confirmed by repeated measures t-tests between Impossible and PW 
problems, where the difference was significant under possibility instructions [t(58) = 
7.30, p < .001], but not under necessity instructions [t(58) = .13, p = .90].  This provided 
support for the search for alternative models, which was in line with experiment 2.   
 
Figure 3.7.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 3, on Impossible and 
PW problems under necessity and possibility instructions  
There was also a significant three way interaction, between instruction, problem type 
and ability [F(1,57) = 7.91, p < .05, p2 = .12], suggesting that there was a different 
pattern of responding between ability groups, for problems presented under necessity 
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instructions (see figure 3.8) and problems presented under possibility instructions (see 
figure 3.9).   
Between subject t-tests confirmed that under necessity instructions, the high ability 
group endorsed significantly less PW problems than the low ability group [t(28) = 2.97, 
p < .005], suggesting the high ability participants were more able to understand the 
meaning of logical necessity; but there was no difference in endorsement rates for 
Impossible problems [t(28) = .25, p .80].  Also there was no difference in the number of 
problems endorsed by the low ability group for Impossible and PW problems [t(29) = 
1.42, p < = .17], although the high ability group did endorse significantly more 
Impossible than PW problems  [t(28) = 2.67, p < .05]. 
 
Figure 3.8.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 3, on Impossible and 
PW problems for both ability groups, under necessity instructions  
Within subject t-tests confirmed that under possibility instructions, both ability groups 
endorsed significantly more PW than Impossible problems; low ability [t(29) = 4.58, p < 
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.01] and high ability [t(29) = 5.76, p < .01] indicating that they had a good 
understanding of the differences between Impossible and PW problems.   There was no 
difference in endorsement rates between ability groups for Impossible problems [t(57) 
= 1.02, p = .38] or PW problems [t(57) = .56, p = .46]. 
 
 
Figure 3.9.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 3, on Impossible and 
PW problems for both ability groups, under possibility instructions 
3.8.2  Reasoning times 
The mean reasoning times for all four types of problem are shown in table 3.10, broken 
down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low ability group 
represent the mean reasoning times for the responses from 30 participants, and the 
cells for the high ability group represent the mean reasoning times for the responses 
from 29 participants, and are shown in milliseconds.   
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Table 3.10 
Mean reasoning times in milliseconds for experiment 3, on all problem types (N = 59, 
SD brackets)  
 Necessary PS Impossible PW 
Necessary         
Low 20697 (8369) 21081 (8780) 19565 (8736) 20076 (7458) 
High 16453 (6224) 19363 (7006) 17250 (5478) 17918 (6335) 
M 18611 (7636) 20236 (7937) 18427 (7349) 19015 (6955) 
Possibility         
Low 22835 (12336) 22303 (8691) 21971 (9178) 20771 (78667) 
High 17254 (7549) 19143 (8161) 17918 (7972) 17923 (6884) 
M 20092 (10560) 20749 (8512) 19979 (8774) 19371 (7376) 
 
Necessary and PS problems  
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed no main 
effect of instruction type [F(1,57) = 1.03, p = .32] which is consistent with experiments 
1 and 2.  The main effect of problem type just missed statistical significance [F(1,57) = 
3.81, p = .056, p2 = .06] when Necessary inferences (M = 19310) took less time than PS 
inferences (M = 20473); as did the main effect of ability [F(1,57) = 1.03, p = .052, p2 = 
.07], suggesting that high ability participants (M = 18053) were quicker reasoners than 
low ability participants (M  = 21729).  These effects were not found in experiments 1 or 
2. 
There was a significant interaction between problem type and ability [F(1,57) = 1.03, p 
< .05, p2 = .07], suggesting that high ability participants were quicker reasoners across 
problem types, and they were more able to discriminate between Necessary and PS 
problems (figure 3.10).   
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Figure 3.10.  Mean reasoning times (in milliseconds) for experiment 3, on Necessary 
and PS problems for low and high ability groups   
 
A follow up within subjects t-test confirmed that those in the high ability group took 
significantly longer on PS problems than on Necessary problems [t(28) = 2.94, p < 
.001]; while the difference for the low ability group was not significant [t(29) = .09, p = 
.93].  There was also a significant difference between the ability groups on response 
times for Necessary problems [F(1,28) = 5.78, p < .05], when high ability participants 
were faster, although this did not extend to PS problems [F(1,28) = 1.75, p = .19].  As 
discussed in the introduction to experiment 1, we do not have evidence to predict that 
participants recognise that on Necessary problems a search for other models is not 
necessary.  However we do know that mental model theory predicts that a search for 
counterexamples is required on PS problems under instructions of necessity.  This may 
have contributed to the longer response times for the high ability group. 
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Impossible and PW problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed no main 
effect of instruction type [F(1,57) = 1.36, p = .25], problem type [F(1,57) = 1.00, p = 
1.00], or ability [F(1,57) = 3.00, p = .09], and there were no interactions.  These results 
were consistent with experiments 1 and 217. 
3.9  Discussion for experiment 3 
The purpose of experiment 3 was to address a number of concerns regarding 
experiment 2, in terms of lower than norm ability scores, the provision of immediate 
feedback, and participants failing to engage with the learning and practice phase.  
Increased emphasis was put on the learning and practice phase to bring it in line with 
the methodology used by Knauff (1995), when immediate feedback was provided to 
participants, as to the correctness of judgements made on the spatial relationship 
between two terms.   
Consistent with previous experiments, there was evidence from the endorsement rate 
data that participants understood the differences between necessity and possibility 
instructions, and also the differences between problem structures.  There was clear 
support from the endorsement rate data that a search was carried out for 
counterexamples on PS problems under necessity instructions (in contrast to 
experiment 2), and that a search for alternatives on PW problems was carried out 
                                                             
17 An equivalent analysis was repeated with log-transformed reasoning times for Impossible and 
PW inferences, because of the number of outliers, but there were no significant effects.   
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under possibility instructions (consistent with experiment 2).  Also, high ability 
reasoners were generally quicker on Necessary and PS problems.   
In terms of ability effects, the lower endorsement rates for PW problems under 
necessity instructions suggests that the high ability group understood instructions of 
logical necessity more than the low ability group.  Under possibility instructions there 
was evidence that both ability groups understood the instructions in a similar way.  
This was not found in experiment 2, and may be because the ability level of the sample 
was considerably higher, leading to a better understanding of the differences between 
necessity and possibility instructions by the high ability group.   
Of course a contributing factor may also have been that participants in the higher 
ability group were more able to apply the skills they had acquired during the training 
session, which is consistent with conclusions drawn by Neilens (2004), and with the 
benefit of immediate feedback (Prowse et al., (2009). 
Goodwin and Johnson-Laird (2005) proposed that rather than carrying out a search for 
counterexamples, participants employ the satisficing principle, when the criterion for 
adequacy is met rather than searching for the optimum solution.  However the results 
from experiment 3 suggest that a significant number of participants routinely went 
past the first model, and did not merely accept a model that satisficed.  Also, when 
required to evaluate conclusions on problems where the first model did not support 
the conclusion under instructions of possibility, the high ability reasoners were more 
inclined to do so.   
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When considering the latency data; it was suggested (Rauh et al., 2000; 
Vandierendonck, 2000; Vandierendonck et al., 2004) that the construction of additional 
models to correctly reject a given conclusion takes longer than when the construction 
of only one model is necessary, although this was not confirmed by experiments 2 or 3.  
One point to consider is that it is generally accepted that there is currently no clear 
explanation as to how response latencies map onto deductive reasoning.  In many types 
of problem solving task, there is a trade off between how fast a task can be performed 
and how many mistakes are made in performing the task (Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 
2009; Thompson et al., 2003). That is, a reasoner can either perform the task quickly 
with a large number of errors, or slowly with very few errors. Under some testing 
situations, when people have been instructed to optimize either speed or accuracy, they 
effectively adopt the appropriate strategy, although results can be difficult to compare 
and there is a paucity of published research in this area.   
The discussion for experiment 2 noted that the mean percentage endorsement rates 
were substantially lower than those previously recorded by Knauff et al. (1995).  This 
was also the case for experiment 3, when the mean percentage endorsement rate on PS 
problems under necessity instructions was 77% across both ability groups, which was 
only slightly higher than the 74% reported in experiment 2.  A cautious conclusion for 
this might be that  the participants recruited for experiments 2 and 3 were less able 
than the sample used by Knauff et al. (1995), although no measure of ability was used 
in this earlier research.   
130 
 
In view of the increased support for counterexample and alternative search found in 
experiment 3 compared to experiment 2, there are a number of reasons why this may 
have been.  First the provision of immediate feedback after each individual line 
relationship in the learning and practice phase may have been effective; second it may 
well be that the sample was more able, given the 6 point difference in IQ scores; or it 
may be that the higher ability participants were more receptive to training, which 
facilitated the provision of normative responding in terms of searching for 
counterexamples or alternatives.  The next section will provide a general discussion of 
the findings relating to experiment 2 and experiment 3. 
3.10  General discussion 
The two experiments reported in this chapter used spatial transitive inference tasks to 
explore whether the lack of evidence to support the search for counterexamples or 
alternatives in syllogistic reasoning, was primarily because of problem complexity, or 
because reasoners tended to accept a conclusion that is good enough rather than 
seeking to find the optimum conclusion.  While the first experiment provided some 
support for the search for counterexamples or alternatives, the evidence was limited, 
and in response to concerns about the learning and practice session being ineffective; 
changes and improvements were incorporated into a second transitive inference 
experiment.  
With the benefit of the procedural changes to the learning and practice phase; which 
were to present this phase electronically and give immediate feedback as to the 
correctness of participant responses; increased evidence was found to support the 
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notion that reasoners carried out a search for counterexamples on indeterminate 
problems in order correctly respond no when asked if a given conclusions was 
necessarily true.   Also, there was evidence that reasoners carried out a search for 
alternative models when asked if a given conclusion possibly followed, on 
indeterminate transitive inference problems.  The procedural changes also appeared to 
be more successfully applied by the high ability group than by the low ability group, as 
proposed initially by Anderson (1978), so perhaps because this group of reasoners had 
a better understanding of both how to execute the skill and how to use the skills.  
Interestingly, it appears that the choice of materials, based on those previously used by 
Knauff et al. (1995), which was influenced by the desire to overcome interpretational 
problems and problems relating to lack of clarity, may have increased the emphasis on 
the learning and practice phase.  It may well be that this problem has not been 
encountered previously, because most studies exploring the processes involved in, and 
how reasoners make transitive inferences, have used traditional materials such as A is 
longer than B, B is longer than C, with much of the focus on whether these are 
interpreted by visualising the terms on a horizontal or vertical axis, or whether 
reasoners employ a more linguistic strategy. 
In conclusion, there was evidence from both experiments to support the search for 
counterexamples and alternatives, and also that people understood the differences 
between necessity and possibility instructions, and the different problem structures.  
The support was more conclusive in experiment 3, where there was an increased 
emphasis for participants to have a clear understanding of the terms they were using, 
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together with the provision on of immediate feedback. It should also be noted that the 
IQ scores for the sample were considerably higher for experiment 3.  The next 
experiment will extend the range of materials to look at how reasoners make 
conditional inferences, which is another reasoning paradigm that has been extensively 
used in deductive reasoning research. 
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Chapter 4 
The search for counterexamples & alternative 
models on conditional inference tasks with 
abstract content 
 
The two experimental paradigms which have been used to investigate whether 
reasoners routinely search for counterexamples or alternatives, produced conflicting 
evidence.  The first paradigm, syllogistic reasoning, used abstract reasoning problems, 
but failed to produce evidence to support the search for counterexamples as proposed 
by the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), or 
alternatives.  On the other hand there was evidence that high ability participants were 
more able to discriminate between instructions of necessity and instructions of 
possibility.   
However the results from experiments 2 and 3, which both used the transitive 
inference paradigm to test the assumptions of the third stage of the mental model 
theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), told a different story.  
Although the endorsement rate results from experiment 2 failed to provide evidence to 
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support the search for counterexamples, there was evidence that a search for 
alternatives was carried out from both the endorsement rate data and the latencies.  
The second transitive inference experiment found that the high ability group were 
better at detecting differences between both instruction and problem types in terms of 
making more correct inferences, and there was evidence to support the search for 
counterexamples under necessity instructions.  There was also evidence to support the 
search for alternatives under possibility instructions, which was mediated by ability in 
that the high ability individuals were more likely to carry out this search.   
A number of reasons were considered for the increased support found for mental 
model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) provided by 
experiment 3, including a 6 point difference in IQ scores, and the provision of 
immediate feedback during the learning and practice phase.  
The experiment reported in this chapter extends the range of research paradigms to 
conditional reasoning, to investigate whether the results from the second transitive 
inference experiment can be generalised to conditional inference tasks with abstract 
content.   
4.1  Introduction to experiment 4 
Conditional reasoning involves drawing inferences about situations in which the 
occurrence of one event is conditional or contingent upon the occurrence of another 
event.  The large body of research that has been carried out in this area over the past 
forty years falls broadly into 2 areas: first, where the emphasis is on reasoning with 
abstract or knowledge lean relations; and second, when the focus is on observing 
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reasoning behaviours using materials which draw on our everyday knowledge.  This 
chapter will concentrate on the former; conditionals with abstract content, which are 
not affected by semantics, or open to interpretation with reference to our knowledge of 
the world.  
The conditional inference task, which is frequently used to investigate conditional 
reasoning18, requires participants to draw inferences from the truth or falsity of one 
component of the conditional to the truth or falsity of the other.  The task involves 
making an inference on the basis of a major premise ‘if p then q’, where 'p' is referred to 
as the antecedent and 'q' as the consequent.  The major premise is followed by a minor 
premise as shown in table 4.1, and the four traditionally studied inferences, based on 
standard logic, are Modus Ponens (MP), Modus Tollens (MT), Affirmation of the 
Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA) (see table 4.1).  As discussed in 
chapter 1, the basic form of the major premise can be negated to produce a total of 
sixteen different premise combinations.  Typically, studies using abstract materials, 
present the major and minor premises with letters and numbers (if there is an A there 
is a 3) or colours  and shapes (if it is a square then it is blue).  
Logically speaking, the validity of an argument is determined by its syntactic form.  The 
inferences MP and MT are valid, in that the conclusions are necessitated by the 
premises; whereas AC and DA are fallacies because the conclusion does not logically 
follow from the premises, or in other words it is not the only conclusion that is possible 
given the truth of the premises.  Endorsement rates for studies using the basic form of 
                                                             
18 Other tasks include the Wason selection task and the truth table task - see general texts such 
as Evans et al. (1993). 
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conditionals and abstract content (if p then q) vary considerably, although MP 
inferences are generally high, at between 89% (Kern, Mirrels & Hinshaw, 1983) and 
100% (Evans, 1977).  The more difficult MT inferences are lower and more variable, 
ranging from 41% (Kern et al., 1983) to 81% (Rumain et al., (1983).  Endorsement 
rates for invalid AC and DA conditionals are also more variable, and tend to fall 
somewhere between 27% (Kern et al, 1983) and 75% (Evans, 1977) for AC 
conditionals, and 28% (Kern et al., 1983) and 69% (Evans, 1977) for DA conditionals.     
Table 4.1 
Conditional inferences with basic major premises  
 MP MT AC DA 
 Given Conclude Given Conclude Given Conclude Given Conclude 
If  p then q p q not q not p q p not p not q 
 
Previous chapters in this thesis have described the mental model theory (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) in relation to both syllogistic reasoning and 
transitive inference, where the third stage proposes that reasoners carry out a search 
for counterexamples where the premises are true but the conclusion is false.  In the 
context of conditional inference, the mental model theory assumes that people begin by 
forming an initial representation of the premises that is incomplete.  Some situations 
are explicitly modelled, and others are left implicit.  For example, the conditional if p 
then q might be represented initially as shown below, where all cases of p are 
exhausted, and other unspecified models are indicated by ellipses. 
[p] q 
…  
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Therefore, given p, the reasoner can immediately infer q (MP).  The MT (if p then q, not 
q, therefore not p) inference however is more difficult in terms of model formation, and 
given the premise not q, no inference immediately follows because the negated form of 
q is not represented in the model.  Hence, the model needs to be fleshed out beyond the 
initial representation: 
[p] q 
not p [not q] 
…  
 
When considering the high number of error rates reported in the conditional reasoning 
literature, for both AC and DA conditionals; within the framework of the mental model 
theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) perhaps the most credible 
explanation is that reasoners fail to flesh out the full set of models.  This process is 
necessary to indicate that not p may occur in the presence of q (disconfirming AC), or q 
may occur in the presence of not p (disconfirming DA), before rejecting AC/DA 
inferences, (see next page): 
p q 
not p not q 
not p q 
 
Another possible explanation for error rates on AC and DA inferences is that reasoners 
interpret the premises biconditionally, where they wrongly assume that if p then q 
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means the same as if q then q.  Therefore if there are p’s there are q’s and if there are q‘s 
there are p’s, and if there are no p’s there are no q’s and if there are no q’s there are no 
p’s.  There is however convincing developmental evidence against a biconditional 
explanation (Barrouillet, Grosset, & Lecas, 2000; Barrouillet & Lecas, 1998); suggesting 
that although young reasoners go through a stage when they display a tendency to 
represent the terms biconditionally, leading to all four inferences being made (MP, MT, 
AC, DA); on approaching adulthood a basic if p then q conditional is represented with 
the models pq, not p, q, not q.  It may also be, as suggested by Evans and Over (2004) 
that some experimental procedures encourage biconditional reasoning more than 
others, depending upon the context and aims of the research.   
A large body of literature exists on conditional reasoning with abstract materials , 
where focus has been predominantly on either content or structure, rather than 
exploring error rates within the context of whether they construct models in the form 
of counterexamples.  However a frequently cited study, Schroyens, Schaeken and 
Handley (2003), explored the factors affecting the likelihood with which people engage 
in a search for counterexamples, by introducing a timing constraint.  When this 
constraint was in place, reasoners were more likely to accept the first model that 
supported the conclusion, leading to errors on both AC and DA conditionals.  This 
suggests that reasoners need time to search for counterexamples to test inferences, in 
order to produce a logically correct response.   
A second experiment (Schroyens et al., 2003), and later research (Schroyens & 
Schaeken, 2008), elaborated on the instructions, by presenting inference problems 
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under either necessity instructions (is it necessary that) or instructions that did not 
specifically mention the word necessary (does it follow that), when there was found to 
be an increased tendency for participants to look for falsification when the emphasis on 
logical necessity was amplified.  This is turn, produced more logically correct 
evaluations.   
Schroyens, Schaeken and Handley (2003) suggest the likelihood with which people 
engage in a search for counter examples is affected by temporal and motivational 
constraints  Therefore, when given time to search, together with being primed with 
clear logical instructions, reasoners can and do search for counterexamples, leading to 
the observed acceptance rates for logical fallacies (AC/DA) to be lower.   
This pattern of results provides support for the notion that individuals carry out a 
search for counterexamples as proposed by the third stage of the mental model theory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), but whether this is the default 
mechanism is open to interpretation.  There is also a suggestion (Schroyens & 
Schaeken, 2008; Schroyens et al., 2003) that this is consistent with the model base 
theory proposed by Schroyens et al. (2001), known as the Syntactic-Semantic 
Counterexample Prompted Probabilistic Thinking and Reasoning Engine (SSCEPPTRE).   
SSCEPPTRE implies that evaluation of a model involves active reasoning, which has a 
probability component leading to a revised specification of the mental model theory 
originally proposed by Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).  The 
likelihood that people will endorse standard inferences is captured by an equation, 
which in a simplified form, has three distinct components:  first, reasoners must be 
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motivated to search for counterexamples; second even if they are motivated they must 
be able to construct the models, and third they must be able to evaluate the model in 
order to accept or reject the model.  Perhaps one advantage of SSCEPPTRE is that it can 
be applied to confirmations of provisional conclusions, such as alternatives, and not 
just the validation-by-falsification which is the hallmark of the mental model theory.  
4.1.1  Aims and rationale  
The aim of experiment 4 was to investigate whether reasoners search for 
counterexamples on abstract conditional inference problems, and alternative models 
under instructions of possibility.  Consistent with experiments 1, 2, and 3, the 
relationship between cognitive ability and carrying out a search for counterexamples or 
alternative models was also explored, to look at whether ability is a good predictor of 
whether this successfully takes place.  There were limited ability effects from the 
previous experiments, when there was evidence that high ability participants were 
more likely to search for alternative models on PW problems under possibility 
instructions.  Measures of cognitive ability in studies of conditional reasoning have not 
been widely used, but the small number of studies that have done so, report that 
performance on logically invalid AC and DA inferences correlates highly with cognitive 
ability (Evans et al., 2007; Newstead et al., 2004), so it may well be that higher ability 
participants will be more likely to search for counterexamples and alternative models.  
To date, research (Schroyens & Schaeken, 2008; Schroyens et al., 2003) suggests that 
reasoners are able to search for counterexamples; but there is no evidence to suggest 
that this is a compulsory part of the process unless reasoners are motivated to do so.   
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The four problem types employed for this experiment were similar to those used in 
experiments 1, 2 and 3:  Necessary (the conclusion must be true), PS (the conclusion 
may be true as the first model supports the conclusion), PW (the conclusion may be 
true, although the first model negates the conclusion) and, Impossible (the conclusion 
must be false (Necessary, PS, Impossible and PW).   
The basis for problem selection particularly when finding PS and PW problems was less 
straightforward than for the experiments 1 - 3.  The reasoning problems are composed 
of conditional inferences with both standard and opposite conclusions.  First consider 
the conditional inferences shown in table 4.2 with standard conclusions, which lead to 
the composition of Necessary and PS problem types:  
Table 4.2 
Conditionals with standard conclusions  
 Necessary   PS 
MP 
if p then q 
p 
therefore, q 
 
AC 
if p then q 
q 
therefore, p 
MT 
if p then q 
not q 
therefore, not p 
 
DA 
if p then q 
not p 
therefore, not q 
 
Under necessity instructions the MP and MT arguments are valid; given that the 
premises are true and given p or not q, it is necessary that there is a q (MT) or not p 
(MT).  The second arguments (AC and DA) are invalid, as there may or may not be p’s in 
the case of AC arguments, and similarly there may or may not be q’s in DA arguments.  
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Under possibility instructions the conclusions for all four arguments are possible, and 
as we have seen, AC and DA are endorsed at very high rates (Evans et al., 1995), 
suggesting that they are ‘strong’ conclusions, i.e. based upon the first models that come 
to mind.  The write up of this experiment will refer to AC and DA from standard 
premises as PS conclusions and MP and MT as Necessary conclusions.   
Next consider conditional inferences with opposite conclusions under necessity and 
possibility instructions; where for MP and MT problems the conclusion is inconsistent 
with all models and is therefore impossible, and referred to as Impossible problems 
(table 4.3).  For AC and DA arguments the conclusion is possible, but not necessary, and 
is also inconsistent with an initial representation of the premises; so to judge these 
conclusions as possible a search for alternative models must take place.  These will be 
referred to as PW conclusions, because they are possible conclusions that are rarely 
endorsed (Evans et al., 1999).  
Table 4.3 
Conditionals with opposite conclusions  
 Impossible   PW 
MP 
if p then q 
p 
therefore, not q 
 
AC 
if p then q 
q 
therefore, not p 
MT 
if p then q 
not q 
therefore, p 
 
DA 
if p then q 
not p 
therefore, q 
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4.1.2  Predictions 
The predictions relating to endorsement rates, reasoning times and ability are based on 
the general assumptions of the third stage of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991); and are similar to those explicitly set out for 
experiment 1.   
1. If participants search for counterexamples or alternatives; there will be fewer 
endorsements of PS problems than Necessary problems under necessity 
instructions, and more endorsements of PW problems than Impossible problems 
under possibility instructions. 
2. On problems requiring a search for counterexamples or alternatives, participants 
will take longer. 
3. Participants with higher cognitive ability will be quicker reasoners, produce more 
logically correct responses, and take proportionately longer on problems 
requiring a search for other models in order to provide a logically correct 
evaluation of the given conclusion. 
4.2  Method  
Design 
This experimental study was carried out using a within-subjects design, when initially 
participants completed an AH4 cognitive ability test.  This was followed by the 
conditional reasoning task, where participants were presented with one block of 32 
randomised conditional inference problems under necessity instructions, and one 
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block of 32 randomised conditional inference problems under possibility instructions, 
the order of which was counterbalanced to minimize order effects.     
Participants 
A total of 60 undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth took part in the 
study, in return for either payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 24 males 
and 36 females with a mean age of 22 years, and they were all native English speakers.  
No participants were dyslexic, or had received formal training in logic.  
Materials and procedure  
The procedure adopted was similar to that used in the previous three experiments.  
Participants were run in groups of between 4 and 8 in a laboratory containing several 
computers.  Each participant was seated at their own workstation, to avoid distraction. 
Cognitive Ability Test 
Initially, as a measure of ability, participants completed Parts I and II of the AH4 Test of 
Cognitive Ability (Heim, 1968), which was administered in accordance with the test 
instructions and followed the procedure used in experiment 1.  Question booklets and 
answers sheets were collected by the experimenter before moving on to the conditional 
inference task.      
Conditional inference task  
The set of 32 conditional inference statements consisted of 8 problems in each of the 
four categories: Necessary, Impossible, PS, and PW; and in order to provide a balanced 
mix of problem structures (MP, MT, AC, and DA), there were two different argument 
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forms within each category (see table 4.4).  Randomly chosen letters of the alphabet 
(excluding I and O) and numbers (excluding 0 and 1) were used for the premise terms, 
for example:  if the letter is a B then the number is a 6, the letter is a B, therefore the 
number is a 6.  A complete set of the problems can be found in appendix 4A. 
A computer with a 15” monitor screen was used to present the problems with the 
computer program.  The keyboard was adapted to include yes and no keys, which were 
systematically counterbalanced, so that half the participants had the yes key on the left 
of the keyboard and the no key on the right, while the other half had these positions 
reversed. 
Table 4.4 
The four problem categories, together with premises, conclusions and inference 
type 
 Premises & conclusion Inference Logical definition 
Necessary  
If p then q, p, q MP The conclusion must be 
true given that the 
premises are true If p then q, not q, not p MT 
Impossible  
If p then q, p, not q* MP The conclusion cannot be 
true given that the 
premises are true If p then q, not q, p* MT 
PS 
If p then q, q, p AC The conclusion might be 
true given that the 
premises are true  If p then q, not p, not q DA 
PW  
If p then q, q, not p* AC The conclusion might be 
true given that the 
premises are true  If p then q, not p, q* DA 
    *conclusion presented in opposite direction 
The two sets of written task instructions which included examples of the screen layout, 
were printed on A4 paper, and were similar to those used in the previous experiments. 
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These related to whether problems were being evaluated for either necessity 
correctness or possibility correctness.  Examples of the screen layouts are shown in 
table 4.5 and a complete set of instructions is presented in appendix 4B and appendix 
4C.  
Table 4.5 
Screen layouts included in task instructions 
    
   Screen 1 
 
 
    Screen 2 
 
    Screen 1 
 
 
    Screen 2 
 
 
Given: 
If the letter is a B then the number is a 6 
The number is a 6 
 
Given: 
If the letter is a T then the number is a 4 
The number is a 4 
 
Given: 
If the letter is a T then the number is a 4 
The number is a 4 
Is it necessary that  
The letter is a T 
Given: 
If the letter is a B then the number is a 6 
The number is a 6 
Is it possible that  
The number is a 6 
 
147 
 
The instructions were distributed (necessity or possibility) for the first block of 
problems and after a short reading period, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions on any points that they were less clear about.  The participants were also 
told that they must ask the experimenter for the second set of instructions (necessity or 
possibility) as soon as a message appeared on the screen, and reminded that at the 
start of each block there were two practice questions.   
Participant responses, yes or no, were recorded by the program, together with the time 
taken to indicate understanding of the problem (screen 1) and the time taken to 
complete the reasoning process (screen 2).  These were saved to disc. 
4.3  Results  
The AH4 test sheets were scored in accordance with the test instructions, when one 
mark was given for each correct answer.  There was a significant positive correlation 
between Parts I and II (r = .62, p < .01), and the scores from both parts were added 
together to give an overall general ability score for each participant.  The observed 
mean for participants was 102.27 (SD = 16.35), which was higher than for the previous 
experiments, and higher than the available norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) for university 
students (Heim, 1968).   The sample was divided into high and low cognitive ability 
groups, on the basis of a median split on the AH4 test scores; cases below the median of 
104 were classified as low ability and those above the median were classified as high 
ability.  None of the participants recorded a score of 104.   
All participants evaluated conclusions under both necessity instructions and possibility 
instructions.  The first dependent variable was the mean percentage endorsement rates 
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for each problem category, i.e. the number of yes responses.  The second dependent 
variable was the time course of the reasoning process; that is to say premise processing 
and response times together.   These were totalled for each problem type and 
instruction group to produce a mean reasoning time (in milliseconds).  Although for the 
purposes of this study the analysis was carried out on problem types (Necessary, PS, 
Impossible and PW), a breakdown of endorsement rates into argument forms can be 
found in appendix 4D. The results from the endorsement rate data are reported first; 
followed by the results from the reasoning time data.  All ANOVA tables for experiment 
4 are shown in appendix 4E.  
4.3.1  Conclusion endorsement rates 
The mean percentage endorsement rates for all four types of problem are shown in 
table 4.6, broken down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for the low 
ability group and the high ability group represent the mean percentage endorsement 
rates for the responses from 30 participants. 
Table 4.6 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for all problem types (N = 60, SD in 
brackets) 
 Necessary  PS  Impossible  PW 
Necessary            
Low 70 (19.61)  66 (27.88)  17 (14.11)  17 (18.12) 
High 70 (17.56)  50 (30.88)  13 (15.72)  10 (17.40) 
M 70 (18.45)  58 (30.24)  15 (14.93)  14 (17.93) 
Possibility            
Low 83 (16.24)  83 (14.53)  24 (15.72)  37 (31.65) 
High 89 (12.60)  93 (10.69)  32 (18.48)  55 (33.10) 
M 86 (14.75)  88 (13.62)  28 (17.47)  46 (33.14) 
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Necessary and PS problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 47.09, p < .001, p2 = .45], reflecting higher endorsement 
rates when problems were presented under possibility instructions; and of problem 
type [F(1,58) = 8.35,  p < .005, p2 = .13], whereby Necessary problems were endorsed 
more frequently than PS problems.  The main effect of problem type reflects a tendency 
to endorse more valid (MP/MT) conclusions than invalid (AC/DA) conclusions, in line 
with the literature.  There was no main effect of ability [F(1,58) = .01, p = .94].  The 
main effect of instruction and problem type was consistent with the previous 
experiments, suggesting that participants understood the differences between the 
instructions, and also problem structures.  
There was a significant two way interaction between instruction and problem type 
[F(1,58)] = 9.84, p < .005, p2 = .15], mainly because of the difference in endorsement 
rates under necessity instructions. This was confirmed by repeated measures t-tests 
where the difference was significant under necessity instructions [t(59) = 3.33, p < 
.005], but not under possibility instructions [t(59) = .78, p = .90]; this is consistent with 
experiment 3.  There was also a significant three-way interaction between instruction, 
problem type and ability [F(1,58) = 5.90,  p < .005, p2 = .09], reflecting a different 
pattern of responding for the low ability group than the high ability group (see figure 
4.1 and figure 4.2).  The high ability group were able to discriminate between 
Necessary and PS problems under necessity instructions, which was confirmed by a 
within subjects t-test [t(29) = 4.15, p < .001]; but this effect was not present for the low 
ability group [t(29) = .72, p = .48].  These findings provide strong support for the 
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prediction that the high ability participants would be better performers, due to a search 
for counterexamples on PS problems under necessity instructions. 
 
Figure 4.1.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for Necessary and PS problems under 
necessity and possibility instructions for the high ability group 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for Necessary and PS problems under 
necessity and possibility instructions, for the low ability group 
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Impossible and PW problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 44.39, p < .001, p2 = .43], reflecting higher endorsement 
rates under possibility instructions; and of problem type [F(1,58) = 14.73, p < .001, p2 
= .20], whereby PW problems were more frequently endorsed than Impossible 
problems.  There was no main effect of ability [F(1,58) = 1.63, p = .21].  The main effect 
of instruction and problem type was consistent with previous experiments, suggesting 
that participants had an understanding of the differences between both instruction and 
problem types.   
There were two significant interactions.  The first was between instruction and 
problem type [F(1,58) = 18.58, p < .001, p2 = .24], which supports the search for 
alternatives on PW problems under possibility instructions (see figure 4.3); and is 
consistent with experiments 2 and 3.   
 
Figure 4.3.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for Necessary and PW problems under 
necessity and possibility instructions 
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This effect was confirmed by follow up t-tests, which revealed significant differences 
between Impossible and PW problems under possibility instructions [t(59) = 4.77, p < 
.001], but not when the problems were presented under necessity instructions [t(59) = 
.62, p = .54].    
The second interaction was between instruction and ability [F(1,58) = 7.23, p < .01, p2 
= .11], whereby the higher ability participants endorsed more problems under 
possibility instructions, where a search for alternative models was required(see figure 
4.4).  This was confirmed by repeated measures t-tests where high ability participants 
endorsed significantly more problems under possibility instructions [t(1,58) = 2.40, p 
<.05], and the difference under necessity instructions was not significant [t(1,58) 1.48, 
p = .15].  This finding was consistent with experiment 1 (syllogistic reasoning). 
 
Figure 4.4.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for the high and low ability group 
under necessity and possibility instructions 
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4.3.2  Reasoning times  
The mean reasoning times for all problem types are shown in table 4.7, and are again 
broken down by instruction, problem type and ability.  The cells for low ability group 
and the high ability group represent the mean reasoning times for the responses from 
30 participants, and are shown in milliseconds.   
Table 4.7 
Mean reasoning times (milliseconds) for all problem types (N = 60, SD in 
brackets) 
 Necessary  PS  Impossible  PW 
Necessary            
Low 11333 (4437)  10857 (3135)  11173 (3753)  10787 (3351) 
High 10170 (4505)  11020 (5593)  10277 (4795)  10999 (4685) 
M 10752 (4472)  10938 (4496)  10725 (4293)  10893 (4040) 
Possibility            
Low 11102 (3111)  11427 (3342)  11791 (3072)  11811 (3393) 
High    9436 (3243)     9883 (3305)  10339 (4402)  10414 (3966) 
M 10268 (3261)  10655 (3386)  10915 (3866)  11113 (3726) 
 
Necessary and PS problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA revealed no main effects 
of instruction [F(1,58) = .96, p = .33], problem type [F(1,58) = 2.19, p = .14], or ability 
[F(1,58) = 1.87, p = .18].  There were no significant interactions. 
Impossible and PW problems 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) 2 x (ability) mixed ANOVA test was carried out, but 
there were no main effect of instruction [F (1,58) = .21, p = .65], problem type [F(1,58) 
= 1.16, p = .29], or ability [F(1,58) = 1.20, p = .28].  There was a significant interaction 
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between problem type and ability [F(1,58) = 4.65, p < .05,  p2  = .07].  Follow up within 
subject t-tests were carried out, on the high ability group (see figure 4.5), when there 
was found to be a significant difference in reasoning times between Impossible and PW 
problems [t(1, 29) = 2.23, p < .05], but there was no evidence of this for the low ability 
group [t(1, 29) = .78, p = .44].  The processing speeds for the low ability were longer, 
which was as predicted. 
 
 
Figure 4.5.  Mean reasoning times (in milliseconds) for Impossible and PW problems 
under necessity and possibility instructions 
4.4  Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to further investigate whether reasoners searched for 
counterexamples or alternative models when making conditional inferences with 
abstract materials; and whether cognitive ability is a good predictor of whether this 
search takes place.  Consistent with the previous experiments reported in this thesis, 
there was evidence from the endorsement rate data to suggest that participants 
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understood the differences between necessary and possibility instructions, and also the 
differences between Necessary and PS problem structures and the differences between 
Impossible and PW problem structures.   
There was clear supporting evidence from the endorsement rate data that the high 
ability participants were searching for counterexamples on PS problems under 
necessity instructions; and that both ability groups were searching for alternative 
models on PW problems under possibility instructions.  These effects are consistent 
with experiment 3 (the second transitive inference experiment), although the ability 
effects were different, in that experiment 3 found ability effects relating to PW 
problems under possibility instructions, rather than PS problems under necessity 
instructions found in experiment 4.  
When considering the latency data from experiment 4, previous research (Schroyens & 
Schaeken, 2008; Schroyens et al., 2003) has found that reasoners display a tendency to 
search for counterexamples when there are no time constraints, leading to an increased 
number of correct evaluations of indeterminate problems.  However, even though there 
were no time constraints in place for experiment 4, there was only limited evidence 
from the latencies to support the search for counterexamples or alternatives.  Analysis 
suggests that high ability reasoners took significantly longer on PW problems across 
both problem types; but we can only speculate that this was because of the time taken 
to carry out a search for alternative model under possibility instructions.  One possible 
explanation that has been offered for consideration (Evans et al., 2007) was that in past 
research the processing time for MT (if p then q, not q) and DA arguments (if p then q, 
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not p) is longer because of the need to process negations.  However in experiment 4, it 
is unlikely that this is the case, because the reasoning problems were made up of a 
balanced mix of problem types; although it may be that the effect of processing 
negations overrides, or at least influences, the time taken to access additional 
alternatives.  
In looking at the results from a theoretical viewpoint, it would seem that while the 
mental model theory proposed by Johnson Laird (1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), 
claims that a search for counterexamples is the default in deductive reasoning; it may 
be that this claim needs to be modified.  Clearly, as has been shown in experiment 2, 3 
and 4, people can and sometimes do carry out a search for alternative models, when 
given instructions to evaluate reasoning problems for logical necessity or possibility. 
Schroyens et al. (2003) found that temporal and motivational constraints affect the 
likelihood with which people engage in a search for counterexamples; with an 
increased tendency for individuals to look for falsification when given time to test the 
inferences made, and when the emphasis on logical necessity was increased.  This in 
turn led to more logically correct evaluations, and to the identification of three main 
factors which contribute to whether reasoners search for counterexamples (Schroyens 
& Schaeken, 2008; Schroyens et al., 2003), which were motivation, ability to construct 
models, and ability to evaluate the model in order to accept or reject the initial model 
constructed.  These factors are linked to the model based theory SSCEPTRE (Schroyens 
et al., 2001), which takes into account validation by falsification, and rejection by 
confirmation.   
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Although the response time data does not support the search for counterexamples, and 
does not directly support the search for alternative models, the high ability group took 
longer on PW problems in relation to Impossible problems, and were generally quicker 
reasoners. This would support the notion that the high ability participants can 
recognise that PW problems are different to Impossible problems, which is consistent 
with the general findings reported across the experimental studies, that higher ability 
leads to a greater capacity to distinguish between different instructions and different 
logical structures. 
To summarise, experiment 4 has produced evidence to support the prediction that 
individuals with higher cognitive ability are able to and do carry out a search for 
counterexamples on PS problems under necessity instructions; and also support for the 
search for alternatives on PW problems under possibility instructions.  The two 
experiments reported in the next chapter will extend the range of conditional inference 
experimental materials, to investigate the inferences people are prepared to make on 
conditional inference problems with realistic everyday content, where one event 
causes the other.   
The experiments that have been reported so far have adopted abstract or non-thematic 
content, alongside clear logical structures, and the introduction of everyday materials 
enabled an investigation into the extent to which reasoning behaviours are influenced 
by the availability of other causes, and the relationship between these and the logical 
properties of the conditional argument forms.  A second experiment will look at the 
influence of content on the inferences that participants are prepared to make, when 
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there are no logical properties to the inferences.  In each of these experiments, both 
necessity and possibility instructions will be used, and a measure of cognitive ability 
will also be taken look at how these interact with endorsement rates and reasoning 
times.  
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Chapter 5 
The search for counterexamples & alternative 
models on causal conditional inference tasks 
 
The experiments that have been reported up to this point in the thesis have adopted 
reasoning tasks with clear logical structures, and either abstract or spatially related 
content, to look at whether reasoners search for counterexamples or alternatives when 
evaluating a conclusion. The results from analysis of the conditional inference data, and 
the second transitive inference experiment, revealed clear evidence to support the 
search for both counterexamples and alternatives; although there was limited support 
from the first transitive inference experiment, and no evidence from the abstract 
syllogistic reasoning experiment reported in chapter 2.  However, it was also clear that 
individuals made a substantial amount of errors, which is the motivation for the choice 
of everyday materials in the two experiments reported in this chapter. 
Research has consistently shown that human reasoning performance is heavily 
influenced by the content or subject matter, and reasoning with identical formal 
properties but different subjective content, frequently produces different levels of 
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performance.  The two experiments use 'if p then q' conditional inferences of the type 
used in experiment 4, but this time they are constructed with everyday realistic content 
rather than abstract terms, to form causal conditional statements with few and many 
alternative causes.  This enables the investigation not only of whether a search for 
counterexamples or alternative models takes place, and the degree to which this is 
mediated by ability, but also the extent to which the number of alternative causes to the 
rule under consideration influences this search.  In order to clarify the terms, 
alternative models is used to describe the search for other models under instructions of 
possibility, and alternative causes is used to indicate the number of other  causes to the 
rule. 
5.1  Introduction to experiments 5 and 6  
As discussed in chapter 4, conditional reasoning involves drawing inferences about 
situations in which the occurrence of one event is contingent on the occurrence of 
another.  The standard conditional inference tasks which have been frequently used, 
particularly in earlier reasoning research, generally looked at the factors which 
influence performance on the logical validity of 'if p then q' arguments for valid MP and 
MT inferences, and AC and DA fallacies (see table 5.1).  Typically, endorsement rates 
are close to 100% for MP arguments, for MT arguments they are around 74% or less, 
but often as many as 80% of people are prepared to erroneously endorse AC and DA 
arguments.  There is however much variation between studies, particularly with AC 
and DA arguments, although this is widely believed to be because of the different 
methodologies that have been used. 
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Table 5.1 
The four conditional arguments 
MP if p then q, p, therefore q 
MT if p then q, not q,  therefore p 
AC if p then q, q, therefore p 
DA if p then q, not p, therefore q 
 
Although early conditional reasoning research with abstract materials has made a 
significant contribution to our understanding of logical competence, in everyday life we 
are required to reason with meaningful and content-rich materials, which draw on our 
prior knowledge.  For instance take the statement, if butter is heated it will melt, 
followed by the statement the butter did not melt.  Most adult individuals would be 
inclined to conclude that the butter had not been heated, by accessing their prior 
knowledge that heating butter causes it to melt.  This conclusion is both logically 
correct, and congruent with our understanding of the relationship between heat and 
butter, although, less than 74% of people are prepared to endorse this MT argument 
when it is presented with abstract content.   
Seminal work by Byrne (1989) found that it was easy to manipulate the willingness of 
participants to endorse conclusions to conditional inference reasoning problems, by 
increasing or decreasing the availability of additional information within each 
conditional statement.  The effect of manipulating a response became known as the 
suppression effect, when the number of inferences that that reasoners are prepared to 
make, decreases with the availability or number of counterexamples.  For example, 
when the additional information shown in italics was added to the causal conditional 
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statement shown below, reasoners were less inclined to accept the inference ‘the light 
will go on when the fridge was opened’: 
If you open the fridge, then the light inside will go on 
If the light bulb is working, then the light inside will go on  
Somebody opens the fridge 
Early methodology which was used to produce the suppression effect, presented the 
additional information after the conditional statement, but prior to the conclusion 
under evaluation.  However, later research showed that the effect could also be 
achieved if alternative causes were not explicitly mentioned, but could merely be 
retrieved from the knowledge that people had, based on their everyday experiences of 
the world.  The factors affecting the retrieval of alternative causes were explored by a 
frequently cited programme of research carried out by Cummins et al. (1995; 1991).  
When a pre-test was carried out in which participants were asked to generate 
counterexamples to a variety of causal conditional statements, Cummins et al. (1995; 
1991) found that the retrieval process was sensitive to two factors: alternative causes 
and disabling conditions.  Take for example the following causal conditional statement: 
If the brake is depressed, the car will slow down 
An alternative cause suggests that there may be a reason for the car slowing down, 
other than the one cited in the rule under consideration, which produces the effect 
mentioned; for example running out of fuel, or climbing a steep hill.  On the other hand a 
disabling condition prevents the effect from occurring despite the presence of the cause; 
which may be ice on the road, or fractured brake lines.  When conditional inference 
problems were constructed to test for the effects of alternative causes or disabling 
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conditions, Cummins et al. (1995; 1991) found that the valid inferences MP and MT 
were more likely to be made for conditionals with few disablers, and the invalid AC and 
DA inferences were more likely to be made for conditionals with few alternative causes.  
Consider for instance the following example and narrative, taken from recent research 
(Evans, Handley, & Neilens, 2010): 
If global warming continues (p) then London will be flooded (q) 
A participant might think that global warming will cause a rise in sea 
levels and that London being quite low lying, will be at risk of flood.  But 
then they may think of a disabling condition, such as expensive flood 
barriers that a major city would invest in the time to consider the problem.  
On this basis they may decline the MP inference that London will 
necessarily be flooded.  When offered the AC inference however, they might 
well accept it.  It seems unlikely that London would be flooded except by 
such a major environmental disaster.  So for this person, the statement 
would be high in disablers, but low in alternatives (Evans et al., 2010, p. 
894). 
Other related work on causal conditionals carried out by Thompson (1994, 2000) used 
the terms necessity and sufficiency instead of alternative causes or disablers, and asked 
participants to rate sentences such as the above example for (a) is it necessary for p to 
happen in order for q to happen, or (b) p happening is enough to ensure that q will 
happen.  There were strong effects of perceived sufficiency on the acceptance of MP and 
MT conditionals, and strong effects of perceived necessity on AC and DA conditionals.  
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So, when considering the causal statement 'if global warming continues then London 
will be flooded', the statement is rated as low sufficiency and high necessity, producing 
similar outcomes to those reported by Cummins et al. (1995; 1991), in that there would 
be low rates of MP and MT endorsements, but high rates of AC and DA endorsements. 
An alternative view which has been used to explain the processes which underlie the 
conditional inferences that people make is that people treat them as probabilistic 
statements (Liu, Lo, & Wu, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2001).  When making 
judgements of probability, the theory proposes that participants calculate the 
probability that exceptions to the event will occur; which will in turn affect the 
likelihood of individuals endorsing a given conclusion.  Liu et al. (1996) rephrased 
conditionals of the nature used by Cummins et al. (1995; 1991), and asked participants 
to rate perceived probabilities; this resulted in an increase in correct responses with 
the perceived probability of q, given p, for each of the four forms of conditional 
arguments: MP, MT, AC and DA.   
Comparisons were made between inferential reasoning and probabilistic reasoning 
(Markovits & Handley, 2005) using identical if then statements with everyday content.  
The participants were either asked to rate the probability on a likert scale, or respond 
either yes or no to question, for instance Michael’s dog has fleas, is it certain that 
Michael’s dog will scratch constantly?  In a second experiment problems were presented 
either under instructions of logical necessity, or instructions asking ‘what is the 
probability of’ on a scale of between 0 and 100%.  The results suggested that deductive 
and probabilistic inferences are not structurally similar, and highlighted the difficulties 
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in try to consider these two systems in terms of them both having a single underlying 
process. 
5.1.1  Mental Model Theory  
The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) predicts 
that when reasoners are presented with a causal conditional inference problem, an 
initial internal model of the information is constructed.  In order to reject invalid AC 
and DA inferences under instructions of logical necessity, participants must flesh out 
the full set of models to indicate that p may not occur in the presence of q, and q may 
not occur in the presence of not p (disconfirming DA).  Therefore when there are few 
alternative causes, reasoners are less likely to find them, and are more likely to produce 
a logically incorrect response under instructions of necessity, for instance take the 
following example where there are few causes for the consequent other that the one 
mentioned: 
If butter is heated then it will melt  
The butter was heated (p) The butter melted (q) 
 
The conclusion the butter was heated is frequently endorsed, because there are few (if 
any) other events that would cause the butter to melt.  Consider in contrast the 
following example, where there are many alternative causes scenario.  The conclusion 
that the stone was kicked is less frequently endorsed, as there are many other causes 
that might be responsible for the movement of the stone (see next page) 
166 
 
If the stone is kicked it will move  
The stone was kicked (p) The stone moved (q) 
The stone was thrown (p) The stone moved (q) 
A dog picked up the stone (p) The stone moved (q) 
There was an earth tremor (p) The stone moved (q) 
 
5.1.2  Dual process theories 
There are also theoretical implications within the framework of dual process theories, 
in terms of the influence of the number of alternative causes to the conditional rule 
under consideration, which have more recently been investigated (Evans, 2010).  In 
conditional reasoning research, interest in dual process theories has been increasing in 
recent years to reflect research about the effect of the number of causes that can be 
accessed from our everyday knowledge of the world.  Within a dual process theory 
framework, the intuitive Type 1 response is to endorse a conclusion because it is 
consistent with underlying beliefs, unless the less intuitive and more deliberate Type 2 
process takes over to decouple the logical properties of a conditional from the 
reasoners stored knowledge of the world19.   
In a recently published study, which was carried out after experiment 5 in this thesis 
was planned and executed, Evans et al. (2010) used both necessity instructions (similar 
to those used in this thesis) and pragmatic instructions; together with a measure of 
cognitive ability.  The task under pragmatic instructions concerned the ability of people 
                                                             
19   Type 1 (system 1) is fast, automatic and intuitive, whereas Type 2 (system 2) is slow and 
more considered - see Chapter 1, and Evans (2010). 
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ability to reason about real-life situations as opposed to a test of logical reasoning; 
therefore no reference was made to assuming the premises to be true, or to logical 
necessity.  Participants were asked to rate their degree of belief in the conclusion given, 
thus encouraging reasoners to focus on the believability rather than the validity of an 
event.  The responses to the pragmatic instructions produced responses on a scale, 
rather than yes/no binary responses, which was in a similar form to the data collected 
by (Liu et al., 1996).  The content of the conditional reasoning problems introduced a 
conflict between logic and belief under necessity instructions, enabling comparisons to 
be made between logical instructions and pragmatic instructions.   
The results clearly show that higher ability participants were significantly less 
influenced by the everyday content of the reasoning problems when presented under 
strict logical instructions, but under pragmatic instructions (supposing the following 
…….. to what extent would you believe that) this effect disappeared.  This led to the 
conclusion that that ability and specific instructions are required in order for people to 
reason in an abstract and decontextualized manner, despite the content being linked to 
our everyday experiences.   
5.1.3  Reasoning times 
Although very few studies have looked at whether the retrieval of few or many 
alternative causes has an effect on the time course of conditional reasoning, it would 
seem a reasonable assumption that due to a more extended search process, within the 
framework of the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991), reasoning times would be longer when there are many alternative causes than 
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when there are few alternative causes.  The implications of this are that the reasoning 
times would be longer for inferences such as if the stone is kicked it will move than for 
inferences with few alternative causes such as if the butter is heated it will melt.  One 
study which did successfully collect latency data (De Neys et al., 2002) hypothesised 
that reasoning with standard argument form conditionals would produce longer 
reasoning times when there were many alternative causes, than when there were few 
alternative causes.  Consistent with this hypothesis, participants took significantly 
longer on MP and AC argument forms, but not for MT and DA argument forms.  The lack 
of support for MT and DA arguments forms was thought to be because of a trade off 
between the search process, and the need to process negations; MT (if p then q, not q) 
and DA (if p then q, not p) arguments. 
5.1.4  Aims and rationale for experiment 5  
The approach to Experiment 5 was novel, in that it combines the presentation of causal 
conditional problems with few and many alternatives causes, under instructions of 
logical necessity and instructions of possibility (as previously used in this thesis), to 
collect endorsement rates and reasoning times.  A measure of cognitive ability was also 
taken, and recent work by Verschueren et al. (2005) suggests that participants with 
greater cognitive capacity are more likely to retrieve, and selectively use 
counterexamples to reject invalid (AC and DA) conditional inferences, which is 
consistent with the literature.  Furthermore, the effect of ability has been shown to 
increase with development throughout childhood (Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 
1999). 
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The aim was to investigate the effect that the number of alternative causes to the rule 
under consideration had on judgements of necessity and possibility, when evaluating 
conclusions to the four different problems types used in experiments 1 – 4.  The 
development of Necessary, PS, Impossible and PW problems was facilitated by the use 
of argument forms with standard direction conclusions, and argument forms with 
opposite direction conclusions.  This was a similar method to that used for experiment 
4 (conditionals with abstract content), but with the addition of an extra level in terms 
of few and many alternative causes.  The standard conclusion inferences lead to the 
composition of Necessary and PS problem types; under necessity instructions the 
conclusion on MP and MT arguments forms is logically valid, but not under possibility 
instructions, and are referred to as Necessary problems.  The standard conclusion AC 
and DA arguments are not logically valid under necessity instructions, but they are 
possible, and are referred to as PS problems.   
The opposite conclusions on MP and MT inferences are impossible under both types of 
instruction, as logically the conclusion is inconsistent with all models, and these are 
referred to as Impossible problems.  The AC and DA problems with opposite 
conclusions are not necessary, but they are possible, because although logically they are 
not consistent with an initial model of representations of the premises, there is a model 
or models which does not support the premises, and these are referred to as PW 
problems.  An example of a PW problem with many alternative causes is; if Simon cuts 
his finger it will bleed, given that Simon’s finger is bleeding, the first model that comes to 
mind is that Simon cut his finger, when in fact his finger may be bleeding because he 
caught it on a bramble, grazed it on gravel, or was bitten by a hamster. 
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5.1.5  Predictions for experiment 5 
The following predictions are made on the basis of previous research (Cummins, 1992, 
1995; Evans et al., 1999; Thompson, 1994, 2000), and the general assumptions of the 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
1. There will be more endorsements under possibility instructions than necessity 
instructions, because lots of everyday events are possible, but not necessary. 
2. If participants search for counterexamples under necessity instructions: when 
there are many alternative causes there will be fewer endorsements of PS 
problems than Necessary problems, because other causes are more readily 
available because the first model under consideration supports the conclusion. 
3. If participants search for alternative models under possibility instructions: when 
there are many alternative causes there will be more endorsements of PW 
problems than Impossible problems, because other causes are more readily 
available, given that the first model under consideration does not support the 
conclusion. 
4. If participants search for counterexamples or alternative models: under 
necessary instructions the high ability group will produce more correct 
responses than the low ability group for problems with few alternative causes, 
and the high ability group will also produce more correct responses to PS 
problems under necessity instructions and PW problems under possibility 
instructions; this is because they are better at searching for counterexamples or 
alternative models. 
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5. High ability participants will be quicker reasoners, but may take proportionately 
longer on problems requiring a search for counterexamples or alternative 
models; more particularly PS inferences under necessity instructions, and PW 
inferences under possibility instructions. 
5.2  Method for experiment 5 
Design 
This experimental study was carried out using a within-subjects design, when initially 
participants completed an AH4 cognitive ability test.  This was followed by the causal 
conditional problem solving task, where participants were presented with one block of 
32 problems with everyday content under necessity instructions, and one block of 32 of 
the same problems under possibility instructions, the order of which was 
counterbalanced to minimise order effects.   
Participants 
A total of 60 undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth took part in the 
study, in return for either payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 10 males 
and 50 females with a mean age of 21 years, and they were all native English speakers.  
No participants were dyslexic, or had received formal training in logic. 
Materials and procedure 
The procedure adopted was similar to that used in the previous 5 experiments, when 
participants were run in groups of between 2 and 6 in a laboratory containing several 
computers.  Each participant was seated at their own workstation, to avoid distraction. 
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Cognitive Ability Test 
Participants completed Parts I and II of the AH4 Test of Cognitive Ability (Heim, 1968), 
which was administered in accordance with the test instructions and followed the 
procedure used in experiment 1.  Question booklets and answers sheets were collected 
by the experimenter before moving on to the inference task. 
Causal conditional inference task  
The 32 inference problems consisted of 8 problems in each of the four categories used 
in previous experiments: Necessary, PS, Impossible and PW, and within each category 
there were two statements with few alternative causes, and two statements with many 
alternative causes.  In order to provide a balanced mix of argument structures (MP, MT, 
AC and DA) there were two different argument forms within each category, which were 
equally balanced for few and many alternative causes. 
Initially, two sets of premise pairs were identified (see table 5.2) each of which 
contained two statements with many potential alternative causes, and two statements 
with few potential alternative causes.  Presentation of the two sets was 
counterbalanced so that half of the participants received the content from set A for 
Necessary and PS problems and set B content for Impossible and PW problems, and  
the other half had the presentation order reversed.  The two sets of problem content 
and structure are presented in appendix 5A and appendix 5B. 
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Table 5.2 
The two sets of premise content for experiment 5 
 Set A 
Few 
if butter is heated, it will melt 
if Simon cuts his finger, it will bleed 
  
Many 
if the stone is kicked, it will move  
if the brake is pressed, the car will slow down 
 
 
 
 Set B 
Few 
if the paper clip touches the magnet, it will stick to it 
if water is frozen, it will become ice 
  
Many 
if the window is open, the room will be cold 
if the mug is dropped, it will break 
 
A computer with a 15” monitor screen was used to present the problems with the 
computer program.  The keyboard was adapted to include yes and no keys, which were 
systematically counterbalanced, so that half the participants had the yes key on the left 
of the keyboard and the no key on the right, while the other half had these positions 
reversed.  The two sets of written task instructions which included examples of the 
screen layout, were printed on A4 paper, and were similar to those used in the previous 
experiments. These related to whether problems were being evaluated for either 
necessity correctness or possibility correctness.  Examples of the screen layouts are 
shown in table 5.3, and a complete set of instructions is presented in appendix 5C and 
appendix 5D.  
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The instructions were distributed (necessity or possibility) for the first block of 
problems and after a short reading period, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions on any points that they were less clear about.   
Table 5.3 
Screen layouts included in task instructions 
    
   Screen 1 
 
 
    Screen 2 
 
    Screen 1 
 
 
    Screen 2 
 
 
Given: 
If Simon cuts his finger then it will bleed 
Simon cut his finger 
 
Given: 
If the stone is kicked then it will move 
The stone was kicked 
 
Given: 
If the stone is kicked then it will move 
The stone was kicked 
Is it necessary that  
The stone moved 
Given: 
If Simon cuts his finger then it will bleed 
Simon cut his finger 
Is it possible that  
Simon’s finger bled 
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The participants were also told that they should ask the experimenter for the second 
set of instructions (necessity or possibility) as soon as a message appeared on the 
screen, and reminded that at the start of each block there were two practice questions.   
Participant responses, yes or no, were recorded by the program, together with the time 
taken to indicate understanding of the problem (screen 1) and the time taken to 
complete the reasoning process (screen 2).  These were saved to disc. 
5.3  Results for experiment 5  
The AH4 test sheets were scored in accordance with the test instructions, when one 
mark was given for each correct answer.  There was a significant positive correlation 
between Parts I and II (r = .49, p < .001), therefore scores from both parts were added 
together to give an overall general ability score for each participant.  The observed 
mean for participants was 102.78 (SD = 12.82), which was higher than to the available 
norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) for university students (Heim, 1968), higher than 
experiments 2 and 3, lower than experiment 1, and substantially lower than 
experiment 4.  The sample was divided into high and low cognitive ability groups, on 
the basis of a median split on the AH4 test scores; cases below the median of 105 were 
classified as low ability and those above the median were classified as high ability.  
None of the participants recorded a score of 105.   
All participants evaluated conclusions under both necessity instructions and possibility 
instructions. The first dependent variable was the mean percentage endorsement rates, 
i.e. the number of yes responses.  The second dependent variable was the time course of 
the reasoning process; that is to say premise processing and response times together.  
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These were totalled for each problem type and instruction group to produce a mean 
reasoning time (in milliseconds).  The results from the endorsement rate data are 
reported first; followed by the results from the reasoning time data.  The inference 
rates and reasoning times which are further broken down into argument forms can be 
found in appendix 5E.  All ANOVA tables for experiment 5 are shown in appendix 5F. 
5.3.1  Conclusion endorsement rates  
Necessary and PS problem types  
The mean percentage endorsement rates for Necessary and PS inference problems are 
shown in table 5.4, broken down by instruction, problem type, alternative causes, and 
ability.  The cells for the low ability group and the high ability group represent the 
mean percentage endorsement rates for the responses from 30 participants. 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (alternative causes) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA 
test revealed a main effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 32.14, p < .001, p2 = .36], reflecting 
higher endorsement rates when problems were presented under possibility 
instructions, and a main effect of problem type [F(1,58) = 16.79,  p < .001, p2 = .23], 
whereby Necessary problems were endorsed more frequently than PS problems.  These 
effects which are consistent with the previous experiments and the literature, suggest 
that reasoners understood the differences between making judgements of necessity 
and judgements of possibility, and also reflects a tendency to endorse more valid 
(MP/MT) conclusions than invalid (AC/DA) conclusions. 
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Table 5.4 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on Necessary and PS 
inferences (N = 60, SD in brackets)  
 N (few)  N (many)  PS (few)  PS (many) 
Necessary            
Low 82 (25.37)  85 (22.36)  80 (28.16)  64 (40.83) 
High 90 (16.87)  92 (13.67)  80 (36.20)  69 (39.21) 
M 86 (21.77)  88 (18.68)  80 (32.15)  67 (39.77) 
Possibility            
Low 98 (7.63)  99 (4.56)  98 (7.62)  95 (10.17) 
High 99 (4.56)  98 (7.63)  98 (7.62)  98 (6.34) 
M 98 (6.29)  98 (6.29)  98 (7.56)  97 (8.57) 
 
There was also a significant difference between few and many available alternative 
causes [F(1,58) = 5.89, p < .05, p2 = .09], whereby problems with few available 
alternative causes were endorsed more frequently than those with many available 
alternative causes, which is consistent with the literature, and suggests that when there 
were fewer alternative causes available participants were less likely to find them.  
There was no main effect of ability [F(1,58) = .92, p = .34]. 
There was a three-way interaction between instruction, problem type and available 
alternative causes [F(1,58) = 18.32, p < .001, p2 = .24], indicating a different pattern of 
responding under necessity instructions, (table 5.1) than under possibility instructions 
(table 5.2).  Under necessity instructions participants were more likely to search for 
counterexamples in order to reject PS conclusions (to AC/DA) when there were many 
alternative causes.   
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Figure 5.1.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on Necessary and PS 
inferences under necessity instructions  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on Necessary and PS 
inferences under possibiity instructions  
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Follow up within subjects t-tests indicate that inferences with many alternative causes 
show evidence of a search for counterexamples, in that there were significantly less 
endorsements of PS inferences than Necessary inferences, [t(1,59) = 4.99, p < .001]), 
but this effect was not present for inferences with few alternative causes [t(1,59) = 
1.57, p = .12].  A within subjects t-test also indicated that there was a significant 
difference between PS inferences with few alternative causes and many alternative 
causes [t(1,59) = 4.45, p < .001].  The effects under instructions of necessity were not 
present under possibility instructions.   
Impossible and PW problem types  
The mean percentage endorsement rates for Impossible and PW problems are shown 
in table 5.5, broken down by instruction, problem type, alternative causes, and ability.  
The cells for the low ability group and the high ability group represent the mean 
percentage endorsement rates for the responses from 30 participants.   
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (alternative causes) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA 
test revealed a main effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 25.49, p < .001, p2 = .31], reflecting 
higher endorsement rates when problems were presented under possibility 
instructions.  This is consistent with both previous experiments and the literature, and 
reflects the fact that reasoners can differentiate between types of instruction.  There 
was also a main effect of alternative causes [F(1,58) = 44.02, p < .001, p2 = .43], when 
problems with few available alternative causes were endorsed less frequently than 
problems with many available alternative causes, which is consistent with past 
research, and confirms that the number of alternative causes increases the likelihood of 
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a given conclusion being endorsed by reasoners.  There was no main effect of problem 
type [F(1,58) = .73, p = .34], and there was no main effect of ability [F(1,58) = .84, p = 
.36]. 
Table 5.5 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on Impossible and PW 
inferences (N = 60, SD in brackets) 
 I (few)  I (many)  PW (few)  PW (many) 
Necessary            
Low 15 (22.61)  27 (32.12)    7 (13.02)    8 (18.74) 
High   2 (9.13)    7 (25.37)  11 (21.46)    6 (20.43) 
M   8 (18.22)  17 (30.42)    9 (17.23)    7 (19.46) 
Possibility            
Low 13 (21.51)  41 (42.29)  12 (22.49)  46 (39.44) 
High   5 (10.17)  38 (42.93)  23 (32.78)  52 (41.49) 
M   9 (17.20)  38 (42.28)  18 (28.47)  49 (40.24) 
 
There were three significant interactions; the first of these was between instruction 
and problem type [F(1,58) = 10.12, p < .05, p2 = .15].  Figure 5.3 suggests that this is 
because more conclusions were correctly accepted following a search for alternative 
models on PW problems under possibility instructions than under necessity 
instructions, and also more conclusions were endorsed on PW problems than 
Impossible problems under possibility instructions.  These effects were confirmed by 
within subjects t-tests when significantly more PW problems were endorsed than 
Impossible under possibility instructions [t(1,59) = 5.48, p < .05]; and significantly 
more PW problems than Impossible problems were endorsed under possibility 
instructions [t(1,59) = 2.14, p < .05].  This replicated the results found in experiments 2, 
3 and 4. 
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Figure 5.3.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on Impossible and 
PW inferences under necessity and possibility instructions  
The second interaction was between instruction and the alternative causes [F(1,58) = 
35.36, p < .001, p2 = .38], suggesting that under necessity instructions the number of 
available alternative causes did not affect the willingness of participants to endorse or 
reject conclusions, but under possibility instructions participants were more prepared 
to endorse problems with many available alternative causes than with few available 
alternative causes (see figure 5.4).  The difference between few and many alternative 
causes under possibility instructions was confirmed by a follow up within subjects t-
test, when problems with many alternative causes were endorsed significantly more 
often than problems with few alternative causes [t(1,59) = 7.53, p < .001].  This pattern 
was predicted for PW problems; however there was no three-way interaction between 
instruction, alternative causes and problem type, suggesting that high rates of 
endorsement under many alternatives is present for both PW problems and Impossible 
problems.     
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Figure 5.4.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on inferences with 
few and many alternative causes under necessity and possibility instructions  
 
Figure 5.5.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 5, on Impossible and 
PW inferences for low and high ability groups  
The third interaction was between problem type and ability [F(1,58) = 11.10, p < .05, 
p2 = .16] whereby participants in the high ability group performed better on 
Impossible problems, by rejecting them more frequently than the low ability group.  
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This was confirmed by a between subjects t-test when the high ability group endorsed 
significant less Impossible problems than the low ability group [t(1,58) = 2.51, p < .01].  
Also, although the high ability group did not perform significantly better than the low 
ability group on PW problems, the effect was in the direction predicted [t(1,58) = 1.29, 
p = .20], and the high ability endorsed significant more PW problems than Impossible 
problems [t(1,29) = 2.93, p < .005] whereas the low ability did not [t(1,29) = 1.77, p = 
.09].  These effects are consistent with the literature. 
5.3.2  Reasoning times  
Necessary and PS problem types 
The mean reasoning times for Necessary and PS problems are shown in table 5.6 which 
are broken down by instruction, problem type, alternative causes and ability.  The cells 
for the low ability group and the high ability group represent the mean reasoning times 
for the responses from 30 participants, and are shown in milliseconds. 
Table 5.6 
Mean reasoning times in milliseconds for experiment 5, for Necessary and PS 
inferences (N = 60, SD in brackets)  
 N (few) N (many) PS (few) PS (many) 
Necessary         
Low 6742 (2207) 6675 (1834) 6798 (2879) 7032 (2433) 
High 6811 (3703) 6573 (2393) 6554 (2161) 6661 (2287) 
M 6776 (3022) 6624 (2114) 6676 (2527) 6846 (2348) 
Possibility         
Low 6563 (2651) 6352 (1703) 6442 (2192) 7175 (2519) 
High 6310 (1966) 6013 (1894) 5783 (1432) 5898 (1383) 
M 6437 (2318) 6182 (1794) 6092 (1869) 6536 (2115) 
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A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (alternative causes) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA 
test was carried out, and there were no main effects of instruction [F(1,58) = 3.36, p = 
.07], problem type [F(1,58) = .06, p = .81], alternative causes  [F(1,58) = .10, p = .75], or 
ability [F(1,58) = .91, p = .35].  There were no interactions. 
Impossible and PW problem types  
The mean reasoning times for Impossible and PW problems are shown in table 5.7 , 
broken down by instruction, problem type, alternative causes and ability.  The cells for 
the low ability group and the high ability group represent the mean reasoning times for 
the responses from 30 participants, and are shown in milliseconds. 
Table 5.7 for experiment 5 
Mean reasoning times in milliseconds for experiment 5, on Impossible and PW 
inferences (N = 60, SD in brackets) 
 I (few) I (many) PW (few) PW (many) 
Necessary         
Low 9375 (3773) 8259 (3286) 8269 (2825) 8900 (4770) 
High 7670 (2210) 7346 (2678) 8107 (3906) 7132 (2417) 
M 8523 (3184) 7803 (3007) 8188 (3213) 8016 (3950) 
Possibility         
Low 8358 (2671) 8148 (3125) 9171 (2695) 7515 (3031) 
High 8156 (3471) 6773 (1657) 7477 (2496) 6925 (2375) 
M 8258 (3072) 7461 (2575) 8324 (2714) 7220 (2878) 
 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (alternative causes) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA 
test revealed a main effect of alternative causes [F(1,58) = 13.15, p  < .001, p2 = .19], 
whereby problems with few alternative causes took longer than those with many 
alternative causes, and a main effect of ability [F(1,58) = 4.07 p < .05, p2 = .07] when 
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participants in the low ability group took longer than participants in the high ability 
group.  There were no main effects of instruction [F(1,58) = .88, p = .35], or problem 
type [F(1,58) = .11, p = .75].   
The main effect of ability is consistent with the literature, where it has been shown that 
high ability reasoners are generally quicker.  However, the main effect of alternative 
causes suggests that participants were spending time looking for alternative causes 
when there were few available ones, which is inconsistent with findings reported by de 
Neys et al. (2002).  The lack of a main effect for problem types may have been affected 
by the time taken to process negations.  This is because Impossible problems consisted 
of MP and MT arguments with opposite conclusions, and PW problems consisted of 
AC/DA argument with opposite conclusions, which in this case would affect MP (if p 
then q, p, not q) and AC (if p then q, q, not p); although it would be expected that this 
would have affected each problem type equally. 
There was a four-way interaction between instruction, problem type, alternative causes 
and ability [F(59) = 9.58, p < .005, p2 =.14].  This was difficult to understand, and given 
that there was no clear interpretation, and that the latency effects in this thesis so far 
have been small and inconsistent; no attempt is made to draw any firm conclusions 
regarding this complex interaction.    
5.4  Discussion for experiment 5 
Experiment 5 used causal conditionals with everyday content, to explore the influence 
of the number of alternative causes that could be retrieved from our everyday 
knowledge of the world, on endorsement rates and latencies under necessity and 
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possibility instructions.  A measure of cognitive ability also allowed comparisons to be 
made for performance and latencies between low and high ability groups.  Consistent 
with experiment 1 - 4, there was clear evidence that participants understood the 
difference between instructions of necessity, and instructions of possibility, as there 
were more endorsements of possibility than of necessity.  This supports previous 
research (Evans et al., 1999). 
There was strong evidence to suggest that participants were accessing their knowledge 
of the world before responding, in terms of endorsement rates. Congruent with the 
literature (Cummins et al., 1991; Evans et al., 2010), there were more endorsements of 
inferences with few alternative causes than many alternative causes, on logically valid 
inferences (Necessary) and PS inferences where the first model supports the 
conclusion.  There was also a novel finding that has not been reported previously in the 
literature, in that the number of possible causes led to inferences with few alternative 
causes being endorsed less frequently than inferences with many alternative causes, 
inferences with a logically Impossible conclusion, and indeterminate inferences where 
the first model under consideration does not support the conclusion (PW).  These 
findings were not affected by ability.  An example of inference content with few 
alternatives causes is butter melting, in that there are few causes other than it being 
heated which would cause butter to melt; on the other hand if a room is cold, in addition 
to the window being open, there may be many reasons why the room is cold, such as an 
old heating system, extreme weather, or lack of insulation.     
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The main analysis and comparisons were carried out between Necessary and PS 
problem types to explore whether reasoners searched for counterexamples on PS 
problems under necessity instructions, and whether reasoners searched for alternative 
models on Impossible and PW problems under possibility instructions.  In each case a 
search for counterexamples or alternative models was necessary in order to provide 
the correct response to the conclusion under evaluation.   
The patterns of behaviour were different, in terms of finding evidence to support the 
search for counterexamples under necessity instructions, and alternative causes under 
possibility instructions.  There was a clear difference between endorsement rates for 
Necessary inferences and PS inferences, when there were more rejections of 
conclusions to PS inferences than to Necessary inferences.  Consistent with 
experiments 1 - 4, inferences with necessarily correct conclusions (Necessary) were 
endorsed more frequently than inferences with indeterminate conclusions (PS), which 
suggests that reasoners were aware of the logical framework of the inferences.  
However the difference between Impossible problems and PW problems was not 
significant, indicating a lack of discrimination between inferences types.     
Looking first at Necessary (MP/MT) inferences with logically valid structures and 
invalid PS (AC/DA) inferences.  There was a strong indication that more reasoners 
were carrying out a search for counterexamples when there were many alternative 
causes under necessity instructions, than they were when there were few alternative 
causes.  The theoretical implications of this are that when there are many alternative 
causes to an event, under necessity instructions, reasoners are more likely to 
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successfully search for counterexamples as proposed by the mental model theory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).  For instance take the invalid AC 
conditional ‘if the brake is pressed the car will slow down’, and the knowledge that the 
car slowed down, rather than accepting that the brake was pressed, participants 
appeared to think of other causes, for example running out of fuel, climbing a hill, 
leaving the handbrake on, overheating, having a broken fan belt.  However, the 
likelihood of a search taking place was not affected by ability. 
The analysis for Impossible and PW problems was less clear in terms of the 
relationship between the number of alternative causes and the search for alternative 
models; but there was support for the prediction that that reasoners searched for 
alternative causes on PW problems under possibility instructions, although this was 
not mediated by the number of alternative causes or by ability.  Therefore, participants 
were equally likely to search for alternative causes for the water becoming ice other 
than it being frozen; and for the mug breaking because it was dropped.    
The high ability group endorsed significantly more PW problems than Impossible 
problems, which was expected since Impossible problems are not necessary or possible, 
but PW problems are possible but not necessary.  However surprisingly, the low ability 
group endorsed less PW problems than Impossible problems, which again was not 
affected by the number of causes.   
There were particularly high endorsement rates for Impossible problems when there 
were many alternative causes, under possibility instructions.  For instance, given the 
statement ‘if the window is open, the room will be cold’, and the information that the 
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window was open, many participants were willing to access their knowledge of the 
world to find reasons why the room was not cold; perhaps because the heating was on, 
the curtain were drawn, or the weather was hot.  On the other hand given the statement 
'if the paperclip touches the magnet, it will stick to it', and the information that the 
paper clip and magnet were stuck together, this was not the case.  Interestingly, the 
high ability group did not override this effect, and the high number of erroneous 
responses to PW problems by both ability groups suggests that possibility instructions 
led participants to question the causal link more than when problems are presented 
under necessity instructions. 
When looking at the results in relation to past research, Cummins et al. (1995; 1991) 
found that invalid AC and DA inferences were more likely to be made for conditionals 
with few available causes, which in this case are PS problems.  There was clear 
evidence of this when 80% of inferences were erroneously endorsed when there were 
few alternative causes, as opposed to 67% when there were many alternative causes, 
and the results suggest that a successful search for counterexamples was carried out on 
inferences with many alternative causes, but was either not carried out or was 
unsuccessful on those with few alternative causes.   
Clearly, our knowledge of the world plays an important role in the inferences we are 
prepared to make, although this was not as affected by ability as might be expected.  In 
contrast to previous research by Evans et al. (2010), there was no evidence to suggest 
that cognitive ability played a role in performance under either necessity instructions 
or possibility instructions, on inferences that are logically valid or supported by an 
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initial model.  However under possibility instructions the high ability group were better 
performers on Impossible inferences and PW inferences where the conclusions was not 
supported by the initial model 
The next and final study of this thesis, simplifies experiment 5, to look at the 
consequents from specific antecedents under necessity and possibility instructions, 
where the emphasis was on content rather than the relationship between content and 
the logical structure.    
5.5  Introduction to experiment 6  
The previous study illustrated how different contents, in terms of the number of 
alternative causes that can be accessed from our everyday knowledge of the world, lead 
to the construction of certain models in order to evaluate a given conclusion relating to 
the rule under consideration.  This final study adopts a simplified inference task, to look 
at the consequents from specific antecedents under different conditions, again using 
necessity and possibility instructions, a measure of cognitive ability, and the collection of 
inference latencies.  The focus here is on possible disabling conditions (Cummins, 1995; 
Cummins et al., 1991; De Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2003), so given the conditional 
‘if the brake is depressed, then the car will slow down’, possible disabling conditions are: 
a fractured brake lines, icy road conditions, or accelerating at the same time.  Therefore 
if such disablers are present, depressing the brake will not result in the slowing down of 
the car.  The disablers make it clear that it is not sufficient to depress the brake to slow 
the car down, and there are other conditions that need to be satisfied.   
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Unlike the preceding experiments reported in this thesis, and the practice most 
commonly adopted in studies of conditional inference, syllogistic reasoning, and 
transitive inference; responses to the tasks in experiment 6 do not require deductive 
reasoning skills, but merely a response that reflects the general perceptions people 
have of a given scenarios, by accessing their knowledge about the world. 
The inference structure of the conditionals are shown in table 5.8, using abstract 
examples; but in order to ensure that the associative strength was in line with the 
inference category for all of the inferences i.e. PS inferences were highly likely, a pilot 
study was carried out to identify the specific antecedents and consequents.  
Table 5.8  
Inference structures for experiment 6 
Type Inference Rationale 
Necessary  If p, then q 
The antecedent will almost certainly lead to the 
consequent 
PS If p ,then q 
The antecedent is highly likely to  lead to the 
consequent, so individuals need to find a disabling 
condition in order to reject inferences under 
necessity instructions 
Impossible If p, then q The antecedent will not lead to the consequent 
PW If p, then q 
The antecedent is highly unlikely to  lead to the 
consequent, so individuals need to find an enabling 
condition in order to endorse PW inferences under 
possibility instructions 
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5.6  Pilot study for experiment 6  
The purpose of the pilot study was to select a reliable set of 32 simple inferences with 
an equal number in each of the four categories (Necessary, Impossible, PS and PW).  A 
bank of 64 inferences was generated, where the causal inference broadly fell into one of 
four inference type categories (Necessary, PS, Impossible, PW).  These were based on 
the relationship between p (the antecedent) and q (the consequent). 
Participants  
The participants were run in groups of 5, and were 20 undergraduate students from 
the University of Plymouth, who took part in the pilot study in return for either 
payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 6 males and 14 females with a mean 
age of 22 years, and they were all native English speakers.   
Task materials and procedure 
Table 5.9  
Task instructions for pilot study on experiment for experiment 6  
 
Read the sentence at the top of the page.  Assuming this statement is true, please 
indicate the probability that the conclusion given in the second sentence is also 
true.   This should be done by placing a mark on the scale in the appropriate place, 
where you think it should be, for instance: 
 
If James jumps into the river 
he will get wet 
 
 
  
impossible true 
20% 40% 60% 80% 
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The 64 inferences were presented to participants in a randomised list with three 
inferences on each page; a set of six point likert scales, numbered 1 – 64 which again 
had three on each page; and the written task instructions (see table 5.9). 
The mean ratings were calculated for all 64 inferences, when proposed Necessary 
inferences such as ‘if it rains heavily, the streets will get wet’ with a mean score of 90% 
were retained for the main study, while inferences such as ‘if a ruler is used, the line will 
be straight’ (mean score of 85%) were discarded.  A full set of inferences used in the 
selection process are presented in appendix 5G.  The selection criteria for identifying 
the inferences for use in experiment 5 are shown in table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 
Selection criteria for inferences used in experiment 6 
Necessary At least 50% of responses 100% Mean response ≥ 90% 
PS 
At least 50% of responses between 
50% and 80% 
Mean response was 
between 60% and 85% 
Impossible At least 50% of responses 0% Mean response ≤ 10% 
PW 
At least 50% of responses between  
20% and 50% 
Mean response was 
between 15% and 40% 
 
5.6.1  Predictions for experiment 6  
There are a number of predictions that can be made about the willingness of 
participants to endorsement or reject conclusions, which are based on the assumption 
that prior knowledge concerning disabling conditions for a given scenario, will affect 
whether or not a search is carried out for counterexamples or alternative models. 
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1. There will be more endorsements of possibility than of necessity, as although on 
PS and PW problems it cannot be concluded that the conclusion under 
consideration is necessary, it can be concluded that it is possible.   
2. If reasoners consider disabling conditions for the scenario:  under necessity 
instructions there will be higher endorsement rates for Necessary inferences than 
for PS inferences, because whilst PS inferences are not necessary, they are 
possible.   
3.  If reasoners consider disabling conditions for the scenario:  under possibility 
instructions there will be higher endorsement rates for PW inferences than for 
Impossible inferences, because Impossible inferences are not possible under both 
types of instruction, but PW inferences are possible (but not necessary). 
4. As the experiments reported so far have failed to find supporting evidence from 
the latencies for the search for counterexamples or alternative models, the only 
prediction that is made is that high ability participants will respond more quickly.     
5.7  Method for experiment 6 
Design 
This experimental study was carried out using a within-subjects design, when initially 
participants completed an AH4 cognitive ability test.  This was followed by the 
inference task, where participants were presented with one block of 32 randomised 
inferences under necessity instructions, and one block of 32 randomised inferences 
under possibility instructions, the order of which was counterbalanced to minimize 
order effects.  
195 
 
Participants 
A total of 60 undergraduate students from the University of Plymouth took part in the 
study, in return for either payment or course credit.  The sample consisted of 15 males 
and 45 females with a mean age of 24 years, and they were all native English speakers.  
No participants were dyslexic.   
Materials and procedure 
Using a similar procedure to the experiments reported in chapters 2, 3 and 4, 
participants were run in groups of between 4 and 7 in a laboratory containing several 
computers.  Each participant was seated at their own workstation, to avoid distraction. 
Cognitive Ability Test 
Participants completed Parts I and II of the AH4 Test of Cognitive Ability (Heim, 1968), 
which was administered in accordance with the test instructions and followed the 
procedure used in experiment 1.  Question booklets and answers sheets were collected 
by the experimenter before moving on to the inference task. 
Causal inference task 
The set of 32 one statement inferences identified in the pilot study, consisted of 8 
simple inferences in each of four categories: Necessary, PS, Impossible, and PW; these 
were evaluated first under necessity instructions and then under possibility 
instructions, or vice versa.  Examples of the inferences used are shown in table 5.11, 
and the full set off inferences can be found in appendix 5H.  
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Table 5.11 
Examples of inferences for experiment 6 
Necessary If it rains heavily, the streets will get wet 
PS If a baby is hungry, he will cry  
Impossible If oil is added to water, they will mix 
PW If the dog falls into the canal, she will drown 
 
A computer with a 15” monitor screen was used to present the inferences, with the 
computer program.  The keyboard was adapted to include yes and no keys, which were 
systematically counterbalanced, so that half the participants had the yes key on the left 
of the keyboard and the no key on the right, while the other half had these positions 
reversed. 
The two sets of written task instructions which included examples of the screen layout, 
were printed on A4 paper, and were similar to those used in the previous experiments. 
These related to whether problems were being evaluated for either necessity 
correctness or possibility correctness.  Examples of the screen layouts are shown in 
table 5.14, and a complete set of instructions is presented in appendix 5I and appendix 
5J. 
The instructions were distributed (necessity or possibility) for the first block of 
inferences and after a short reading period, participants were given the opportunity to 
ask questions on any points that they were less clear about.  The screen layouts are 
shown in table 5.15.  The participants were also told that they should ask the 
experimenter for the second set of instructions (necessity or possibility) as soon as a 
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message appeared on the screen, and reminded that at the start of each block there 
were two practice questions.   
Table 5.12 
Screen layouts included in task instructions for experiment 6  
Screen 1 Screen 2 
 
 
 
Screen 1 Screen 2 
 
 
 
 
Participant responses, yes or no, were recorded by the program, together with the time 
taken to indicate understanding of the inference (screen 1) and the time taken to 
complete the reasoning process (screen 2).  These were saved to disc. 
5.8  Results for experiment 6 
The AH4 test sheets were scored in accordance with the test instructions, when one 
mark was given for each correct answer.  In line with the previous studies reported in 
this thesis, and the procedure generally adopted in the literature, the scores from the 
AH4 test parts I and II were totalled to give an overall general ability score for each 
Given that: 
It is a lemon 
Given that: 
It is a lemon 
Is it necessary that 
It will taste sweet 
Given that: 
He cuts his finger 
Given that: 
He cuts his finger 
Is it possible that 
It will bleed 
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participant.  The observed mean for participants was 96.95 (SD = 10.78), which was 
similar to the available norm of 96.36 (SD = 15.01) for university students (Heim, 
1968), and to experiment 3 (first transitive inference experiment) and experiment 5 
(everyday conditionals), but substantially higher than for the syllogistic reasoning 
experiment and the first transitive inference experiment, and lower than the abstract 
conditional reasoning experiment.   
The sample was divided into high and low cognitive ability groups, on the basis of a 
median split on the total AH4 test scores; cases below the median of 96.5 were 
classified as low ability and those above the median were classified as high ability.  All 
participants evaluated the causal inferences under both necessity instructions and 
possibility instructions.  The first dependent variable was the mean percentage 
endorsement rates for each inference type, i.e. the number of yes responses.  The 
second dependent variable was the time course of the evaluation process; that is to say 
both premise processing and response times together.  These were totalled for each 
inference type and instruction group to produce a mean evaluation time (in 
milliseconds). The results from the endorsement rate data are reported first; followed 
by the results from the evaluation time data.  All ANOVA tables for experiment 4 are 
shown in appendix 5K. 
5.8.1  Inference endorsement rates  
The mean percentage endorsement rates for all four types of inferences (Necessary, PS, 
Impossible and PW) are shown in table 5.13, broken down by instruction, inference 
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type and ability.  The cells for the low ability group and the high ability group represent 
the mean percentage endorsement rates for the responses from 30 participants.   
Table 5.13 
Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 6, on all inference 
types (N = 60, SD in brackets)  
 Necessary PS Impossible PW 
Necessary         
Low 86 (18.49) 53 (33.05) 4 (17.58) 4 (14.05) 
High 86 (16.20) 47 (31.94) 4 (7.44) 3 (8.00) 
M 86 (17.24) 50 (32.34) 4 (7.45) 4 (11.34) 
Possibility         
Low 100 (2.28) 100 (0.00)   12 (13.10) 78 (26.24) 
High 97 (5.37) 98 (7.14) 15 (13.57) 84 (19.12) 
M 98 (4.28) 99 (5.08) 13 (4.29) 82 (22.96) 
 
Necessary and PS inferences 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (inference type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 103.08, p < .001, p2 = .64], reflecting higher 
endorsement rates when inferences were presented under possibility instructions; and 
a main effect of inference type [F(1,58) = 125.88,  p < .001, p2 = .69], whereby 
Necessary inferences were endorsed more frequently than PS inferences.  There was no 
main effect of ability [F(1,58) = .58, p = .45].  This indicated that participants had an 
understanding of the difference between necessity and possibility instructions, which is 
consistent with the previous experiments reported in this thesis, and also that 
participants were discriminating between inferences where there were no disabling 
conditions such as if butter is heated, it will melt; and inferences where there were few 
disabling condition such as if a baby is hungry, he will cry.   
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There was a highly significant interaction between instruction and inference type 
[F(1,58) = 133.36, p < .001, p2 = .70], suggesting that participants were successfully 
finding disabling conditions in order to reject the conclusion on PS inferences under 
necessity instructions, as illustrated in figure 5.6   
 
Figure 5.6.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 6, on Necessary and PS 
inferences under necessity and possibility instructions  
For instance given the statement if the baby is hungry he will cry, participants were 
finding at least one disabler for a baby not crying when it is hungry.  Follow up within 
subjects t-tests were carried out, which confirmed that there was a significant 
difference between endorsements on inferences under instructions of necessity [t(59) 
= 11.65, p < .001]. On the other hand, under possibility instructions, where both 
Necessary and PS inferences are possible, the difference was not significant [t(59) = 
1.27, p = .21]. 
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Impossible and PW inferences 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (inference type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 352.83, p < .001, p2 = .85], reflecting higher 
endorsement rates under possibility instructions; and of inference type [F(1,58) = 
342.29, p < .001, p2 = .85], whereby PW inferences were more frequently endorsed 
than Impossible inferences.  There was no main effect of ability [F(1,58) = .92, p = .34].  
Again, the main effect of instruction suggests that participants had an understanding of 
the differences, which is consistent with previous experiments; and the inference type 
effects suggest that participants were able to discriminate between Impossible 
statements such as if it is night time it will be sunny, and PW statements such as if he has 
a cold, he will cough or sneeze. 
 
Figure 5.7.  Mean percentage endorsement rates for experiment 6, on Impossible and 
PW inferences under necessity and possibility instructions  
There was also a significant interaction between instruction and inference type 
[F(1,58) = 495.54, p < .001, p2 = .89], which is illustrated in figure 5.7.  This interaction 
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suggests that under possibility instructions, participants looked past their first thought, 
to find an enabling condition where the statement was true.  Follow up between 
subjects t-tests were carried out, which confirmed that there was a significant 
difference between inference types under possibility instructions [t(59) = -23.23, p < 
.001], but not under necessity instructions [t(59) = .13, p = .90]. 
5.8.2  Inference evaluation times  
Table 5.14 
Mean evaluation times in milliseconds for experiment 6, on all inference types 
(N = 60, SD in brackets)  
 N PS I PW 
Necessary         
Low 4154 (1846) 4368 (1551) 4672 (1373) 4353 (1188) 
High 3223 (904) 3284 (986) 3501 (992) 3344 (945) 
M 3688 (1400) 3826 (1400) 4086 (1326) 3849 (1180) 
Possibility         
Low 3420 (1070) 3329 (1241) 4492 (1241) 4436 (1344) 
High 2911 (811) 2717 (960) 3786 (860) 3618 (1283) 
M 3166 (976) 3023 (1205) 4139 (1205) 4027 (1367) 
 
The mean inference evaluation times for all inference types are shown in table 5.14, 
which are again broken down by instruction, inference type and ability.  The cells for 
low ability group and the high ability group represent the mean inference evaluation 
times for the responses from 30 participants, and are shown in milliseconds.   
Necessary and PS inferences 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (inference type) x 2 (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of instruction [F(1,58) = 25.61, p = .001, p2  = .31], reflecting longer evaluation 
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times under necessity instructions; and also of ability [F(1,58) = 9.28, p < .005, p2  = 
.14], when the high ability group were quicker than the low ability group, as predicted.  
There was no main effect of inference type [F(1,58) = .00, p = .98], and there were no 
significant interactions. 
Impossible and PW inferences 
A 2 (instruction) x 2 (inference type) 2 x (ability) mixed ANOVA test revealed a main 
effect of ability [F(1,58) = 20.98, p < .001, p2 = .27], whereby the high ability group 
were quicker than the low ability group, again as predicted.  There was no main effect 
of instruction [F(1,58) = .88, p = .35]; or inference type [F(1,58) = .23, p = .63], and there 
were no significant interactions. 
5.9 Discussion for experiment 6 
The aim of this final experiment was to show how cognitive ability and our knowledge 
of the world influences the willingness of people to accept or reject a conclusion, when 
inferences were presented either under necessity instructions, or the more relaxed 
possibility instructions.  There was no logical structure involved, which enabled 
confirmation of the effect of everyday content in relation to specific antecedents, for 
each of the problem types and structures which have featured throughout this thesis.   
As predicted, the high ability participants were generally quicker for all inference 
types; and on Necessary and PS inferences the response times were longer for all 
participants under instructions of necessity, suggesting that reasoners were finding it 
more difficult to make judgements of necessity than judgements of possibility.  There 
were also more endorsements of possibility than necessity, which was congruent line 
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with past research (Evans et al., 1999), and consistent with the predictions and findings 
from experiments 1 – 5. 
When making comparisons between scenarios where the event was certain to occur 
(Necessary), and those where it was highly likely to occur (PS); there was a significant 
difference suggesting that participants were discriminating between the two, by 
accessing disabling conditions for the rule under consideration on highly possible 
scenarios.  For instance, participants were prepared to concede that it is not necessary 
that the baby will cry if he is hungry, by perhaps considering that he is sucking his 
dummy, or has temporarily lost his voice.  There was firm evidence from the interaction 
between instruction and inference type that this search for disabling conditions was 
strongest for PS inferences under instructions of necessity.     
The endorsement rates for PW inferences were significantly higher than for Impossible 
inferences, suggesting that participants were discriminating between Impossible 
scenarios and ones that are unlikely, but may still occur.  There was also evidence to 
support the prediction that participants were searching for enabling conditions on PW 
inference under possibility instructions.  This suggests that when there were no logical 
constrictions on the structure of a task, the decision on whether or not to endorse the 
conclusion under consideration was heavily influenced by our knowledge of everyday 
events in the world.  For example given an inference such as if it is stormy weather; 
participants were searching for enabling conditions for the oil tanker sinking, such as it 
being heavily laden, or hitting a rock. 
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In summary, experiment 6 has shown very clearly that people can discriminate 
between the meaning of necessity and possibility, when making judgements that rely 
primarily on their beliefs about the world, and also between instances where the 
scenario is almost certainly true, highly likely (PS), less likely (PW), and impossible. 
5.10  Discussion for experiments 5 and 6 
The two final experiments reported in this experimental program of research, fully 
support the pattern of results reported in the large body of literature on causal 
conditional reasoning with everyday statements (i.e. Cummings et al., 1991) which  
confirms that knowledge influences the extent to which people are prepared to accept 
or reject each of the four conditional inferences, and also inferences that are based 
solely on content.  
This suggests that the nature and number of alternative causes and disabling 
conditionals is important in the decisions that people make on a daily basis.  In 
experiment 5 more inferences with few alternative causes were endorsed, than 
inferences with many alternative causes, on Necessary and PS inference structures, and 
this was reversed for Impossible and PW inference structures.  In experiment 6, the 
endorsement rates were also heavily influenced by content.   
In terms of the theoretical implications, there was strong evidence in support of the 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), for the 
search for counterexamples under necessity instructions.  There was also support for 
the predictions that individuals would search for alternative models under possibility 
instructions, when the first model on an inference which was possible did not support 
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the conclusion.  In experiment 5, where there was a distinction between conditional 
statements with few and many alternative causes, the effect of a search for 
counterexamples was present only when there were many alternative causes, but it 
was across both causal groups under possibility instructions.  These are novel findings.  
There was also very strong evidence to support the search for counterexamples and 
alternative models from experiment 6, which further confirms the influence of content 
on the inferences which individuals are prepared to make.   
When considering the endorsement rate results for experiment 5 and 6 from a dual 
process perspective, Evans et al. (2010) found that high ability participants were less 
influenced by content, than low ability participants, under instructions of logical 
necessity, although experiment 5 found no evidence to support this.  The presence of 
this effect under necessity instructions was concluded to be because high ability people 
are more able to decontextualize the content of an inference, with the logical properties 
(Evans et al., 2010).   
A further theory which was discussed in the introduction is that some researchers (i.e. 
Liu, Lo, & Wu, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2001) propose that people make 
inferences on if then conditionals with everyday content, according to the perceived 
probability of q, given p, for all four inferences.  However Markovits and Handley (2005) 
found considerable evidence to suggest that these two systems are not isomorphic.  
Given the aims and nature of this programme of research, no direct comparisons are 
possible, although this may be an area of research that might be explored in the future.     
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The final chapter of this thesis will provide a discussion of the findings reported in each 
experimental chapter for the six studies which we carried out.  The theoretical 
implications will also be discussed, together with directions for future research. 
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Chapter 6  
General Discussion 
 
The principal aims and objectives of this programme of experimental research were 
threefold.  First, to extend the investigations on reasoning about necessity and 
possibility carried out by Evans et al. (1999), to include other paradigms; using a range 
of deductive arguments and types of inference.  Second, to incorporate a measure of 
cognitive ability; and third to record the time course of the reasoning process, to 
evaluate whether this is a more sensitive measure in gauging reasoning behaviours.  
The predictions were derived from the principles of the mental model theory of human 
reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), more specifically the 
third stage, which proposes that deductive competence is achieved by people searching 
for counterexamples, to identify other models in order to justify rejection of a putative 
conclusion.   
The approach used in the preparation of this thesis is novel, in that not only do the 
experiments present reasoning problems with abstract and everyday content, under 
necessity instructions, across a range of reasoning paradigms; but the problems are 
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also presented under the more relaxed instructions of possibility.  The addition of 
measures of cognitive ability and the time course of processing judgements, enabled a 
systematic investigation of whether people search for counterexamples under 
necessity instructions when the initial model fails to disconfirm the conclusion; and 
whether they search for alternative models under possibility instructions, when the 
initial model fails to support the conclusion.  This work is theoretically important, 
because the literature suggests that people tend to be errorful in reasoning, and that 
they do not consider other possibilities; while mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) suggests that people do search for other models 
but are sometimes unsuccessful in this search. 
Although the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) 
has generated a large body of reasoning research over the past twenty five years, and 
has provided a framework for testing reasoning behaviours across a wide range of 
experimental studies, surprisingly little support has been found for the idea that people 
actually do search for counterexamples.  There is a growing consensus in recent 
reasoning literature, that if people can find a model that supports the conclusion under 
consideration, they will satisfice on this model, rather than engaging in a more effortful 
approach to reasoning.  This view is consistent with the satisficing principle, which is 
the third principle of hypothetical thinking theory, originally proposed by Evans, Over, 
and Handley (2003), and more fully developed by Evans (2007a). 
To facilitate the aims of the reported in this thesis, four different types of reasoning 
problem were used, which were broadly similar for each paradigm.  The structure and 
211 
 
composition of these was inspired by the work of Evans et al. (1999), who carried out a 
large syllogistic reasoning study which produced a useful database of endorsement 
rates for all 256 syllogistic combinations, under both necessity and possibility 
instructions.  This enabled the selection of materials for experiment 1, in terms of valid 
syllogisms, where the conclusion for evaluation is necessarily true and therefore 
possibly true (Necessary problems), syllogisms with Impossible conclusions, and also 
two sets of indeterminate syllogisms.  Evans et al. (1999) found that problems 
supporting possible conclusions fell into two categories, which were termed PS 
(possible strong) and PW (possible weak); when PS problems were regularly taken to 
imply necessary conclusions, because the first model supported the conclusion, but PW 
problems were rarely taken to imply necessary conclusions, because the conclusion 
was not supported by the first model.  These two types of possible problems have been 
pivotal in the development of materials, and the general analysis of the experiments 
carried out. 
We first review and discuss the results from each of the six experimental studies, 
followed by an evaluation of the reasoning time results and the findings in relation to 
individual differences in cognitive ability.  Following this the theoretical implications 
will be considered, before moving on to look at areas for future research and our 
concluding comments.   
Summary of key experimental findings from the endorsement 
rate data 
We presented deductive reasoning problems and inferences to participants across 
three paradigms; syllogistic reasoning, transitive inference and conditional inference.  
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The syllogistic reasoning problems had abstract content; the transitive inference 
problems described non-ambiguous relationships between red, blue and green lines 
akin to 3-term series problems; and the conditional inferences had either abstract 
content or everyday content.  We recorded reasoning behaviours under standard 
logical instructions, and under instructions asking participants to evaluate whether 
conclusions possibly followed.  We also administered a measure of cognitive ability, 
and recorded the time course of the reasoning process.   
The data was interpreted within the framework of the mental model theory (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and comparisons were made between 
Necessary and PS problems/inferences, and Impossible and PW problems/inferences.  
This facilitated the exploration of whether a search for counterexamples and 
alternative models was carried out, because on PS problem under necessity 
instructions, a search for counterexamples is needed to find a model that falsifies the 
initial conclusion, and on PW problems under possibility instructions, a search for 
alternative models is necessary because the first model disconfirms the conclusion.   
The search for counterexamples under necessity instructions 
We made a number of predictions, which were systematically tested across the six 
experiments reported in this thesis.  First, conclusions would be more frequently 
endorsed under possibility instructions than under necessity instructions, because only 
one model will suffice for a possible conclusion.  Also, there would be more 
endorsements of Necessary problems than PS problems, because PS conclusions are 
only true under instructions of possibility. 
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Second, we predicted that a search for counterexamples would result in an interaction 
between instruction and problem type (Necessary and PS), since under possibility 
instructions no search for other models is required for either type of problem, but a 
search is required on PS problems under necessity instructions.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, although there is no evidence to suggest that people know in advance 
whether they need to search for counterexamples on valid reasoning problems, we do 
know that they only need to confirm that a given conclusion is correct.  However, with 
invalid problems where the first model supports the premises (PS problems), mental 
model theory predicts that people need to search for counterexamples in order to 
reject a given conclusion. 
Third, people with higher cognitive ability would be more able to discriminate between 
problems which were necessarily true (Necessary), and those which were merely 
possible (PS).  Also, people with higher cognitive ability would be more discriminating 
between the two types of instruction, and would generally be better performers.  The 
ability predictions were based on previous work (i.e. Stanovich and West, 1998a; 
1998b). 
Our final prediction relates specifically to experiment 5 where the number of 
alternative causes was manipulated: on inferences with many alternative causes, there 
would be fewer endorsements of PS inferences than Necessary inferences because 
other causes are more readily availability; however we posited that the effect may not 
be present when there were few alternative causes.  This prediction was informed by 
previous research (Cummins et al., 1995; 1991; De Neys et al., 2003).      
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Table 6.1 
Table of effect sizes (p2) on significant differences in endorsement rates for main 
effects and interactions - Necessary and PS problems/inferences 
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 Syllogisms  .14 .11 - x - - - x x 
 Transitive 
inference  (1st) 
- .17 - x - - - x x 
Transitive 
inference  (2nd) 
.12 .29 - x .20 .18 .08 x x 
Abstract 
conditionals  
.45 .13 - x .15 .08 - - x 
Everyday 
conditionals  
.36 .23 - .09 .15 - - .08 .24 
Everyday 
inferences  
.64 .69 - x .70 - - x x 
   *       less endorsements under necessity instructions than under possibility instructions 
   **     more rejections of PS problem conclusions than Necessary problem conclusions 
   ***   few alternative causes more frequently endorsed than many alternative causes 
 
A summary of effect sizes for significant main effects and interactions is presented in 
table 6.1.  As predicted, we found across all six experiments that people were more 
likely to endorse conclusions about what they believed was possible, rather than what 
they believed to be necessary20, which is in line with previous research using necessity 
and possibility instructions (i.e. Evans et al., 1999).  The effect was strongest for 
experiment 6 (simple inferences), where no reasoning was required, and responses 
were based solely on the content of the inference. 
                                                             
20   There was one notable exception; this was in the first transitive inference experiment, when 
there appeared to be a lack of clarity on the part of the participants, in terms of how to interpret 
the terms. 
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Also as predicted and shown in table 6.1, across all six experiments, there was a 
significant difference between endorsement rates for Necessary problems and PS 
problems; when Necessary problems were endorsed more frequently than PS 
problems, indicating that people were rejecting some invalid (PS under necessity 
instructions) inferences.  Again, this was strongest for the simple everyday inferences 
presented to participants in experiment 6.  It should also be noted that the frequency of 
Necessary and PS acceptance rates reported in each experimental chapter was high, 
particularly under possibility instructions, which was expected given our experimental 
manipulation.  Turning now to look at the extent to which interactions between 
instruction and problem type provide evidence for the search for counterexamples, and 
also other interactions present; each chapter will be reviewed in order of presentation 
in this thesis, with reference to the literature where appropriate.     
We first consider experiment 1, which was a replication and extension of previous 
work carried out by Evans et al (1999), using the syllogistic reasoning paradigm.  There 
was no evidence to support the search for counterexamples (see table 6.1), which 
confirms comments from Evans at al. (1999) suggesting that little search for alternative 
models occurs when the first model identified confirms the conclusion.  This may well 
be because individuals were satisficing as proposed by hypothetical thinking theory 
(Evans, 2007a); because of the structural complexity of syllogisms.  The theoretical 
implications of this will be discussed later in the chapter.  In addition, there was no 
evidence that ability affected reasoning behaviours (see table 6.1).  The lack of ability 
effects is somewhat at odds with some of the earlier reasoning literature (i.e. Stanovich 
and West, 1998a; 1998b), when it was suggested that higher ability people were better 
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at syllogistic reasoning; although more recently research in syllogistic reasoning within 
the belief bias paradigm (i.e. Handley et al., 2010; Evans, et al., 2010) has found that 
higher ability people are merely less belief biased than lower ability people, when 
reasoning under instructions of logical necessity.    
Chapter 3 introduced the transitive inference paradigm to the problem structures used 
in the first experiment, and benefitted from the use of a database of endorsement rates 
collected by Knauff et al. (1995) in a study investigating differences in model variation.  
The database provided preferred conclusions on indeterminate spatial relationships of 
transitivity, as well as valid relationships of transitivity, and was used to inform the 
choice of our transitive inference problems.   
The first of our two experiments using transitive inference problems failed to provide 
evidence to support the search for counterexamples, in that there was no interaction 
between instruction and problem type, and there were no ability effects (see table 6.1).  
A number of reasons were considered, which may have contributed to this, aside from 
the fact that participants were merely satisficing on PS problems after meeting the 
criteria for adequacy rather than search for the optimum solution as proposed by 
Goodwin and Johnson-Laird (2005).   
The decision to re-run the transitive inference experiments was motivated by three 
things; first, the observed mean for experiment 2 was considerably lower than the 
available norm, and the mean, and the lack of results may have been due to participants 
not having the cognitive ability to carry out this search.  It is generally accepted that 
ability is a good predictor of logically correct performance on a number of reasoning 
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tasks, and this is discussed in more detail in chapter 1.  Second, and in line with the 
argument put forward by Anderson (1978), participants may not have had a clear 
understanding of the content and format of the spatial compositions used for the 
problems, which in turn may have led to interpretational problems.  Third, it has been 
found by Prowse et al. (2009), that immediate feedback is more effective in remedying 
some of the systematic misunderstandings found in reasoning tasks, which in turn 
leads to improved performance; although it is acknowledge that improved performance 
does not necessarily mean that people are searching for counterexamples.   
These concerns led us to carry out a second transitive inference experiment, with a 
learning and practice phase which provided immediate feedback; more in line with the 
one used in the research carried out by Knauff et al. (1995), in terms of providing 
immediate feedback as to the correctness of responses during the practice phase.  In 
sharp contrast to experiment 2, the findings from experiment 3 provided firm support 
for our predictions (see table 6.1), when not only was there was evidence of a search 
for counterexamples in the form of an interaction between instruction and inference 
type, but there were also ability effects in that the high ability people were more able to 
discriminate between types of instruction, and between problem structures.   
The fourth experiment, which was reported in chapter 4, was the first of three 
experiments that we carried out using the conditional inference paradigm.  Experiment 
4 produced firm evidence in support of the search for counterexamples (see table 6.1), 
confirming previous research with similar aims (Schroyens, Schaeken and Handley, 
2003; Schroyens & Schaeken, 2008).  In addition we found that people with higher 
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cognitive ability were more able to discriminate between instructions of necessity, and 
instructions of possibility.  In chapter 4, we also reported a three way interaction, 
confirming the predictions made, that it was people with higher cognitive ability who 
were more likely to search for counterexamples.   
The first of the two experiments reported in chapter 5, introduced another factor, in 
that we varied the number of alternative causes to the rule under consideration that 
could be accessed from people’s everyday knowledge of the world.  Early research by 
Cummings et al. (1995; 1991; De Neys et al., 2003) found the inferences that people 
were prepared to make could be suppressed by manipulating the number of alternative 
causes retrievable from the everyday experiences that people have.  We confirmed 
these predictions which were based on this previous research, and found there to be 
significantly more endorsements of inferences with few alternative causes, than 
inferences with many alternative causes (see table 6.1).  In addition we found that 
higher ability people were more able to discriminate between types of instruction, and 
Necessary and PS inference types (see table 6.1).  We also found firm evidence to 
support the prediction that a search would be carried out for counterexamples across 
few and many alternative causes (see table 6.1), and as we reported in chapter 5, this 
search was more likely to be successful when there were many alternative causes, than 
when there were few alternative causes.   
Our final experiment used simple inferences, to look at the consequents from specific 
antecedents, where the emphasis was on content, rather than the interaction between 
content and logical structure (Cummins et al., 1995; 1991).  The content of the 
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inferences used in this study, were selected by carrying out a pilot study to ensure that 
the terms reflected the general perceptions that people hold about the world.  An 
example of a Necessary inference is if butter is heated it will melt, and it is generally 
agreed that there is no disabler that will enable butter to stay firm when melted.  
Alternatively, although it is highly likely that people will die if the aeroplane crashes, 
there are a small number of conditions under which this may not happen. 
Although we found no effects of ability (main effects or interactions), there was very 
strong evidence to suggest that people carried out a search for counterexamples.  This 
confirmed our predictions; and the interaction between inference and instruction 
suggests that people can discriminate between specific events that are almost certain to 
occur and those which are highly possible, which in turn interacted with instructions of 
necessity and possibility.   
The search for alternative models under possibility instructions 
In this section we will review the evidence for the search for alternative models under 
possibility instructions.  Our predictions were methodically tested across the six 
experiments as discussed in the previous section.  Our first prediction is that people 
would be more likely to endorse conclusions under possibility instructions than under 
necessity instructions, because although on PW problems it cannot be concluded that 
the conclusion under consideration is necessary, it is possible; under both types of 
instructions Impossible conclusions remain impossible.  Also, we predicted that there 
would be more endorsements of PW problems than Impossible problems, because PW 
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problems are possible under possibility instructions, but Impossible problems remain 
impossible under both types of instruction.   
The second prediction is that a search for alternative models would result in an 
interaction between instruction and problem type (Impossible and PW), because under 
necessity instructions no search for alternative models is required for either type of 
problem, but a search is required on PW problems under possibility instructions.  
Again, as discussed in chapter 2, we know that although people may not know that they 
do not need to search for alternative models on Impossible problems; we do know that 
if they search for and find alternative models on PW problems, the correct response 
will be facilitated.   
The third prediction is based on previous work (i.e. Stanovich and West, 1998a; 1998b) 
that people with higher cognitive ability would be more able to discriminate between 
the problems which were impossible (Impossible), and those which were possible 
(PW), but not supported by the first model.  Furthermore, people with higher cognitive 
ability would be more able to discriminate between the two types of instruction, and 
would generally be better performers.   
The last prediction we made, which is specific to experiment 5, is that on inferences 
with many alternative causes there would be more endorsements of PW inferences than 
Impossible inferences, because other causes are more readily available from people’s 
knowledge of the world (Cummins et al., 1995; 1991; De Neys et al., 2003).   
The endorsement rate results, in terms of effect sizes for significant main effects and 
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interactions, are summarised in table 6.2.  Consistent with previous research (i.e. Evans 
et al., 1999), and the findings from the analysis of Necessary and PS problems, we found 
across all six experiments that people were more likely to endorse conclusions about 
what they believed was possible, rather than what they believed was necessary.  We 
found this to be strongest for experiment 6, where the nature of the task required 
people to make inferences based solely on the content of the inference (see table 6.2).  
We also found that, as expected, the frequency of acceptance rates under both types of 
instruction were low, which confirms the success of the experimental manipulation.   
Furthermore, as predicted, there was a significant difference between endorsement 
rates for Impossible problems  and PW problems on all experiments apart from 
experiment 5 (every day causal inferences), which is shown in table 6.2.  The main 
effects of both instruction and problem type are strongest in the final experiment 
(simple inferences), where people merely made inferences based on their everyday 
knowledge (see table 6.2).  We suggest the lack of main effect for experiment 5, may be 
because of an unexpectedly high number of yes responses to Impossible inferences with 
many alternative causes.  We will now look at the extent to which the findings provide 
evidence to support the search for alternative models, resulting in an interaction 
between instruction and problem type; and also other interactions that were present.  
References will be made to the literature where appropriate.  
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Table 6.2 
Table of effect sizes (p2) on significant differences in endorsement rates for 
main effects and interactions - Impossible and PW problems/inferences 
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Syllogisms  .17 .46 - x  .13 - x 
Transitive 
inference (1st)  
.28 .37 - x .36 - - x 
Transitive 
inference (2nd)  
.51 .36 - x .48 .12 - x 
Abstract 
conditionals  
.43 .20 - x .24 .11 - x 
Everyday 
conditionals  
.31 - - .43 .15 .16 - .38 
Everyday 
inferences  
.85 .85 - x .89 - - x 
            *      less endorsement under necessity instructions than under possibility instructions 
            **    more rejections of Impossible problem conclusions than PW problem conclusions 
            ***  few alternative causes endorsed less frequently than many alternative causes 
 
First we will consider the results from experiment 1, which replicated and extended 
previous work by Evans et al. (1999).  There was no evidence to support the search for 
alternative models (see table 6.2).  We did, however, find an effect of ability, in that the 
higher ability people were more able to discriminate between the two types of 
instruction.  In the last section, we considered the possible explanations for the lack of 
support in the search for alternative models, in that the structural complexity of 
syllogisms may lead people to satisfice by accepting the first available model, rather 
than searching for other models to test their initial model.   
223 
 
In contrast to the results which were reported on the search for counterexamples, we 
found firm evidence from both of the transitive inference experiments to support the 
search for alternative models (see table 6.2).  Our experiment was novel within the 
transitive inference paradigm, because to our knowledge this is the first time that 
transitive inference problems have been presented under instructions of necessity and 
possibility.   
We suggested that the lack of support for the search for counterexamples under 
necessity instructions in experiment two, may have been because of overall low ability 
rates; participants having a poor understanding of the content and format of the spatial 
composition of the problems (Anderson, 1978); or the delay between providing a 
response and receiving feedback (Prowse et al., 2009).  However, given that there was 
evidence to support the search for other models under possibility instructions in both 
experiments, and that reasoning with possibility instructions is easier; the low ability of 
the sample in experiment 2 is a plausible explanation for there being evidence to 
support the search for both counterexamples and alternative models in experiment 3.  
We are not saying however that the training given in experiment 3 was ineffective, and 
similarly that the provision of immediate feedback was not beneficial, but that all or 
some of these explanations may explain the support for the mental model theory in 
experiment 3, which was not present in experiment 2.   
Our experiment using abstract conditional inferences, reported in chapter 4, produced 
firm evidence in support of the search for alternative models when the initial model 
does not support the conclusion.  These findings were novel, as other research has not 
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used possibility instructions of this type, within this paradigm.  Having said this, other 
research has used instructions of non-logical possibility within the belief bias paradigm 
(Evans et al., 2010), which included pragmatic instructions, but responses were 
recorded on a scale, rather than the yes/no binary responses used in the studies 
reported in this thesis.  We also found that people with higher cognitive ability were 
more able to discriminate between the two types of instruction, which was in line with 
one of the general predictions made. 
There was clear evidence to support our predictions relating to the effect of the number 
of alternatives causes for the scenario, when inferences with few alternative causes 
were endorsed less frequently than inferences with many alternative causes in 
experiment 5 (see table 6.2).  This suggests that the number of alternative causes 
increases the likelihood of the identification of other causal models, and is a novel 
findings, because no previous research has used problems with this type of structure.  
In addition, we found that people were more prepared to endorse inferences with 
many alternative causes than those with few alternative causes, when the inferences 
were presented under instructions of possibility, which again is a novel finding.   
There was also firm evidence of a search for alternative models across both causal 
groups, which is in contrast to when PS inferences were presented under necessity 
instructions, when the effect was only present when there were many alternative 
causes (see table 6.2).  The only ability effect was that the higher ability people were 
more discriminating between the two types of instruction.    
We found strong evidence from experiment 6 for the search for alternative models, as 
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shown in table 6.2, this is another novel finding, where our aim was to look at the 
consequents from specific antecedents, to confirm the effect of everyday content on the 
inferences that people are prepared to make.  In line with the analysis on Necessary 
and PS inferences, there was no effect of ability, but the findings do confirm that people 
are able to discriminate between events that are rarely going to occur or impossible 
events under different types of instruction.  For example it is unlikely that students will 
be disappointed if a lecture if cancelled, although it is slightly possible; on the other hand 
people are rarely inclined to endorse the inference if it is night time, it will be sunny. 
Individual differences in cognitive ability 
In the first chapter it was pointed out that some researchers have highlighted the need 
to develop a clearer understanding of individual differences in reasoning behaviours.  
The introduction of a measure of cognitive ability was used for all of the experiments 
reported in this thesis, but while there is some evidence to suggest that the search for 
alternative models was mediated by cognitive ability, there was no clear pattern, and 
our findings were inconsistent across the six experiments. 
The predictions we made across all six of the experiments, were that people with 
higher cognitive ability would be more likely to carry out a search for other models, 
both under necessity instructions and under possibility instructions.  These predictions 
were upheld in experiment 4 (abstract conditionals) under necessity instructions; and 
on the second transitive inference experiment under possibility instructions, where it 
was concluded that people with higher ability benefitted more from an improved 
learning and practice phase.  However, the only other ability effects were that higher 
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ability people were more able to discriminate between instructions of necessity and 
possibility and between types of problems/inferences, although this was in terms of 
modifying endorsement rates not in terms of accuracy,  
It may well be that we should think about the lack of individual differences results, in 
terms of considering whether there is a simple methodological explanation.  The 
procedure which we used to categorise participants into low and high ability groups at 
the median value of their AH4 scores, is consistent with that used in a number of other 
studies (i.e. Evans et al., 2010).   
However, it is observed that other studies have used larger sample sizes than the 60 
participants used for the experiments reported in this thesis, which allowed the sample 
to be split in such a way as to maximise ability differences.  For instance Newstead et al. 
(2004) split AH5 scores into top quartile (n = 21), middle two quartiles (n = 54) and 
bottom quartile (n = 23).  Although with hindsight this procedure have may be more 
appropriate, it was not fitting for the experiments that we have reported in this thesis.  
This is because such a division into quartiles, would have resulted in quartiles 
consisting of too few participants to make the employed analyses valid, and would have 
reduced the power of the tests to a degree whereby the chance of a type II error was 
inflated; ultimately making it difficult to detect any differences which may exist in the 
population/a larger sample.  In selecting the type of analysis, we decided to use a 
similar method to that of the study carried out by Evans et al. (1999), given that our 
first experiment was a replication and extension of that work.  This method of analysis 
was systematically employed throughout the thesis.  A possible next step for this work 
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may be to try and replicate the findings with a larger sample, which would allow the 
inclusion of ability/intelligence as a factor.   
Although the results in terms of not finding a consistent relationship between cognitive 
ability and performance across the reasoning paradigms are disappointing; we did find 
evidence that higher ability people were slightly better performers on indeterminate 
problems/inferences.  For instance on the syllogistic reasoning experiment, 
endorsement rates for PS problems under necessity instructions were 68% for the 
higher ability people, as opposed to 74% for the lower ability people (the logically 
correct response was to reject the conclusion).  Similarly, under instructions of 
possibility, they were 35% for the lower ability people, and 46% for the higher ability 
people (the correct response was yes).  This is consistent with early research studies 
which have administered a measure of cognitive ability prior to a reasoning task 
presented under necessity instructions (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007; 
Newstead et al., 2004; Evans et al., 1983; Newstead et al., 2004; Newstead et al., 1992; 
Stanovich & West, 1998b; Torrens et al., 1999).  Evans et al., Evans et al., 2007; 
Newstead et al., 2004; Newstead et al., 1992; Stanovich & West, 1998a, 1998b; Torrens 
et al., 1999) 
Reasoning times 
The predictions which we made relating to the time course of processing judgements of 
both necessity and possibility were derived from the principles that underlie the 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).  Our 
intention in recording the latencies was to enable the exploration of the deliberation 
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process or reasoning time, to see whether people were spending extra time when the 
task required a search for counterexamples or alternative models, for the provision of 
the correct normative response.  We also considered how the number of alternative 
causes affected the latencies which were collected  
However, the evidence was limited and inconsistent in relation to the predictions made, 
which were that latencies would increase when a search for alternative models was 
required, in order to evaluate the conclusion under consideration.  When considering 
the search for counterexamples, the only experiment which provided us with evidence 
to support the predictions, was the first transitive inference experiment, when people 
took longer on PS inferences under necessity instructions.  We found no evidence of 
increased latencies under instructions of possibility, but there were some other latency 
effects in that the high ability people were generally quicker on both of the transitive 
inference experiments.   
A further prediction was made on experiment 5, which used everyday conditional 
inferences with few and many alternative causes to explore the effect of the number of 
alternative causes that could be recalled from people’s everyday experience of the 
world.  We found a main effect of alternative causes on PW inferences under possibility 
instructions, whereby longer latencies were recorded when there were few alternative 
causes than when there were many alternative causes.  This is an important finding 
which confirms the predictions made, in that even when there were few other causes, 
people were still trying to find an alternative cause in order to disconfirm the 
conclusion under consideration.   
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Although measuring response times is quite common in psychology, and indeed many 
studies have successfully used this methodology to their advantage (i.e. Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005; Handley et. al., 2010; Kosinski & Cummings, 1999; Luce, 1986; 
Thompson et al., 2003) there are a number of disadvantages.  For instance, Rubinstein 
(2007) identified the differences in the speed in which participants read and think, 
reporting very noisy data blurred by the behaviour of participants who choose without 
serious deliberation.  One way around this is by increasing the sample size, to give a 
clearer picture of the relative time responses.  It may also be that although the 
materials were systematically varied across each of the experiments carried out, this 
may have been confounded by presenting the stimuli on two consecutive screens, 
rather than showing the complete problem/inference for evaluation on one screen.  It 
is possible, therefore, that there is a methodological explanation similar to the one 
considered for the lack of latency effects.   
One other factor which may have affected the latency results relates to Evans’ (2009) 
suggestion that people may approach a reasoning task in qualitatively different ways, 
depending on the materials used, for example: with the conditional inference task, it is 
assumed that people start with the major premise (if p then q), from whence they move 
towards a conclusion.  However, in syllogistic reasoning perhaps people start with the 
easier premise; in other words All of the A’s are B’s is an easier relationship to 
comprehend than Some of the B’s are not C’s, resulting in a different processing order.  
This would lead to some syllogisms being approached in different ways, depending on 
the simplicity of each premise.  A further comment which has been made (Evans et al., 
1999) is that psychology lacks a good theory of how response latencies map onto 
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cognitive processes, particularly with complex problems such as syllogisms; and 
therefore perhaps a satisfactory theoretical explanation to this question has not yet 
been found.  With the aforementioned discussion and comments in mind, the 
remainder of this chapter will focus on the findings from the endorsement rate data. 
Theoretical Implications 
The opening chapter of this thesis discussed deductive reasoning in the light of general 
reasoning theories; the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991), mental logic theories (Braine & O'Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994), the VRH (Polk 
& Newell, 1995),  dual process theories (Evans, 2008; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999), and probabilistic reasoning (Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999, 2001).  Also theories that have been developed specifically to explain 
reasoning paradigms were discussed, for instance in the case of syllogistic reasoning, 
one of the theories considered was the atmosphere effect (Woodworth & Sells, 1935).  
These theories tend to assume cognitive universality, which is the assumption that all 
individuals reason in a similar way.   
The theory that has been used as a framework in the preparation of this thesis is the 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), which has 
been the dominant theory in reasoning studies over the past two decades; although 
dual process theories (i.e. Evans, 2008; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999) now seem to be more widely used to explain 
research findings across a range of paradigms.   
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The mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) suggests 
that people first construct an internal model from the state of affairs described, second 
they try to form a parsimonious conclusion by fleshing out the initial model, and finally 
the stage that is of interest to our research, people search for alternative models 
(counterexamples) of the premises in which their putative conclusion is false.  Although 
the theory does not extend to judgements of possibility, it follows that if a statement is 
possible, but not necessarily true; when asked if a set of given premises is possible, the 
correct response is ‘yes’ because possibility calls for only a single model of the premises 
to support the conclusion, whereas necessity calls for all models of the premises to 
support the conclusion.   
In seeking to reconcile the findings with the claims made by the third stage of the 
mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), the 
predictions we made are upheld by five of the six experiments which we ran.  
Therefore, we found evidence to support our predictions from the transitive inference 
experiments, and strong evidence from the conditional inference experiments when 
inferences were presented with abstract contents, and when they were presented with 
everyday content.    
However, the support for the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991) did not extend to syllogistic reasoning, where we failed to find evidence 
that people carried out a search for counterexamples, or evidence to suggest that 
people searched for alternative models under instructions of possibility.  However, 
when preparing materials for this experiment, the main reasoning behaviours that have 
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been observed in relation to syllogistic reasoning (discussed in chapter 1) were 
considered, and taken into account, so it is not thought they had a bearing on the 
results.  Specifically, we used a range of problem structures and difficulty, and each 
category (N, PS, I and PW) had two problems from each of the four syllogistic figures 
(one a - c and one c - a direction), with one problem in each mood in a - c and c - a 
direction, thus controlling for figural and atmosphere effects, and conclusion direction.   
It is of course conceivable that some people did not understand the quantifiers all and 
some …. not and thought that each implied their converse, for example they held the 
belief that All of the A’s are B’s means the same as All of the B’s are A’s.  This is the main 
characteristic of conversion theory (Chapman & Chapman, 1959), and there is further 
discussion of this in the following section when directions for further research are 
considered. 
The VRH (Polk & Newell, 1995) offers a possible explanation for the syllogistic 
reasoning data.  The VRH (Polk and Newell, 1995) is a model theory where people 
evaluate a conclusion by repeatedly encoding the premises until a legal conclusion 
interrelating the premise terms is generated.  According to the VRH (Polk & Newell, 
1995), the default mechanism is that reasoners do not proceed past the first model, and 
emphasis on model formation is less important than in the model theory developed by 
Johnson-Laird.  Therefore within the parameters of the VRH (Polk & Newell, 1995), 
because syllogisms are linguistically more complex reasoning problems, there may be 
an increased tendency to produce errors.  However the VRH (Polk & Newell) fails to 
233 
 
provide an adequate explanation for poor performance on the other less complex 
reasoning task tasks that we have used in our research.   
The rule based theories of Rips (1994) and Braine and O’Brien (1998) assume that 
reasoning is carried out by applying rules of inference stored in a mental logic, and 
problem difficulty is accounted for in terms of the number of rules that must be applied 
and the faulty application of these rules.  Again, although rule based theories may offer 
an explanation for the syllogistic reasoning data, the nature of the tasks employed in 
transitive inference and conditional inference research are widely considered to be 
simpler, so we might expect the rules to be easier to apply, leading to a greater number 
of correct responses than we have reported throughout this thesis. 
An alternative explanation for the data, and which allows for the failure to search for 
counterexamples in the syllogistic reasoning data that we collected, is hypothetical 
thinking theory (Evans 2007a).  The theory has been referred to on a number of 
occasions throughout this thesis, and is currently gaining popularity in the reasoning 
literature (for a comprehensive review see Evans, 2007a).  Hypothetical thinking 
theory consists of three principles; the singularity principle, the relevance principle and 
the satisficing principle.  It is the third of these principles, the satisficing principle, which 
is a key component when reasoning with premises which require either a search for 
counterexamples in order to reject an initial conclusion, or a search to disconfirm an 
initial conclusion.  The satisficing principle suggests that reasoners are prepared to 
settle for what is ‘good enough; in other words, reasoners accept the first model under 
consideration, unless there is good reason to reject, modify, or replace it.  Moving past 
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this initial model requires effortful active reasoning, which is motivated by external 
factors or specific instructions which encourage extra reasoning (Evans et al., 2010). 
When considering whether hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007a) which was 
developed from research on syllogistic reasoning, is a good overall explanation for the 
data reported in this in this thesis, there were a number of reasons why we rejected 
this account.  While it is a plausible explanation for syllogistic reasoning with abstract 
content, the data from the transitive inference and conditional inference paradigms 
clearly suggest that satisficing is perhaps not as widespread as is claimed by 
hypothetical thinking theory (Evans, 2007a), and that people can and do go past the 
first possible model to find another possible model which disconfirms the initial 
preferred response.  We therefore conclude that hypothetical thinking theory, while 
offering an explanation for the syllogistic reasoning data, fails to support the data 
which we collected from the other reasoning paradigms.   
In thinking about the wider implications of the data, we make particular reference to 
experiment 5 where inference problems were presented to participants with both few 
and many alternative causes.  There was strong support for the influence of the number 
of alternative causes on the search of counterexamples, which is consistent with the 
literature (Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991), and also the influence of the number 
of alternative causes on the search for alternative models under instructions of 
possibility.  However there may be an alternative explanation for these findings in 
terms of the probability heuristics model (Oaksford & Chater, 2001), which proposes 
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that people do not employ logic at all, but rather make judgements with reference to a 
single probabilistic dimension.   
The probability heuristics model (Oaksford & Chater, 2001) suggests that errors and 
biases arise because people draw incorrect probabilistic inferences based on their 
knowledge of the world.  This rather complex model which is domain specific and 
composed of computational and algorithmic levels, has been found to account for 
variation in performance in a number of studies reported in the literature, and has led 
to an ongoing debate as to whether deductive reasoning and probabilistic reasoning are 
the same, or whether they are two distinct processes.  However Markovits and Handley 
(2005) carried out a study which made direct comparisons between probabilistic and 
deductive reasoning, and found convincing evidence to suggest that the two are not 
interchangeable.  On the other hand an earlier study by Liu et al. (1996) reported that 
when people were asked to rate perceived probabilities on a likert scale, most people 
treated a conditional as a probabilistic statement, concluding a probabilistic model is 
an appropriate one to adopt.  
According to a probabilistic account of reasoning, judgements of possibility and 
necessity such as those used in the studies reported in this thesis, should differ only in 
terms of where participants place the threshold for response.  Therefore under 
possibility instructions participants should generally be less sensitive in the placing of 
this threshold.  However, the findings of this thesis show an interaction between 
instruction and problem/inference type, suggesting that participants approach 
judgements of possibility and necessity in qualitatively different ways.  This is 
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consistent with recent work which suggests that deductive and inductive judgements 
are accomplished through distinct processes (Heit and Rotello, 2010, Rips, 2001).  
Directions for future research 
Although the evidence to support the search for counterexamples and alternative 
models was a fairly robust effect across the transitive inference and conditional 
inference paradigms (replicated five times across these experiments), there was no 
evidence of this in our first experiment, where people were presented with abstract 
syllogistic reasoning problems.  This is somewhat surprising, since the search for 
counterexamples is a key component of mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), which was originally developed using the syllogistic 
reasoning paradigm, and later projected as a general theory of reasoning.  The 
suggestions for future research are based on the effect of training on the terminology 
used in the transitive inference experiments reported in this thesis, and how this might 
be transferred to further explore the relationship between syllogistic reasoning with 
abstract content, training, and cognitive ability.   
The second and third experiments (transitive inference) presented in this thesis raised 
questions on which is whether people failed to search for counterexamples in 
experiment 2 because the sample had an ability rate that was 6 points below the norm 
and below the ability rate recorded in experiment 1.  Alternatively it may be that the 
participants did they did not fully understand how to interpret the terms used to 
construct the transitive inference problems; or whether they may have benefitted from 
immediate feedback during the learning and practice phase.  These concerns led to the 
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design of a second transitive inference experiment which is also reported in chapter 3.  
The second transitive inference experiment subsequently produced strong evidence to 
support both the search for counterexamples under instructions of necessity, and 
alternative models under possibility instructions.   
Evans (1972) refers to interpretational problems within reasoning studies, because of a 
misunderstanding relating to the meaning of the terms or relationships used.  Although 
it was only one of the reasons considered for the lack of evidence to support the search 
for counterexamples found in experiment 2, it may well be that by introducing a 
training phase to syllogistic reasoning experiments, based on the one used in the 
second transitive inference experiment, evidence will emerge to support the search for 
counterexamples.  This will then give us a clearer picture of the reasoning behaviours 
produced by syllogistic reasoning with abstract content.  Indeed, an early theory 
specific to syllogistic reasoning, conversion theory (Chapman & Chapman, 1959) 
suggests that some people do not understand the quantifiers all and some …. not and 
believe that each implies its converse, for example All A’s are B’s means the same as All 
B’s are A’s.  Also, early research (Henle, 1962) argues that people do not commit logical 
errors, but they merely misinterpret the premises presented to them.   
To our knowledge, no other work has focussed on designing a training phase to explore 
whether this facilitates people to search for counterexamples or alternative models in 
syllogistic reasoning.  Studies looking at the impact of training and instruction on both 
logical and statistical reasoning tasks (Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Lehman, Lempert, 
& Nisbett, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980); report significant improvements in the 
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reasoning skills of individuals after training and practice, and although the aim is not to 
improve reasoning skills per se, it is anticipated that this may also be the case.   
One key point to bear in mind when considering how best to introduce a training and 
practice phase into syllogistic reasoning studies, is that research has shown individuals 
tackle syllogistic reasoning problems in qualitatively different ways.  Ford (1995) made 
a basic distinction between verbal and spatial reasoners, which has been confirmed by 
a number of studies (i.e. Bacon 2003; Serpell, 2004), and this research has shown that 
some people adopt predominantly spatial strategies in conclusion evaluation tasks, and 
some use verbal strategies.  Notwithstanding this, there have been found to be few 
performance differences between strategy groups, despite each strategy group finding 
the other group’s strategy quite alien.  A syllogistic reasoning strategy questionnaire 
was later developed and used by Bacon (2003) and Serpell (2004), which was found to 
reliably identify strategic preferences independently of reasoning tasks. This might 
usefully be employed when developing a training phase, for presentation to 
participants prior to a series of syllogistic reasoning problems, thus avoiding cueing 
people into adopting an alien strategy.  This is a novel methodology and approach to 
individual difference in syllogistic reasoning, and to our knowledge has not been 
reported previously in the literature. 
The role of individual differences in cognitive ability, as a mediating factor in the 
effectiveness of training in deductive reasoning was extensively investigated by Neilens 
(2004); who reported that participants of higher ability were more able to understand 
and apply the principles they had been taught in order to transfer these skills and 
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knowledge to a number of reasoning and problem solving tasks.  The present 
experiments suggest that this is also the case within the transitive inference paradigm, 
since with the benefit of an improved training phase, there was evidence that the 
higher ability group were more likely to search for alternative models.  As mentioned 
previously the procedure which we used to categorise participants into low and high 
ability groups at the median value of their AH4 scores, is consistent with that used in a 
number of other studies (i.e. Evans et al., 2010).  However, our sample size was 
relatively small, and a larger sample would allow the sample to be split into quartiles, 
and to include ability/intelligence as a factor. 
Overall, the above suggestions would allow the research presented in this thesis to be 
extended to investigate whether training in quantifier interpretation leads to reasoning 
behaviours which are consistent with the third stage of the mental model theory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson Laird & Byrne, 1991), and whether these behaviours are 
linked to individual differences in cognitive ability.  This would also afford a better 
understanding of syllogistic reasoning, and add something novel to the extensive 
literature that currently exists. 
Concluding comments 
This programme of study has provided a number of novel findings to advance our 
understanding of the extent to which reasoners think about possibilities, when 
reasoning deductively under instructions of logical necessity, and under the more 
relaxed instructions of possibility.  First there was firm evidence to suggest that 
individuals can, and do search for other possibilities to the first available model, when 
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making transitive inferences, and reasoning with conditional inferences containing 
both abstract and everyday content.  There was also strong evidence confirming past 
research (Cummins, 1995), that the likelihood of a successful search being carried out 
is mediated by the number of alternative causes; as the search more frequently took 
place when an individual could access many alternative causes from their everyday 
experience of the world.   
Second, for the first time across reasoning paradigms, two other measures were 
introduced (cognitive ability and the time course of the reasoning process) to evaluate 
whether they were more sensitive in gauging whether people can and do search for 
other models, before providing a correct evaluation to a given conclusion.  While there 
was evidence that high ability people were more likely to search for counterexamples 
on abstract conditionals, and for alternative models when making transitive inferences; 
there was limited and inconsistent evidence for the predictions that if people searched 
for models they would take longer.    
The thesis also highlights the fact that syllogisms are, as many researchers believe, 
unique in terms of the reasoning behaviours that they produce.  This view is supported 
by the experimental studies which we have reported in this thesis, where we found 
evidence to support the search for counterexamples from all of our studies, except the 
first experiment which used abstract syllogistic reasoning problems.    
In conclusion, the experiments that we have carried out and reported in this thesis 
offer support for the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991), and provided some fresh insight into how individuals consider 
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possibilities, based upon the knowledge and information available at that time.  We 
believe it also leads to other avenues of research in the field of human reasoning, in 
order to facilitate and further our knowledge of what is an inherently human 
characteristic. 
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Appendix 2A 
A complete set of syllogisms together with problem type, percentage endorsement 
rates previously recorded, figure, and conclusion direction (Evans et al., 1999) 
 
 
 
First premise Second premise Conclusion Problem N* P* Figure ac-ca 
All R's are N's All N's are B's All R's are B's N 73 80 1 
a-c 
All P's are E's No D's are E's No P's are D's N 83 87 3 
All P's are M's Some A's are P's Some M's are A's N 87 87 2 
All J's are E's Some J's are not B's Some E's are not B's N 87 83 4 
All F's are T's All N's are F's All N's are T's N 80 87 2 
c-a 
All Q's are G's No B's are G's No B's are Q's N 80 80 3 
Some M's are D's All D's are P's Some P's are M's N 83 90 1 
Some R's are not D's All R's are K's Some K's are not D's N 87 90 4 
        
All M's are R's All M's are K's All R's are K's PS 70 87 4 
a-c 
No F's are E's All E's are C's No F's are C's PS 77 83 1 
Some Q's are G's All C's are G's Some Q's are C's PS 83 97 3 
All D's are N's Some P's are not D's Some N's are not P's PS 93 93 2 
All J's are T's All T's are A's All A's are J's PS 77 83 1 
c-a 
All B's are T's No B's are D's No D's are T's PS 73 90 4 
Some T's are Q's Some L's are T's Some L's are Q's PS 83 100 2 
Some J's are not P's All C's are P's Some C's are not J's PS 80 90 3 
        
All B's are L's No B's are N's All L's are N's I 7 20 4 
a-c 
All G's are K's All J's are G's No K's are J's I 3 7 2 
All R's are M's No E's are M's Some R's are E's I 7 20 3 
All C's are P's All P's are F's Some C's are not F's I 23 13 1 
No T's are D's Some T's are L's All L's are D's I 2 10 4 
c-a 
No A's are L's Some G's are L's All G's are A's I 7 3 3 
Some T's are G's All G's are K's No K's are Ts I 7 20 1 
All J's are Q's All F's are J's Some F's are not Q's I 7 20 2 
        
No N's are T's All N's are G's All T's are G's PW 0 17 4 
a-c 
Some G's are M's All R's are G's No M's are R's PW 10 20 2 
No B's are K's All K's are E's Some B's are E's PW 10 17 1 
All A's are B's All E's are B's Some A's are not E's PW 23 30 3 
Some G's are not K's All K's are J's All J's are G's PW 7 10 2 
c-a 
Some C's are L's All M's are C's No M's are L's PW 7 20 2 
All T's are P's All T's are G's Some G's are P's PW 27 17 4 
All N's are D's All F's are D's Some F's are not N's PW 17 30 3 
      * Necessity or possibility instructions 
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Appendix 2B 
Written instructions (necessity) presented to participants prior to the reasoning task 
 
 
Instructions (N) 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate how people solve logical reasoning 
problems.   
 
A number of problems will be presented on the screen one at a time.  Each problem 
consists of two statements which describe the relationship between three letters, 
followed by a conclusion.  Your task is to indicate whether the conclusion necessarily 
follows from the sentences that precede it.  A necessary conclusion is one that must be 
true, given the truth of the preceding sentences. 
 
Below are examples of the screen layouts.  First you will be shown two statements, and 
you should press the space bar to indicate your understanding of these.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
A conclusion will then be added, and your task is to decide whether this conclusion 
must be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the conclusion 
necessarily follows and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion does not necessarily follow. 
 
                             Given that                  
All of the A’s are B’s 
Some of the B’s are C’s 
                             Is it necessary that  
All of the A’s are C’s 
    
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem. 
 
Note:  Initially, you will be given two practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Given that                  
All of the A’s are B’s 
Some of the B’s are C’s 
 
Press space bar to continue 
 
 
press the space bar to continue 
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Appendix 2C 
Written instructions (possibility) presented to participants prior to the reasoning task 
 
 
Instructions (P) 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate how people solve logical reasoning 
problems.   
 
A number of problems will be presented on the screen one at a time.  Each problem 
consists of two statements which describe the relationship between three letters, 
followed by a conclusion. Your task is to indicate whether the conclusion possibly 
follows from the sentences that precede it.  A possible conclusion is one that could be 
true, given the truth of the preceding sentences. 
 
Below are examples of the screen layouts.  First you will be shown two statements, and 
you should press the space bar to indicate your understanding of these.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
A conclusion will then be added, and your task is to decide whether this conclusion 
could be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the conclusion is 
possible and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion is impossible. 
 
                              Given that                  
None of the T’s are D’s 
All of the D’s are M’s 
                              Is it possible that  
                                                                  All of the T’s are M’s 
        
    press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem. 
 
Note:  Initially, you will be given two practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed.  
Given that                  
None of the T’s are D’s 
All of the D’s are M’s 
 
Press space bar to continue 
 
 
press the spac bar to continue 
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Appendix 2D 
A breakdown of the mean percentage endorsement rates and standard deviations for 
each reasoning problem; broken down into a-c and c-a direction conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 Necessary  PS 
 a-c  c-a  a-c  c-a 
Necessary               
Low 83 (19.86)    73 (30.75)  71 (28.69)  77 (27.02) 
High 79 (27.92)  76 (2.71)  68 (30.90)  68 (38.92) 
Possibility            
Low 82 (27.80)  88 (22.50)  83 (26.53)  81 (26.82) 
High 85 (25.09)  83 (23.06)  77 (28.57)  82 (23.61) 
 
 
 
 
 Impossible  PW 
 a-c  c-a  a-c  c-a 
Necessary               
Low 22 (26.86)    23 (25.72)  23 (31.44)  41 (25.83) 
High 13 (17.04)  10 (16.87)  18 (21.71)  33 (21.92) 
Possibility            
Low 23 (26.55)  22 (23.43)  28 (24.87)  43 (23.61) 
High 28 (29.89)  27 (31.44)  39 (33.27)  53 (25.15) 
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Appendix 2E 
All ANOVA tables for experiment 1 (syllogistic reasoning) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
4166.66 
41.66 
26807.29 
1 
1 
58 
4166.67 
41.67 
462.20 
9.02 
.09 
 
.00 
.77 
 
.14 
.00 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
1760.42 
260.42 
14307.29 
1 
1 
58 
1760.42 
260.42 
246.68 
7.14 
1.06 
 
.01 
.32 
 
.11 
.02 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error instruction*problem) 
166.67 
41.66 
9713.54 
1 
1 
58 
166.67 
41.67 
167.48 
1.00 
.24 
 
.32 
.63 
 
.02 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low and 
high ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
147266.66 
375.00 
92505.21 
1 
1 
58 
142666.66 
375.00 
1594.92 
923.35 
.24 
 
.00 
.63 
 
.94 
.00 
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Appendix 2E continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Impossible and PW 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
60000.00 
166.67 
28817.71 
1 
1 
58 
60000.00 
4166.67 
496.86 
12.08 
8.39 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.17 
.13 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
11690.10 
315.10 
14010.42 
1 
1 
58 
11690.10 
315.10 
241.56 
48.40 
1.30 
 
.00 
.26 
 
.46 
.02 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error instruction*problem) 
260.42 
10.42 
11213.54 
1 
1 
58 
260.42 
10.42 
193.34 
1.35 
.05 
 
.25 
.82 
 
.02 
.00 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low 
and high ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
  Mean 
   Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
185648.44 
2.60 
65052.08 
1 
1 
58 
185648.44 
2.60 
1121.59 
165.52 
.00 
.00 
.96 
.74 
.00 
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Appendix 2E continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Necessary and PS problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
1749333.75 
98496.02 
1.79 
1 
1 
58 
1749333.75 
98496.02 
3.09 
.06 
.00 
 
.81 
.95 
 
.00 
.00 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
304878.82 
1246176.82 
2.73 
1 
1 
58 
304878.82 
1246176.82 
4708196.54 
.07 
.27 
 
.80 
.61 
 
.00 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error instruction*problem) 
358981.35 
899640.15 
2.73 
1 
1 
58 
358981.35 
899640.15 
4747409.89 
.08 
.19 
 
.78 
.67 
 
00 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
4.26 
4.38 
7.64 
1 
1 
58 
4.26 
4.38 
1.31 
323.20 
3.33 
.00 
.07 
.85 
.05 
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Appendix 2E continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Impossible and PW problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
4.22 
3669932.02 
1.22 
1 
1 
58 
4.22 
3669932.02 
2.11 
2.00 
.17 
 
.16 
.68 
 
.03 
.03 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
5551650.01 
76683.75 
3.66 
1 
1 
58 
5551650.01 
76683.75 
6307501.81 
.88 
.01 
 
.35 
.91 
 
.02 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error instruction*problem) 
7828648.82 
1.40 
2.50 
1 
1 
58 
7828648.82 
1.40 
4222831.14 
1.85 
3.32 
 
.18 
.07 
 
.03 
.05 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
3.93 
5.43 
6.19 
1 
1 
58 
3.93 
5.43 
1.07 
368.43 
5.09 
 
.00 
.03 
.86 
.08 
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Appendix 2F 
A breakdown of the mean percentage endorsement rates and standard deviations for 
a-c and c-a direction conclusions (N = 60, SD in brackets)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
a-c 
 
N 
c-a 
 
PS 
a-c 
 
PS 
c-a 
Necessary               
Low 83 (29.86)  73 (30.75)  71 (28.68)  77 (20.02) 
High 79 (27.92)  76 (29.71)  68 (30.90)  68 (38.92) 
M 81 (24.08)  75 (30.00)  69 (29.60)  72 (33.53) 
Possibility            
Low 82 (27.80)  88 (23.06)  83 (26.53)  81 (26.82) 
High 85 (25.09)  83 (22.51)  77 (28.57)  82 (23.61) 
M 83 (26.31)  85 (22.69)  80 (27.54)  81 (25.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
a-c 
 
I 
c-a 
 
PW 
a-c 
 
PW 
c-a 
Necessary            
Low 21 (26.86)  23 (25.72)  2 (31.44)  41 (25.83) 
High 13 (17.04)  10 (16.87)  18 (21.71)  33 (21.92) 
M 18 (22.69)  16 (22.47)  21 (26.91)  37 (24.12) 
Possibility            
Low 23 (26.55)  22 (23.43)  28 (24.87)  43 (23.61) 
High 28 (29.89)  27 (31.44)  39 (33.72)  53 (26.04) 
M 25 (28.18)  24 (27.60)  33 (29.71)  48 (25.16) 
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Appendix 3A 
A full set of semantic descriptions of the 9 line relationships used in experiments 2 and 
3, with instructions at the beginning 
 
 
 
 
Instructions: Enter the number of the diagram to which each sentence refers, in the box 
next to it:  
 
 
 
The red line overlaps the blue line from the left  
 
 
 
 
The red line equals the blue line  
 
 
 
 
The red line is surrounded by the blue line  
 
 
 
 
The red line surrounds the blue line  
 
 
 
 
The red line touches the blue line at the right  
 
 
 
 
The red line lies to the left of the blue line  
 
 
 
The red line lies to the right of the blue line  
 
 
 
 
The red line touches the blue line at the left  
 
 
 
 
The red line overlaps the blue line from the right  
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Appendix 3B 
A full set of the 9 line relationships used in experiments 2 and 3, which was presented 
to participants with the semantic descriptions shown in appendix 3A 
 
 
 
 
1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
 
6. 
 
 
 
7. 
 
 
 
8. 
 
 
 
9. 
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Appendix 3C 
Written instructions (necessity) presented to participants, for experiment 2 and 3, 
prior to the transitive inference  
 
 
Instructions (N) 
A number of problems will be presented on the screen one at a time.  Each problem 
consists of two statements describing the relationship between a red and a green line, 
and a blue and a green line, followed by a conclusion indicating the relationship 
between the red and the blue line. Your task is to say whether the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the sentences that precede it.  A necessary conclusion is one 
that must be true, given the truth of the preceding sentences. 
 
Below are examples of the screen layouts.  First you will be shown two statements, and 
you should press the space bar to indicate your understanding of these.   
 
   
A conclusion will then be added to the screen, and your task is to decide whether this 
conclusion must be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the 
conclusion necessarily follows and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion does not necessarily 
follow. .For example: 
     
 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem.  Initially, you will be given four practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately. 
  
Given that                  
The red line surrounds the green line 
The blue line lies to the left of the green line 
 
press the space bar to continue 
Given that                  
The red line surrounds the green line 
The blue line lies to the left of the green line 
Is it necessary that 
The red line lies to the left of the blue line 
 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
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Appendix 3D 
Written instruction (possibility) presented to participants, for experiment 2 and 3, 
prior to the transitive inference  
 
 
Instructions (P) 
A number of problems will be presented on the screen one at a time.  Each problem 
consists of two statements describing the relationship between a red and a green line, 
and a blue and a green line; followed by a conclusion indicating the relationship 
between the red and the blue line. Your task is to say whether the conclusion possibly 
follows from the sentences that precede it.  A possible conclusion is one that could be 
true, given the truth of the preceding sentences. 
 
Below are examples of the screen layouts.  First you will be shown two statements, and 
you should press the space bar to indicate your understanding of these.   
 
 
 
 
A conclusion will be added to the screen, and your task is to decide whether this 
conclusion could be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the 
conclusion is possible and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion is impossible. For example: 
                    
                   Given that                  
The red line surrounds the green line 
The green line touches the blue line at the left 
                   Is it possible that 
The red line surrounds the blue line 
 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem.  Initially, you will be given four practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately. 
  
Given that                  
The red line surrounds the green line 
The green line touches the blue line at the left 
 
press the space bar to continue 
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Appendix 3E 
All ANOVA tables for experiment 2 (transitive inference) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
78.78 
52.73 
15766.93 
1 
1 
58 
78.78 
52.73 
271.84 
.29 
.19 
.59 
.66 
.00 
.00 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
4271.48 
235.03 
20766.93 
1 
1 
58 
4271.48 
235.03 
358.05 
11.93 
.66 
.00 
.42 
 
.17 
.01 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
287.11 
406.90 
13016.93 
1 
1 
59 
287.11 
406.90 
224.43 
1.28 
1.81 
.26 
.18 
 
.02 
.03 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low and 
high ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
 Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
1156828.78 
1094.40 
54225.26 
1 
1 
58 
1156828.78 
1094.40 
934.92 
1237.36 
1.17 
 
.00 
.28 
 
.95 
.02 
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Appendix 3E continued …... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Impossible and PW 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
13146.84 
1503.50 
33514.30 
1 
1 
58 
13146.84 
1503.50 
577.83 
22.75 
2.60 
 
.00 
.11 
 
.28 
.04 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
23028.05 
443.09 
40014.75 
1 
1 
58 
23028.05 
443.09 
689.91 
33.78 
.64 
 
.00 
.43 
 
.37 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
14631.26 
258.55 
261.58 
1 
1 
58 
14631.26 
258.55 
451.01 
32.44 
.57 
 
 
 
 
.36 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low 
and high ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
356456.46 
2.88 
31137.80 
1 
1 
58 
356456.46 
2.88 
36.86 
663.97 
.01 
 
.00 
.94 
 
.92 
.00 
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Appendix 3E continued …... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Necessary and PS problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
4.77 
1.61 
4.93 
1 
1 
58 
4.77 
1.61 
8.50 
.56 
1.37 
 
.46 
.25 
 
.01 
.02 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
2.78 
1.19 
1.02 
1 
1 
58 
2.78 
1.19 
1.75 
1.59 
6.77 
 
.21 
.01 
 
.03 
.11 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
4.83 
2899052.11 
6.83 
1 
1 
58 
4.83 
2899052.11 
1.18 
4.10 
2.50 
 
.05 
.62 
 
.07 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
9.64 
7.84 
6.22 
 1 
1 
58 
9.64 
7.84 
1.07 
899.83 
.73 
 
.00 
.40 
 
.94 
.01 
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Appendix 3E continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Impossible and PW problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
2.43 
8.02 
7.37 
1 
1 
58 
2.43 
8.02 
1.27 
1.91 
6.32 
 
.66 
.43 
 
.00 
.01 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
1.17 
4622040.15 
8.60 
1 
1 
58 
1.17 
4622040.15 
1.48 
7.93 
3.10 
 
.38 
.58 
 
.01 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
1.89 
4151126.31 
1.22 
1 
1 
58 
1.89 
4151126.31 
2.10 
.90 
.20 
 
.35 
.66 
 
.01 
.00 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
9.93 
1.67 
7.38 
1 
1 
58 
9.93 
1.67 
1.27 
780.83 
1.31 
 
.00 
.26 
 
.93 
.02 
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Appendix 3F  
All ANOVA tables for experiment 3 (transitive inference) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of  
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
 Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
2490.38 
4134.98 
18637.80 
1 
1 
57 
2490.38 
4134.98 
326.98 
7.62 
12.65 
 
.01 
.00 
 
.12 
.18 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
8740.41 
1926.32 
21344.33 
1 
1 
57 
8740.41 
1926.32 
374.46 
23.34 
5.14 
 
.00 
.03 
 
.29 
.08 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
3102.14 
488.26 
12075.30 
1 
1 
57 
3102.14 
488.26 
211.85 
14.64 
2.31 
 
.00 
.14 
 
.20 
.04 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low and 
high ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
1172080.49 
1198.61 
41248.43 
1 
1 
57 
1172080.49 
1198.61 
723.66 
1619.66 
1.66 
 
.00 
.20 
 
.97 
.03 
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Appendix 3F continued …… 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Impossible and PW 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
 Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
27316.32 
3011.36 
26692.39 
1 
1 
57 
27316.32 
3011.36 
468.29 
58.33 
6.43 
 
.00 
.01 
 
.51 
.10 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
20949.38 
16.50 
37600.67 
1 
1 
57 
20949.38 
16.50 
659.66 
31.76 
.03 
 
.00 
.88 
 
.36 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
22213.66 
3345.69 
24101.87 
1 
1 
57 
22213.66 
3345.69 
422.84 
.00 
.01 
 
.00 
.01 
 
.48 
.12 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low 
and high ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
265753.56 
298.95 
35448.81 
1 
1 
57 
265753.56 
298.95 
621.91 
427.32 
.48 
 
.00 
.49 
 
.88 
.01 
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Appendix 3F continued …… 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Necessary and PS problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
5.73 
2.85 
3.17 
1 
1 
57 
5.73 
2.85 
5.56 
1.03 
.51 
 
.32 
.48 
 
.02 
.01 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
7.98 
9.02 
1.19 
1 
1 
57 
7.98 
9.02 
2.09 
3.81 
4.31 
 
.06 
.04 
 
.06 
.07 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
1.38 
39111.41 
8.81 
1 
1 
57 
1.38 
39111.41 
1.55 
.90 
.96 
 
.35 
.96 
 
.02 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and 
high ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
9.34 
7.97 
1.16 
1 
1 
57 
9.34 
7.97 
2.03 
1.03 
.51 
 
.00 
.05 
 
.89 
.07 
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Appendix 3F continued …... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Impossible and PW problem 
types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
5.25 
2.17 
2.19 
1 
1 
57 
5.25 
2.17 
3.85 
1.36 
.57 
 
.25 
.46 
 
.02 
.01 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
808.75 
6839648.08 
1.12 
1 
1 
57 
808.75 
6839648.08 
1.97 
00 
.35 
 
1.00 
.59 
 
.00 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
2.08 
4058195.57 
6.48 
1 
1 
57 
2.08 
4058195.57 
1.14 
1.83 
.55 
 
.18 
.55 
 
.03 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
8.67 
4.77 
9.08 
1 
1 
57 
8.67 
4.77 
1.59 
544.22 
2.93 
 
.00 
.09 
 
.91 
.05 
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Appendix 4A 
A complete set of conditional inference problem, showing problem category and 
argument form, premise one/premise two, and conclusion 
 
 
N 
(MP) 
if the letter is an A then the number is a 2, the letter is an A the number is a 2 
if the letter is a B then the number is not an 8, the letter is a B the number is a not an 8 
if the letter is not an N then the number is a 5, the letter is not an N the number is a 5 
If the letter if not a J then the number if not a 2, the letter is not a J the number is not a 2 
     
N 
(MT) 
if the letter is a C then the number is an 8, the number is not an 8 the letter is not a C 
If the letter is a T then the number is not a 9, the number is a 9 the letter is not a T 
if the letter is not a G then the number is a 3, the number is not a 3 the letter is a G 
if the letter is not a D then the number is not a 6, the number is a 6 the letter is a D 
     
I  
(MP) 
 
if the letter is a Z then the number is a 3, the letter is a Z the number is not a 3 
if the letter is a K then the number is not a 2, the letter is a K the number is a 2 
if the letter is not an M then the number is a 6, the letter is not an M the number is not a 6 
if the letter is not an H then the number is not a 3, the letter is not an H the number is a 3 
     
I 
(MT) 
if the letter is a B then the number is a 9, the number is not a 9 the letter is a B 
if the letter is a V then the number is not an 8, the number is a 8 the letter is a V 
if the letter is not an H then the number is a 2, the number is not a 2 the letter is not an H 
if the letter is not an F then the number is not a 4, the number is a 4 the letter is not an F 
     
PS 
(AC) 
If the letter is a C then the number is a 7, the number is a 7 the letter is a C 
if the letter is a P then the number is not a 4, the number is not a 4 the letter is a P 
if the letter is not a Z then the number is a 7, the number is a 7 the letter is not a Z 
if the letter is not an F then the number is not a 5, the number is not a 5 the letter is not an F 
     
PS 
(DA) 
if the letter is an L then the number is a 5, the letter is not an L the number is not a 5 
if the letter is a D then the number is not a 7, the letter is not a D the number is a 7 
if the letter is not an L then the number is a 7, the letter is an L the number is not a 7 
if the letter is not a J then the number is not a 9, the letter is a J the number is a 9 
     
PW 
(AC) 
if the letter is a W then the number is a 6, the number is a 6 the letter is not a W 
if the letter is an R then the number is not a 3, the number is not a 3 the letter is not an R 
if the letter is not an A then the number is a 9, the number is a 9 the letter is an A 
if the letter is not an E then the number is not a 6, the number is not a 6 the letter is an E 
     
PW 
(DA) 
if the letter is a K then the number is an 8, the letter is not a K the number is an 8 
if the letter is a Y then the number is not a 4, the letter is not a Y the number is a not a 4 
If the letter is not an E then the number is a 5, the letter is an E the number is a 5 
if the letter is not a G then the number is not a 4, the letter is a G the number is not a 4 
 
279 
 
Fact:    
If the letter is a T then the number is a 4 
The letter is a T 
Is it necessary that 
The number is a 4 
Press either ‘yes’ or no’ on the keyboard 
 
Appendix 4B 
Written instructions (necessity) presented to participants prior to the reasoning task 
 
 
Instructions (N) 
A number of problems will be presented one at a time.  For each problem you will be 
shown a statement that you must consider to be true.  Following this you will be given a 
second statement, and your task is to indicate whether the conclusion necessarily 
follows from the sentence that precedes it.  A necessary conclusion is one that must be 
true, given the truth of the preceding sentence.  Below are examples of the screen 
layouts. 
 
 
 
A conclusion will then be added to the screen, and your task is to decide whether this 
conclusion must be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the 
conclusion necessarily follows and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion does not necessarily 
follow. For example: 
 
 
 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem.  Initially, you will be given four practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately.  
Fact:    
If the letter is a T then the number is a 4 
The letter is a T 
 
press the space bar to continue 
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Fact:      
If the letter is a B then the number is a 6 
the number is a 6 
Is it possible that 
The letter is a B 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
Appendix 4C 
Written instructions (possibility) presented to participants prior to the reasoning task 
 
 
Instructions (P) 
A number of problems will be presented one at a time.  For each problem you will be 
shown a statement that you must consider to be true.  Following this you will be given a 
second statement, and your task is to indicate whether the conclusion possibly follows 
from the sentence that precedes it.  A possible conclusion is one that could be true, 
given the truth of the preceding sentence.  Below are examples of the screen layouts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
A conclusion will be added to the screen.  Your task is to decide whether this conclusion 
could be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the conclusion is 
possible and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion is impossible.  For example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem.  Initially, you will be given four practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately.  
Fact:      
If the letter is a B then the number is a 6 
The number is a 6 
press the space bar to continue 
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Appendix 4D 
Breakdown of conditional inference endorsement rates into MP, MT, AC and DA 
argument forms. There were 30 participants in each ability group (SD shown in 
brackets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Necessary Possible strong 
 MP MT AC DA 
Necessary         
Low 89 (19.35) 50 (34.14) 80 (27.38) 53 (34.34) 
High 95 (12.06) 45 (30.37) 65 (36.32) 36 (33.27) 
Possibility         
Low 92 (15.16) 74 (24.11) 98 (11.24) 72 (21.51) 
High 98    (7.63) 81 (20.34) 98   (6.34) 87 (19.40) 
 
 
 
 
 Impossible Possible weak 
 MP* MT* AC* DA* 
Necessary         
Low 13 (14.31) 22 (21.51) 17 (26.53) 18 (17.55) 
High 9 (17.96) 18 (20.91) 7 (17.29) 14 (21.46) 
Possibility         
Low 13 (18.08) 36 (24.29) 33 (33.57) 42 (36.16) 
High 15 (20.34) 49 (24.11) 50 (35.96) 61 (35.77) 
                 *Conclusion presented in opposite direction 
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Appendix 4E  
All ANOVA tables for experiment 4 (abstract conditionals) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of  
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
 Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
30940.10 
3760.42 
38111.98 
1 
1 
58 
30940.10 
3760.42 
657.10 
47.09 
5.72 
 
.00 
.02 
 
.45 
.09 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
1500.00 
585.94 
10414.06 
1 
1 
58 
1500.00 
585.94 
179.55 
8.34 
3.26 
 
.01 
.08 
 
.13 
.05 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
2502.61 
1500.00 
14747.40 
1 
1 
58 
2502.61 
1500.00 
254.27 
9.84 
5.90 
 
.00 
.02 
 
.15 
.09 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low and 
high ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 1365041.67  1 1365041.67 2758.07 .00 .97 
Ability 2.60  1 2.60 .01 .94 .03 
Error 28705.72  58 494.93    
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Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Impossible and PW 
problem types (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
30940.10 
5041.67 
40424.48 
1 
1 
58 
30940.10 
5041.67 
696.97 
44.39 
7.23 
 
.00 
.01 
 
.43 
.11 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
4166.67 
210.94 
16403.65 
1 
1 
58 
4166.67 
210.94 
282.82 
14.73 
7.45 
 
.00 
.39 
 
.20 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
5752.60 
666.67 
17955.73 
1 
1 
58 
5752.60 
666.67 
309.58 
18.58 
1.49 
 
.00 
.15 
 
.24 
.05 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low 
and high ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
160166.67 
940.10 
33268.23 
1 
1 
58 
160166.67 
940.10 
573.59 
279.24 
1.64 
 
.00 
.21 
 
.83 
.03 
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Comparison of mean reasoning times between Necessary and PS problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
3635389.35 
3227700.23 
2.20 
1 
1 
58 
3635389.35 
3227700.23 
3789614.54 
.96 
.85 
 
.33 
.36 
 
.02 
.01 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
2348677.35 
1119541.90 
5.95 
1 
1 
58 
2348677.35 
1119541.90 
1025115.48 
2.30 
1.09 
 
.14 
.30 
 
.04 
.02 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
1276.51 
674266.00 
7.10 
1 
1 
58 
1276.51 
674266.00 
1223367.59 
.00 
.55 
 
9.74 
.46 
 
.00 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Necessary and PS problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
6.88 
1.95 
6.07 
1 
1 
58 
6.88 
1.95 
1.05 
657.43 
1.87 
 
.00 
.17 
 
.99 
.03 
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Comparison of mean reasoning times between Impossible and PW problem types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
629888.22 
5694227.25 
1.77 
1 
1 
58 
629888.22 
5694227.25 
3053881.75 
.21 
1.87 
 
.65 
.18 
 
.00 
.03 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
501260.45 
2992255.01 
2.50 
1 
1 
58 
501260.45 
2992255.01 
430855.68 
1.16 
4.65 
 
.29 
.04 
 
.02 
.07 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
3343.20 
531406.23 
4.92 
1 
1 
58 
3343.20 
531406.23 
848212.61 
.00 
.63 
 
.95 
.43 
 
.00 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Impossible and PW problem types (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
7.14 
1.38 
6.65 
1 
1 
58 
7.14 
1.38 
1.15 
623.56 
1.20 
 
.00 
.28 
 
.92 
.02 
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Appendix 5A 
The eight problem structures with set A for Necessary and PS, and set B for Impossible and PW (experiment 5) 
* Indicates that the conclusion was presented in the opposite direction 
 Premises  Conclusion 
N  (MP) 
Few 
Many 
If butter is heated it will melt, the butter was heated  
If a stone if kicked it will move, the stone was kicked 
the butter melted 
the stone moved 
N  (MT) 
Few 
Many 
If butter is heated it will melt, the butter did not melt  
If a stone is kicked it will move, the stone did not move 
the butter was not heated 
the stone was not kicked 
    
PS  (AC) 
Few 
Many 
If Simon cuts his finger it will bleed, Simons finger bled 
If the brake is pressed the car will slow down, the car slowed down 
Simon cut his finger 
The brake was pressed 
PS  (DA) 
Few 
Many 
If Simon cuts his finger it will bleed, Simon did not cut his finger 
If the brake is pressed the car will slow down, the brake was not pressed 
Simon’s finger did not bleed 
The car did not slow down 
    
I  (MP) 
Few 
Many 
If the paperclip touches the magnet it will stick to it, the paper clip touched the magnet 
 If the window is open the room will be cold, the window is open 
The paper clip did not stick to the magnet* 
The room was not cold* 
I  (MT) 
Few 
Many 
If the paper clip touches the magnet it will stick to it, the paper clip did not stick to it,  
If the window is open the room will be cold, the room was not cold 
The paper clip did not touch the magnet* 
The window was opened* 
    
PW  (AC) 
Few 
Many 
If water is frozen it will become ice, the water became ice 
If the mug is dropped it will break, the mug broke 
The water was not frozen* 
The mug was not dropped* 
PW  (DA) 
Few 
Many 
If water is frozen it will become ice, the water was not frozen 
If the mug is dropped it will break, the mug was not dropped 
The water became ice* 
The mug broke* 
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Appendix 5B 
The eight problem structures with set B for Necessary and PS, and set A for Impossible and PW (experiment 5) 
      * Indicates that the conclusion was presented in the opposite direction 
 Premises  Conclusion 
N  (MP) 
Few 
Many 
If the paperclip touches the magnet it will stick to it, the paper clip touched the magnet 
 If the window is open the room will be cold, the window is open 
The paper clip stuck to the magnet 
The room was cold 
N  (MT) 
Few 
Many 
If the paper clip touches the magnet it will stick to it, the paper clip did not stick to it,  
If the window is open the room will be cold, the room was not cold 
The paper clip touched the magnet 
The window was not opened 
    
PS  (AC) 
Few 
Many 
If water is frozen it will become ice, the water became ice 
If the mug is dropped it will break, the mug broke 
The water was frozen 
The mug was dropped 
PS  (DA) 
Few 
Many 
If water is frozen it will become ice, the water was not frozen 
If the mug is dropped it will break, the mug was not dropped 
The water did not became ice 
The mug did not break 
    
I  (MP) 
Few 
Many 
If butter is heated it will melt, the butter was heated  
If a stone if kicked it will move, the stone was kicked 
the butter did not melt* 
the stone did not move* 
I  (MT) 
Few 
Many 
If butter is heated it will melt, the butter did not melt  
If a stone is kicked it will move, the stone did not move 
the butter was heated* 
the stone was kicked* 
    
PW  (AC) 
Few 
Many 
If Simon cuts his finger it will bleed, Simons finger bled 
If the brake is pressed the car will slow down, the car slowed down 
Simon did not cut his finger* 
The brake was not pressed* 
PW  (DA) 
Few 
Many 
If Simon cuts his finger it will bleed, Simon did not cut his finger 
If the break is pressed the car will slow down, the brake was not pressed 
Simon’s finger bled* 
The car slowed down* 
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Fact: 
if an egg is boiled, then it will become solid 
the egg was boiled 
is it necessary that: 
          the egg was solid 
 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
Appendix 5C 
Written instructions (necessity) presented to participants, for experiment 5, prior to 
the everyday conditional inference task 
 
Instructions (N) 
A number of problems will be presented one at a time.  For each problem you will be 
shown two statements that you must consider to be true.  Following this you will be 
given a conclusion, and your task is to indicate whether the conclusion necessarily 
follows from the sentences that precede it.  A necessary conclusion is one that must 
be true, given the truth of the preceding sentence.  Below are examples of the screen 
layouts. 
 
A conclusion will then be added to the screen, and your task is to decide whether 
this conclusion must be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think 
the conclusion necessarily follows and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow. For example: 
 
 
 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem.  Initially, you will be given two practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately.  
Fact: 
if an egg is boiled, then it will become solid 
press space bar to continue 
 
the egg b co es solid 
 
press the space bar to continue 
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Fact: 
  if the gong is struck, then it will sound 
the gong was struck 
is it possible that: 
       the gong sounded 
 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
 
 
Appendix 5D 
Written instructions (possibility) presented to participants for experiment 5 prior to 
the everyday conditional inference task 
 
Instructions (P) 
A number of problems will be presented one at a time.  For each problem you will be 
shown two statements that you consider to be true.  Following this you will be given 
a conclusion, and your task is to indicate whether the conclusion possibly follows 
from the sentences that precede it.  A possible conclusion is one that could be true, 
given the truth of the preceding sentence.  Below are examples of the screen layouts.  
 
 
 
 
A conclusion will be added to the screen.  Your task is to decide whether this 
conclusion could be true.  Using the keyboard, you should press ‘yes’ if you think the 
conclusion necessarily follows and ‘no’ if you think the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow. For example: 
 
 
 
 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next problem.  Initially, you will be given two practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately. 
Fact:    
if the gong is struck, then it will sound 
 
press the space bar to continue 
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Appendix 5E 
Breakdown of conditional inference endorsement rates into MP, MT, AC and DA 
argument forms for experiment 5.  There were 30 participants in each ability group (SD 
shown in brackets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N (few)  N (many) 
 MP  MT  MP  MT 
Necessity               
Low 83 (33.05)  80 (33.73)  96 (20.34)  87 (21.30) 
High 95 (15.26)  83 (33.05)  97 (12.68)  88 (25.20) 
Possibility            
Low 100 (0)  95 (15.26)  98 (9.13)  100 (0) 
High 100 (0)  98 (9.13)  98 (9.13)  97 (12.69) 
 
 
 
 
 N (few)  N (many) 
 AC  DA  AC  DA 
Necessity               
Low 78 (33.95)  82 (27.80)  63 45.36  65 (41.83) 
 High 82 (38.25)  78 (38.69)  70 42.75  68 (38.25) 
Possibility            
 Low 100 (0)  95 (15.26)  98 (9.13)  92 (18.90) 
High 100 (0)  95 (15.26)  100 (0)  97 (12.69) 
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Appendix 5E continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
 I (few)  I (many) 
 MP*  MT*  MP*  MT* 
Necessity               
Low 18 (30.75)  12 (28.42)  27 (36.52)  27 (38.80) 
High   2 (9.13)    2 (9.18)    7 (25.37)    7 (25.37) 
Possibility            
Low 13 (26.04)  13 (22.07)  41 (43.71)  40 (44.34) 
High   3 (12.69)    7 (17.29)  38 (48.57)  37 (43.42) 
   *Opposite direction conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 PW (few)  PW (many) 
 AC*  DA*  AC*  DA* 
Necessity               
Low 3 (18.26)  10 (20.34)  10 (30.51)  5 (15.26) 
High 17 (37.91)  5 (15.26)  7 (25.37)  5 (20.13) 
Possibility            
Low 13 (34.58)  10 (20.34)  47 (50.74)  42 (41.70) 
High 17 (37.90)  30 (38.51)  50 (50.86)  53 (43.42) 
            *Opposite direction conclusion 
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Appendix 5F 
All ANOVA tables for experiment 5 (everyday causal conditionals) 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
inferences (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
36750.00 
520.83 
66322.92 
1 
1 
58 
36750.00 
520.83 
1143.50 
32.14 
.46 
.00 
.50 
.36 
.01 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
6750.00 
83.33 
23322.92 
1 
1 
58 
6750.00 
83.33 
402.12 
16.79 
.21 
 
.00 
.65 
 
.22 
.00 
 
Few/many 
Few/many*ability 
Error (few/many) 
1020.83 
20.83 
10052.08 
1 
1 
58 
1020.83 
20.83 
173.31 
5.90 
.12 
 
.02 
.73 
 
.09 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error(instruction*problem) 
4687.50 
333.33 
27635.42 
1 
1 
58 
4687.50 
333.33 
476.47 
9.84 
.70 
 
.00 
.41 
 
.15 
.00 
 
Instruction*few/many 
Instruction (few/many*ability) 
Error (instruction*few/many) 
750.00 
20.83 
972.92 
1 
1 
58 
750.00 
20.83 
156.43 
4.79 
.13 
.03 
.72 
 
.08 
.00 
Problem*few/many 
Problem*few/many*ability 
Error (problem*few/many) 
2083.33 
333.33 
6489.58 
1 
1 
58 
2083.33 
333.33 
111.89 
18.62 
2.98 
.00 
.09 
.24 
.05 
Instruction*problem*few/many 
Instruction*problem*few/many*ability 
Error (instruction*problem*few/many 
1687.50 
.00 
5373.75 
1 
1 
58 
1687.50 
.00 
92.13 
18.32 
.00 
 
.00 
1.00 
 
.24 
.00 
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Appendix 5F continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates 
between low and high ability groups on Necessary and 
PS problem types (between subjects) 
 
Sum of  
Squares 
df F Sig. 
Partial  
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
3798520.83 
1020.83 
64677.08 
1 
1 
58 
3406.37 
.92 
 
.00 
.34 
 
.98 
.02 
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Appendix 5F continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Impossible and PW 
inferences (within subjects) 
 
Sum of    
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
41255.21 
2520.83 
93880.21 
1 
1 
58 
41255.21 
2520.83 
1618.62 
25.49 
1.56 
 
.00 
.22 
 
.31 
.03 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
520.83 
7921.88 
41401.04 
1 
1 
58 
520.83 
7921.88 
713.81 
.73 
11.10 
 
.40 
.00 
 
.01 
.16 
 
Few/many 
Few/many*ability 
Error (few/many) 
34171.88 
333.33 
45026.04 
1 
1 
58 
34171.88 
333.33 
776.31 
44.02 
.43 
 
.00 
.52 
.43 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error(instruction*problem) 
5671.88 
833.33 
32838.54 
1 
1 
58 
5671.88 
833.33 
566.18 
10.19 
.15 
 
.00 
.70 
 
.15 
.00 
 
Instruction*few/many 
Instruction (few/many*ability) 
Error (instruction*few/many) 
22687.50 
255.21 
37213.54 
1 
1 
58 
22687.50 
255.21 
641.61 
35.26 
.40 
 
.00 
.53 
 
.38 
.01 
 
Problem*few/many 
Problem*few/many*ability 
Error (problem*few/many) 
630.21 
187.50 
21526.04 
1 
1 
58 
630.21 
187.50 
371.14 
1.70 
.51 
 
1.98 
.48 
 
.03 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem*few/many 
Instruction*problem*few/many*ability 
Error (instruction*problem*few/many 
1020.83 
255.21 
16067.71 
1 
1 
58 
1020.83 
255.21 
277.03 
3.69 
.92 
.06 
.02 
.06 
.02 
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Appendix 5F continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low 
and high ability groups on Necessary and PS inferences (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial  
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
180187.50 
1171.88 
80671.88 
1 
1 
58 
180187.50 
     1171.88 
     1390.89 
129.55 
.84 
 
.00 
.36 
 
.69 
.01 
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Appendix 5F continued …… 
 
 
 
  
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Necessary and PS inferences types 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
2.08 
6841858.85 
3.59 
1 
1 
58 
2.08 
6841858.85 
2.09 
3.36 
1.10 
 
.07 
.30 
 
.06 
.02 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
139571.30 
7181211.50 
1.37 
1 
1 
58 
139571.30 
7181211.50 
6841858.85 
.06 
3.04 
 
.81 
.09 
 
.00 
.05 
 
Few/many 
Few/many*ability 
Error (few/many) 
304688.20 
1774752.02 
1.71 
1 
1 
58 
304688.20 
1774752.02 
2965861.02 
.10 
.60 
 
.75 
.44 
 
.00 
01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error(instruction*problem) 
86322.85 
1183358.10 
1.14 
1 
1 
58 
86322.85 
1183358.10 
1960752.68 
.04 
.60 
 
.84 
.44 
 
.00 
.01 
 
Instruction*few/many 
Instruction (few/many*ability) 
Error (instruction*few/many) 
204476.35 
264751.10 
1.41 
1 
1 
58 
204476.35 
264751.10 
2424040.02 
.08 
.11 
 
.77 
.74 
 
.00 
.00 
 
Problem*few/many 
Problem*few/many*ability 
Error (problem*few/many) 
7736586.92 
390621.35 
1.77 
1 
1 
58 
7736586.92 
390621.35 
3054563.65 
2.53 
.13 
 
.12 
.72 
 
.04 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem*few/many 
Instruction*problem*few/many*ability 
Error (instruction*problem*few/many) 
1025362.97 
557262.55 
1.15 
1 
1 
58 
1025362.97 
557262.55 
1982234.93 
.52 
.28 
 
.48 
.60 
 
.10 
01 
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Appendix 5F continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between low and high 
ability groups on Necessary and PS inferences (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
2.02 
1.93 
1.23 
1 
1 
58 
2.02 
1.93 
2.12 
963.47 
.91 
 
.00 
.35 
 
.94 
.02 
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Appendix 5F continued ......  
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean reasoning times between Impossible and PW inferences 
(within subjects) 
 Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial  
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
1.20 
884856.00 
7.98 
1 
1 
58 
1.20 
884856.00 
1.38 
.88 
.06 
 
.35 
.80 
 
.02 
.00 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
655862.60 
660.35 
3.57 
1 
1 
58 
655862.60 
660.35 
6165916.63 
.11 
.00 
 
.75 
.99 
 
.00 
.00 
 
Few/many 
Few/many*ability 
Error (few/many) 
5.85 
1462468.80 
2.58 
1 
1 
58 
5.85 
1462468.80 
4452560.17 
13.15 
.33 
 
.00 
.60 
 
.18 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error(instruction*problem) 
20206.30 
3653506.52 
2.39 
1 
1 
58 
20206.30 
3653506.52 
4119495.32 
.01 
.89 
 
.94 
.35 
 
.00 
.02 
 
Instruction*few/many 
Instruction (few/many*ability) 
Error (instruction*few/many) 
7623756.35 
1037043 
2.64 
1 
1 
58 
7623756.35 
1037043 
4546430.94 
1.68 
2.29 
 
.20 
.64 
 
.03 
.00 
 
Problem*few/many 
Problem*few/many*ability 
Error (problem*few/many) 
430980.60 
27015.00 
3.00 
1 
1 
58 
430980.60 
27015.00 
 
.08 
.01 
 
.77 
.94 
 
.00 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem*few/many 
Instruction*problem*few/many*ability 
Error (instruction*problem*few/many 
5480763.92 
4.10 
2.48 
1 
1 
58 
5480763.92 
4.10 
 
1.28 
9.58 
 
.26 
.00 
 
.02 
.14 
 
 
  
299 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5F continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between 
low and high ability groups on Necessary and PS inferences 
(between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial  
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
3.05 
1.33 
1.89 
1 
1 
58 
3.05 
1.33 
3.26 
937.67 
4.07 
 
.00 
.05 
 
.94 
.07 
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Appendix 5G 
The mean ratings for all of the 64 inferences used in the pilot study for experiment 6 
(the shaded inferences were selected for experiment 6, as per selection criteria) 
 
 
 
 
N if water temperature falls below zero it will freeze 97.20 
N if butter is heated it will melt 96.20 
N if a person dies they will stop breathing 94.60 
N if the bucket is lowered into a dry well it will come up empty 91.40 
N if the balloon is pricked it will burst 91.40 
N if the dog has fleas it will scratch itself 91.20 
N if the Pope dies a new pope will be elected 90.90 
N if it rains heavily the streets will get wet 90.60 
N if black paint is added to white paint it will turn grey 90.50 
N if the water is carbonated it will get bubbles 90.10 
N if it has warm blood it will be a mammal 89.90 
N if Stephanie has her hair cut it will be shorter 89.60 
N if toast is overcooked  it will be black 88.30 
N if a ruler is used the line will be straight 85.00 
N if the bananas are allowed to become over-ripe they will turn brown 80.60 
N if the car runs into a brick wall it will stop 73.90 
      
    
    
    
I if water is heated to 100 degrees c it will be cold 0 
I if a ball is placed at the bottom of a slope it will roll upwards 0 
I if plastic touches a magnet it will stick to it 4 
I if the car brake is pressed the car will go faster 4.25 
I if it is night time it will be sunny 7.00 
I if she has forgotten her passport she will be able to take her flight 8.10 
I if the print cartridge is empty the printer will print 8.35 
I if oil is added to water they will mix 10.00 
I if the TV is on standby it will not be using electricity 10.20 
I if she is a vegetarian she will eat steak 10.70 
I if he is awake he will have a bad dream 10.90 
I if the door is locked and bolted it will open 11.50 
I if the lock is empty the boat will float 17.00 
I if the canoe has a hole in it it will float 17.00 
I if it is a lemon  it will taste sweet 21.60 
I if the oxygen runs out the fire will burn 21.90 
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Appendix 5G continued ......  
 
 
 
 
PS if it is foggy visibility will be poor 91.90 
PS if he swims in the Plymouth Sound in the winter he will feel cold 87.50 
PS if Camilla eats an ice-lolly her mouth will get cold 86.90 
PS if the weather is hot people will perspire 86.60 
PS if Simon cuts his finger with a sharp knife it will bleed 86.30 
PS if there is a power cut the lights will go out 86.00 
PS if the cat it content She will purr 84.50 
PS if a baby is hungry he will cry 82.50 
PS if the plant receives water and sunlight it will grow 81.10 
PS if a glass is dropped on a stone floor it will break 79.40 
PS if the aeroplane crashes people will die 70.30 
PS if the train breaks down it will be late 69.20 
PS if Sarah peels an onion her eyes will water 64.50 
PS if he has a cold he will cough or sneeze 61.40 
PS if there is no water in the vase The flowers will wilt 59.96 
PS if blotting paper gets wet it will tear 59.00 
    
    
       
    
PW if he drinks 6 pints of beer he will pass a breathalyser test 6.85 
PW if the Queen dies Beatrice will become Queen 11.30 
PW if Victoria Beckham makes a movie she will win an Oscar 15.80 
PW if his parachute fails to open the parachutist will survive 18.80 
PW if she follows a low calorie diet she will gain weight 21.30 
PW if there is an in class test all students will get 100% 24.30 
PW if she is poor she will own a BMW 24.70 
PW if Tim Henman recovers from injury he will win Wimbledon 31.30 
PW if the lecture is cancelled the students will be disappointed 31.90 
PW if Oasis release a new CD sales will be low 31.90 
PW if it is stormy weather the oil tanker will sink 36.40 
PW if the dog falls into the canal it will drown 36.50 
PW if she falls down the stairs she will break her elbow 37.50 
PW if Steve drives through red traffic lights he will be arrested 47.50 
PW if Beckham plays for England again he will be captain 51.40 
PW if the aeroplane crashes on take off some passengers will die 59.90 
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Appendix 5H 
A full set of inferences used for experiment 6 
 
 
 
 
Necessary if water temperature falls below zero, it will freeze 
if butter is heated, it will melt 
if a person dies, they will stop breathing 
if the bucket is lowered into a dry well, it will come up empty 
if the balloon is pricked, it will burst 
if the dog has fleas, it will scratch itself 
if the Pope dies, a new pope will be elected 
if it rains heavily, the streets will get wet 
 
 
PS if a cat is content, it will purr  
if a baby is hungry, he will cry 
if the plant receives water and sunlight, it will grow 
if a glass is dropped on a stone floor, it will break 
if the aeroplane crashes, people will die 
if the train breaks down, it will be late 
if Sarah peels an onion, her eyes will water 
 if he has a cold, he will cough or sneeze 
 
 
Impossible if water is heated to 100 degrees centigrade, it will be cold 
 if a ball is placed at the bottom of a slope, it will roll upwards 
if plastic touches a magnet, it will stick to it 
if the car brake is pressed, the car will go faster 
if it is night time, it will be sunny 
if has forgotten her passport, she will be able to take her flight 
if the print cartridge is empty, the printer will print 
if oil is added to water, they will mix 
  
PW if there is an in class test, all students will get 100% 
if she is poor, she will own a BMW 
if Tim Henman recovers from injury, he will win Wimbledon 
if the lecture is cancelled, the students will be disappointed 
if Oasis release a new CD, sales will be low 
if it is stormy weather, the oil tanker will sink 
If the dog falls into the canal it will drown 
she falls down the stairs, she will break her elbow 
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Appendix 5I 
Written instruction (necessity) presented to participants, for experiment 6, prior to the 
inference task 
 
Instructions (N) 
A number of problems will be presented one at a time.  For each problem you will be 
shown a statement that you must consider to be true.  Following this you will be given a 
second statement, and your task is to indicate whether the conclusion necessarily 
follows from the sentence that precedes it.  A necessary conclusion is one that must be 
true, given the truth of the preceding sentence.  Below are examples of the screen 
layouts. 
 
 
 
A conclusion will then be added to the screen, and your task is to decide whether this 
conclusion must be true. 
 
 
     
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the next 
task.  Initially, you will be given two practice problems, but please ask the experimenter at 
any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately 
Given that 
It is a lemon 
Press space bar to continue 
Given that 
It is a lemon 
is it necessary that 
It will taste sweet  
 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
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Appendix 5J  
Written instruction (possibility) presented to participants, for experiment 6, prior to 
the inference task 
 
Instructions (P) 
A number of problems will be presented one at a time.  For each problem you will be 
shown a statement that you must consider to be true.  Following this you will be given a 
second statement, and your task is to indicate whether the conclusion possibly follows 
from the sentence that precedes it.  A possible conclusion is one that could be true, 
given the truth of the preceding sentence. Below are examples of the screen layouts.   
 
 
A conclusion will be added to the screen.  Your task is to decide whether this conclusion 
could be true.   
    
    
 
 
You will then be asked to press the space bar when you are ready to continue to the 
next task.  Initially, you will be given two practice problems, but please ask the 
experimenter at any time if you are unsure on how to proceed. 
Note:  Responses are timed, and it is important that you answer the questions both 
carefully and accurately. 
  
Given that 
He cuts his finger  
Press space bar to continue 
Given that 
He cuts his finger 
is it possible that 
It will bleed  
 
press either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the keyboard 
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Appendix 5K 
All ANOVA tables for experiment 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Necessary and PS 
inferences (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
57041.68 
2.60 
32096.35 
1 
1 
58 
57041.68 
2.60 
57041.67 
103.08 
.01 
 
.00 
.95 
 
.64 
.00 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
18815.10 
93.75 
8669.27 
1 
1 
58 
18815.10 
93.75 
149.47 
125.88 
 
.63 
.00 
.43 
 
.69 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
20627.60 
166.67 
8971.35 
1 
1 
58 
20627.60 
166.67 
154.68 
133.39 
1.08 
 
.00 
.30 
 
.70 
.02 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low and 
high ability groups on Necessary and PS inferences (between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
1666666.67 
315.10 
31533.85 
1 
1 
58 
1666666.67 
315.10 
543.69 
3065.49 
.58 
 
.00 
.45 
 
.98 
.01 
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Appendix 5K continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between Impossible and PW 
inferences (within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
112666.67 
375.00 
18520.83 
1 
1 
58 
112666.67 
375.00 
319.33 
352.83 
1.17 
 
.00 
.28 
 
.86 
.02 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
69190.10 
23.48 
11723.96 
1 
1 
58 
69190.10 
23.48 
202.14 
342.29 
.12 
 
.00 
.74 
 
.86 
.00 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
70041.67 
41.67 
8197.92 
1 
1 
58 
70041.67 
41.67 
141.34 
495.54 
.30 
 
.00 
.59 
 
.90 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean percentage endorsement rates between low and 
high ability groups on Impossible and PW inferences (between 
subjects) 
 
Sum of  
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial  
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
156315.10 
210.94 
13317.71 
1 
1 
58 
156315.10 
210.94 
229.62 
680.77 
.92 
 
.00 
.34 
 
.92 
.02 
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Appendix 5K  continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean evaluation times between Necessary and PS inferences (within 
subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
   df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
2.63 
2994146.43 
5.97 
1 
1 
58 
2.63 
2994146.43 
1029229.77 
25.61 
2.90 
.00 
.09 
 
.31 
.05 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
453.41 
243389.74 
3.23 
1 
1 
58 
453.41 
243389.74 
556867.30 
.00 
.44 
 
.97 
.51 
 
.00 
.01 
 
Instruction*problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
1190992.79 
9186.89 
1.95 
1 
1 
58 
1180992.79 
9186.89 
335571.78 
3.52 
.03 
 
.07 
.87 
 
.06 
.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean evaluation times between low and high 
ability groups on Necessary and PS inferences (between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial  
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
2.82 
3.69 
2.30 
1 
1 
58 
2.82 
3.69 
3970643.61 
709.38 
9.28 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.92 
.19 
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Appendix 5K continued ...... 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean evaluation times between Impossible and PW inferences 
(within subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Instruction 
Instruction*ability 
Error (instruction) 
837240.47 
562166.00 
5.53 
1 
1 
58 
837240.47 
562166.00 
953752.47 
.88 
.59 
 
.35 
.45 
 
.02 
.01 
 
Problem 
Problem*ability 
Error (problem) 
220493.13 
107.67 
5.48 
1 
1 
58 
220493.13 
107.67 
955951.17 
.23 
.00 
 
.63 
.99 
.00 
.00 
 
Instruction* problem 
Instruction*problem*ability 
Error (instruction*problem) 
1878589.68 
379314.38 
4.80 
1 
1 
58 
1878589.68 
379314.38 
826958.89 
2.27 
.46 
 
.14 
.50 
 
.04 
.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of mean evaluation times between low and high ability 
groups on Impossible and PW inferences (between subjects) 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta2 
Intercept 
Ability 
Error 
3.89 
5.92 
1.64 
1 
1 
58 
3.89 
5.92 
2819823.15 
1379.81 
20.99 
 
.00 
.00 
 
.96 
.27 
 
 
 
 
 
